Journal of Accounting and Economics199927(1), 1-34open access
We use an option pricing framework to model equity valuation when firms face costs associated with violating accounting-based debt covenants. Our model shows that the value of equity depends on two factors: the economic value of the firm and the probability that the firm violates the covenant. Consistent with the model's prediction that the `covenant' effect is greatest for firms near covenant violation, we find that responses to earnings that are less informative about future cash flows (losses and transitory earnings) are significant only for thrift institutions that are near violation of regulatory net worth covenants.
Journal of Accounting and Economics199928(3), 307-327
We study when it is appropriate to add a convex component such as stock options to an optimal, managerial compensation contract. We show that convexity is introduced when managers have moderate levels of relative risk aversion and decreasing absolute risk aversion. In addition, we study how convexity is affected as the distribution of outcomes becomes more skewed toward low outcomes. Here we show that while convexity increases when skewness is increased without regard to the effect on mean stock price, the opposite effect results when increases in skewness leave the mean stock price unchanged.
Journal of Accounting and Economics199926(1-3), 1-34
This paper provides an empirical assessment of the residual income valuation model proposed in Ohlson (Ohlson, J.A., 1995. Earnings, book values and dividends in security valuation. Contemporary Accounting Research 11, 661–687). We point out that existing empirical research relying on Ohlson's model is similar to past research relying explicitly on the dividend-discounting model. We establish that the key original empirical implications of Ohlson's model stem from the information dynamics that link current information to future residual income. Our empirical results generally support Ohlson's information dynamics. However, we find that our empirical implementation of Ohlson's model provides only minor improvements over existing attempts to implement the dividend-discounting model by capitalizing short-term earnings' forecasts in perpetuity.
Journal of Accounting and Economics199927(2), 229-259
Prior research on the factors influencing the use of debt covenants restricting dividends and additional borrowing is extended by considering management incentives. When alternative incentive variables are considered separately, we find covenants have a significant, negative relation to CEO cash compensation, an insignificant relation to the value of CEO equity held, and significant positive relations to both the ratio of the value of CEO equity holdings to cash compensation and the fraction of equity held by the CEO. In two-stage simultaneous equations models, only the latter is significant when jointly considered with each of the other incentive variables.
Journal of Accounting and Economics199926(1-3), 353-357
Guay (1998, Journal of Accounting and Economics, this issue) addresses potential endogeneity biases in cross-sectional studies of derivative use by examining derivative initiations. When derivatives are only part of a risk-management strategy, tests comparing derivative users versus non-users may be biased. One solution to this difficult problem is to examine an exogenous change in derivative use. Guay (1998)identifies a recent reduction in transactions costs as a potential exogenous shock to derivative use. However, if cost reductions cannot explain derivative initiations, then his analysis may not eliminate the biases in previous research. Studies isolating alternative exogenous changes in firms’ risk management strategies may provide further insights.
Journal of Accounting and Economics199927(2), 125-148open access
We identify manager/firm separations where managers quit for a new job and study abnormal returns associated with these events. Applying analyses from labor economics, we argue that the average ability of managers who resign for a similar position at another firm should be higher than that of managers who die suddenly. Controlling for age and tenure, we find that firms losing managers to other firms experience an average abnormal return of −1.51%, compared to +3.82% for firms whose managers die suddenly. We use differences in returns across groups to measure the value of differences in managerial ability.
Journal of Accounting and Economics199926(1-3), 201-235open access
We show harmonizing domestic GAAP with foreign GAAP can have deleterious effects on security market performance, specifically price informativeness and trading volume. Harmonization effects result from interaction between two forces. Direct informational effects depend on whether harmonization increases or decreases GAAP precision. Expertise acquisition effects depend on benefits and costs to foreign investors of becoming domestic GAAP experts. These countervailing forces can result in harmonization to more (less) precise GAAP increasing (decreasing) or, unexpectedly, decreasing (increasing) price informativeness and trading volume. We also observe this for a cost of capital metric. Thus, harmonization is not necessarily a desirable singular goal.
Journal of Accounting and Economics199927(1), 57-87
We examine the effect of option listing on the immediate stock-price response to earnings announcements. Contrary to prior studies using earlier data, we find firms initiating option trading after 1986 fail to exhibit a significant decline in earnings response. We then examine 420 firms initiating option trading during 1973–1993. In a series of tests controlling for market-wide effects and changing firm size we find some evidence that option listing may actually increase the stock-price response to earnings, but no evidence listing reduces the response. Both longitudinal and cross-sectional tests produce similar results.
Journal of Accounting and Economics199926(1-3), 113-142
This study tests the bonus-maximization hypothesis that managers make discretionary accrual decisions to maximize their short-term bonuses. By using the management and financial reporting database of a large conglomerate, we extend previous investigations in two ways. First, the analysis is conducted using business unit-level data, which reduces the aggregation problem that is likely to arise using firm-level data. Second, managers in this setting are paid bonuses based solely on business unit earnings. The potentially confounding effects of long-term performance and stock-based incentive compensation are thus absent. These innovations yield robust evidence consistent with Healy (1985).
Journal of Accounting and Economics199928(3), 243-267
This study investigates whether abnormal returns can be earned using public information about firms’ domestic and foreign earnings. The results indicate that the market understates foreign earnings’ persistence. As a result, it is possible to construct a zero-investment hedge portfolio that consistently earns positive returns across years. A disproportionate fraction of the positive abnormal returns to the long position is concentrated in the few days surrounding the subsequent year's quarterly earnings announcement dates. Furthermore, the abnormal returns do not appear to persist beyond the subsequent year. The results are consistent with market mispricing, and not mis-estimated risk.