We estimate the dynamics of recommendations by financial analysts, uncovering the determinants of inertia in their recommendations. We provide overwhelming evidence that analysts revise recommendations reluctantly, introducing frictions to avoid frequent revisions. More generally, we characterize the sources underlying the infrequent revisions that analysts make. Publicly available data matter far less for explaining recommendation dynamics than do the recommendation frictions and the long‐lived information that analysts acquire but the econometrician does not observe. Estimates suggest that analysts structure recommendations strategically to generate a profitable order flow from retail traders. We provide extensive evidence that our model describes how investors believe analysts make recommendations, and that investors value private information revealed by analysts' recommendations.

We use a shock to the public scrutiny of firm subsidiary locations to investigate whether that scrutiny leads to changes in firms’ disclosure and corporate tax avoidance behavior. ActionAid International, a nonprofit activist group, levied public pressure on noncompliant U.K. firms in the FTSE 100 to comply with a rule requiring U.K. firms to disclose the location of all of their subsidiaries. We use this setting to examine whether the public pressure led scrutinized firms to increase their subsidiary disclosure, decrease tax avoidance, and reduce the use of subsidiaries in tax haven countries compared to other firms in the FTSE 100 not affected by the public pressure. The evidence suggests that the public scrutiny sufficiently changed the costs and benefits of tax avoidance such that tax expense increased for scrutinized firms. The results suggest that public pressure from outside activist groups can exert a significant influence on the behavior of large, publicly traded firms. Our findings extend prior research that has had little success documenting an empirical relation between public scrutiny of tax avoidance and firm behavior.

Hybrid financial instruments contain features of both liabilities and equity. Standard setters continue to struggle with “getting the classification right” for these complex instruments. In this paper, we experimentally test whether the features of hybrid instruments affect the credit-related judgments of experienced finance professionals, even when the hybrid instruments are already classified as liabilities or equity. Our results suggest that getting the classification right is not of primary importance for these experienced users, as they largely rely on the underlying features of the instrument to make their judgments. A second experiment shows that experienced users’ reliance on features generalizes to several features that often characterize hybrid instruments. However, we also find that experienced users vary in their beliefs about which individual features are most important in distinguishing between liabilities and equity. Together, our results highlight the importance of effective disclosure of hybrid instruments’ features

We examine voluntary disclosure and capital investment by an informed manager in an initial public offering (IPO) in the presence of informed and uninformed investors. We find that in equilibrium, disclosure is more forthcoming—and investment efficiency is lower—when a greater fraction of the investment community is already informed. Moreover, managers disclose more information when the likelihood of an information event is higher, more equity is issued, or the cost of information acquisition is lower. Investment efficiency and the expected level of underpricing are non-monotonic in the likelihood that the manager is privately informed.

Accounting measurement and disclosure rules have a significant impact on the real decisions that firms make. In this essay, we provide an analytical framework to illustrate how such real effects arise. Using this framework, we examine three specific measurement issues that remain controversial: (1) How does the measurement of investments affect a firm's investment efficiency? (2) How does the measurement and disclosure of a firm's derivative transactions affect a firm's choice of intrinsic risk exposures, risk management strategy, and the incentive to speculate? (3) How could marking‐to‐market the asset portfolios of financial institutions generate procyclical real effects? We draw upon these real effects studies to generate sharper and novel insights that we believe are useful not only for the development of accounting standards, but also for guiding future empirical research.

Relative to quantitative methods traditionally used in accounting and finance, textual analysis is substantially less precise. Thus, understanding the art is of equal importance to understanding the science. In this survey, we describe the nuances of the method and, as users of textual analysis, some of the tripwires in implementation. We also review the contemporary textual analysis literature and highlight areas of future research.

This study investigates whether fair value accounting contributes to the procyclicality of bank lending. Using banks’ approval/denial decisions on residential mortgage applications to capture banks’ supply of credit, I find no evidence that fair value accounting has procyclical effects on bank lending over the past two business cycles. I further identify two reasons for this result. First, the main accounting item distinguishing fair value accounting from historical cost accounting—unrealized gains and losses on available‐for‐sale securities—does not affect lending decisions. Second, unrealized gains and losses on available‐for‐sale securities are not procyclical, as the risk‐free interest rate rises during some expansionary periods, resulting in unrealized losses, while the risk‐free interest rate (and sometimes the default spread) falls during some recessionary periods, resulting in unrealized gains.

This paper discusses the empirical literature on the economic consequences of disclosure and financial reporting regulation, drawing on U.S. and international evidence. Given the policy relevance of research on regulation, we highlight the challenges with (1) quantifying regulatory costs and benefits, (2) measuring disclosure and reporting outcomes, and (3) drawing causal inferences from regulatory studies. Next, we discuss empirical studies that link disclosure and reporting activities to firm‐specific and market‐wide economic outcomes. Understanding these links is important when evaluating regulation. We then synthesize the empirical evidence on the economic effects of disclosure regulation and reporting standards, including the evidence on International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) adoption. Several important conclusions emerge. We generally lack evidence on market‐wide effects and externalities from regulation, yet such evidence is central to the economic justification of regulation. Moreover, evidence on causal effects of disclosure and reporting regulation is still relatively rare. We also lack evidence on the real effects of such regulation. These limitations provide many research opportunities. We conclude with several specific suggestions for future research

In the published proceedings of the first Journal of Accounting Research Conference, Vatter [1966] lamented that “Gathering direct and original facts is a tedious and difficult task, and it is not surprising that such work is avoided.” For the fiftieth JAR Conference, we introduce a framework to help researchers understand the complementary value of seven empirical methods that gather data in different ways: prestructured archives, unstructured (“hand‐collected”) archives, field studies, field experiments, surveys, laboratory studies, and laboratory experiments. The framework spells out five goals of an empirical literature and defines the seven methods according to researchers’ choices with respect to five data gathering tasks. We use the framework and examples of successful research studies in the financial reporting literature to clarify how data gathering choices affect a study's ability to achieve its goals, and conclude by showing how the complementary nature of different methods allows researchers to build a literature more effectively than they could with less diverse approaches to gathering data

We surveyed 1,638 sales executives across 40 countries regarding their companies’ likelihood of asking sales to perform real earnings management (REM) actions when earnings pressure exists. Using this information, which we refer to as companies’ REM propensities, we study how company characteristics and environmental conditions relate to the responses received. The use of cash-flow incentives for sales personnel and the distribution of interfunctional power in favor of finance rather than sales are both associated with companies’ REM propensities. In addition, we show that sales executives preemptively change their behaviors in anticipation of top management's REM requests. Sales executives working for public companies and companies in the United States reported higher levels of REM propensity. The data also support an association between REM propensity and finance–sales conflict. These findings and others are compared and contrasted with existing empirical and survey-based research on REM throughout the paper