Knowledge that Transforms

We study the effect of disclosure on uncertainty by examining how management earnings forecasts affect stock market volatility. Using implied volatilities from exchange-traded options prices, we find that management earnings forecasts increase short-term volatility. This effect is attributable to forecasts that convey bad news, especially when firms release forecasts sporadically rather than on a routine basis. In the longer run, market uncertainty declines after earnings are announced, regardless of whether there is a preceding earnings forecast. This decline is mitigated when the firm issues a forecast that conveys negative news, implying that these forecasts are associated with increased uncertainty.

Relative performance evaluation (RPE) in chief executive officer (CEO) compensation provides insurance against external shocks and yields a more informative measure of CEO actions. I argue that empirical evidence on the use of RPE is mixed because previous studies rely on a misspecified peer group. External shocks and flexibility in responding to the shocks are functions of, for example, the firm's technology, the complexity of the organization, and the ability to access external credit, which depend on firm size. When peers are composed of similar industry-size firms, evidence is consistent with the use of RPE in CEO compensation.

We investigate the backdating of stock option exercises. Before SOX, we find evidence that some exercises were backdated to days with low stock prices. Consistent with a tax-based incentive, these suspect exercises are more likely when the personal tax savings from backdating are higher. However, suspect CEO exercises generate average (median) estimated tax savings of 96,000 (7,000). These savings appear modest relative to the costs insiders and firms face. We find that the likelihood of a suspect exercise increases in the likelihood of option grant backdating. This suggests that agency problems associated with backdating permeate option compensation in some firms.

The revelation that scores of firms engaged in the illegal manipulation of stock options’ grant dates (i.e. “backdating”) captured much public attention. The evidence indicates that the consequences stemming from management misconduct and misrepresentation are of first-order importance in this context as shareholders of firms accused of backdating experience large negative, statistically significant abnormal returns. Furthermore, shareholders’ losses are directly related to firms’ likely culpability and the magnitude of the resulting restatements, despite the limited cash flow implications. And, tellingly, the losses are attenuated when tainted management of less successful firms is more likely to be replaced and relatively many firms become takeover targets.

We investigate the empirical relation between a firm's accounting conservatism and management's issuance of quantitative earnings forecasts. Using three measures of conservatism from prior literature, along with two aggregate measures, we find a negative association between conservatism and the frequency, specificity, and timeliness of management forecasts. The results are robust to estimating the regression in changes, using firm fixed-effects, and using a two-stage instrumental variables approach. Overall, these results suggest that accounting conservatism acts as a substitute for management forecasts by decreasing information asymmetry in the market and reducing potential litigation through the timely reporting of bad news.

Survey evidence indicates widely held managerial beliefs that earnings volatility is negatively related to earnings predictability. In addition, existing research suggests that earnings volatility is determined by economic and accounting factors, and both of these factors reduce earnings predictability. We find that the consideration of earnings volatility brings substantial improvements in the prediction of both short- and long-term earnings. Conditioning on volatility information also allows one to identify systematic errors in analyst forecasts, which implies that analysts do not fully understand the implications of earnings volatility for earnings predictability.

Cheng and Neamtiu examine whether credit rating agencies exploit market power to sell a substandard product. Their evidence is suggestive, but plausible alternative hypotheses could explain their results. Johnston, Markov and Ramnath provide first evidence on the bond and firm characteristics that determine the quantity of sell-side debt analyst coverage that a corporate bond receives. They also find that debt analysts anticipate credit rating changes and add information to markets incremental to credit ratings, suggesting debt analysts will be important to future research on bond markets. These results also suggest a method for refining tests of rating agency market power.

Several recent papers assume that private information (PIN), proposed by Easley et al. [2002. Is information risk a determinant of asset returns? Journal of Finance 57, 2185–2221; 2004. Factoring information into returns. Working Paper, Cornell University], is a determinant of stock returns. We replicate Easley et al. (2002) and show that while PIN does predict future returns in the sample they analyze, the effect is not robust to alternative specifications and time periods. There is no evidence that PIN factor loadings predict returns or that PIN factor returns reflect future GDP growth. PIN exhibits no association with implied cost of capital derived from analysts’ earnings forecasts. Overall, our findings cast doubt on whether PIN reflects information risk systematically priced by investors.

In this paper, we examine if corporate insiders have other motives for trading besides exploitation of private information. Our results show that insiders’ portfolio re-balancing objectives, tax considerations and behavioral biases play the most important role in their trading decisions. We also find that insiders who have allocated a great (small) proportion of their wealth to insider stock sell more (less) before bad news earnings disclosures. Finally, insider selling is informative for future returns among those insiders who have the greatest proportion of wealth allocated to insider stocks.

This paper provides evidence that uncontested director elections provide informative polls of investor perceptions regarding board performance. We find that higher (lower) vote approval is associated with lower (higher) stock price reactions to subsequent announcements of management turnovers. In addition, firms with low vote approval are more likely to experience CEO turnover, greater board turnover, lower CEO compensation, fewer and better-received acquisitions, and more and better-received divestitures in the future. These findings hold after controlling for other variables reflecting or determining investor perceptions, suggesting that elections not only inform as a summary statistic, but incrementally inform as well.