This paper suggests that earnings announcements provide information that allows certain traders to make judgements about a firm's performance that are superior to the judgements of other traders. As a result, there may be more information asymmetry at the time of an announcement than in nonannouncement periods. More information asymmetry implies that bid–ask spreads increase, suggesting that market liquidity decreases at the time of an earnings announcement. Furthermore, informed opinions resulting from public disclosure may lead to an increase in trading volume, despite the reduction in liquidity that accompanies announcements.

We suggest that transparent bias in management disclosures may result from managers processing information in a heuristic, as distinct from Bayesian, fashion when they face imperfect or head-to-head competition. We predict that transparent bias in disclosures is positively related to the extent of head-to-head competition. In addition, when disclosure is discretionary, we show that managers who exhibit viable, heuristic behavior are less likely to disclose than managers who exhibit Bayesian behavior. Finally, when disclosure is discretionary, we show that the increase in the proportion of uninformed managers who exhibit viable, heuristic behavior encourages more disclosure by an informed manager.

We characterize the steady-state equilibrium in which informed traders who exhibit heuristic (i.e., representativeness, as opposed to Bayesian) and Bayesian behaviors achieve the same expected utility. Then, we show how the endogenous, steady-state proportion of heuristic traders is affected by the quality of public information and other exogenous features of our model. Finally, we discuss how the presence of heuristic traders potentially alters the link between improved public disclosure and market liquidity, the variance in the change in price, and market efficiency.

In addition to being a function of traditional fundamentals such as cash-flow persistence and the discount rate, the equilibrium association between a security price and a value-relevant statistic can simply be a function of what rational investors believe the association will be. We refer to this phenomenon as beliefs-driven price association (BPA). By explicitly considering the phenomenon of BPA, we show that the price response to information releases can vary over time even if the risk-free interest rate and investor preferences are static and the earnings/cash flow generating process is stable. This observation suggests, for example, that price-to-earnings associations and price volatility can vary over time even if a stable pattern of economic fundamentals suggests otherwise. The possibility of BPA suggests that measures of the cost of capital, information content, and growth prospects inferred from observed market prices will be confounded. While we do not predict when periods of BPA will arise, we provide empirically testable predictions about how prices should behave during periods of BPA. In particular, we predict that, during sufficiently long periods of high (positive or negative) BPA, price volatility, price levels, and expected returns will be higher than would be implied by a fundamental valuation framework. Finally, while BPA in the pricing of one security does not cause BPA in the pricing of other securities, the price levels of those other securities will be affected if the securities with BPA are sufficiently large relative to the market as a whole.

We analyze how analysts' forecasts relate to investor beliefs and describe the implications of these relations for price and volume reactions to earnings surprises. We show that dispersion among forecasts does not fully capture investor uncertainty. We also show how the relations between market reactions and forecast properties differ under the alternative assumptions of exogenous and endogenous private information acquisition. Finally, the analysis suggests refined tests for volume reactions at the time of an announcement. Our results indicate that the model is useful for understanding and interpreting empirical work and developing empirical tests of market reactions to announcements.

We extend a standard, rational expectation model of trade to incorporate the possibility of individual investors delegating their trades to an informed financial intermediary. In the presence of delegated trade, we show that a firm׳s risk premium is a function of both the firm׳s exposure to a common risk factor and idiosyncratic characteristics of the firm׳s information environment. We show that even in a large economy, priced risks can manifest in the form of both idiosyncratic firm characteristics and common risk factors; as a consequence, factor-based asset pricing tests cannot rule out that a particular risk is priced.

We study when it is appropriate to add a convex component such as stock options to an optimal, managerial compensation contract. We show that convexity is introduced when managers have moderate levels of relative risk aversion and decreasing absolute risk aversion. In addition, we study how convexity is affected as the distribution of outcomes becomes more skewed toward low outcomes. Here we show that while convexity increases when skewness is increased without regard to the effect on mean stock price, the opposite effect results when increases in skewness leave the mean stock price unchanged.

Using the equity market liberalization of 23 emerging market countries between 1996 and 2006, we examine how the degree of competition for a firm's shares affects the price of information asymmetry. We find evidence of a significant decline in the pricing of information asymmetry as countries remove regulatory restrictions on foreign ownership. Our study provides novel evidence on the link between the degree of competitiveness of equity markets and the price of information asymmetry. The work also furthers our understanding of the economic consequences of foreign stock ownership.

This paper examines how the ex ante level of public scrutiny influences a manager's subsequent decision to misreport. The conventional wisdom is that high levels of public scrutiny facilitate monitoring, suggesting a negative relation between scrutiny and misreporting. However, public scrutiny also increases the weight that investors place on earnings in valuing the firm. This in turn increases the benefit of misreporting, suggesting a positive relation. We formalize these two countervailing forces–“monitoring” and “valuation”–in the context of a parsimonious model of misreporting. We show that the combination of these two forces leads to a unimodal relation. Specifically, as the level of public scrutiny increases, misreporting first increases, reaches a peak, and then decreases. We find evidence of such a relation across multiple empirical measures of misreporting, multiple measures of public scrutiny, and multiple research designs.