We examine the information environments of firms following large, non-recurring charges (“baths”). We test competing hypotheses about the consequences of a bath—a bath either improves the information environment (the transparency hypothesis) or degrades it (the opacity hypothesis). Difference-in-differences analysis suggests that after a bath (1) earnings become smoother, (2) firm-level information asymmetry decreases, and (3) stock returns become more responsive to unexpected earnings. We interpret these findings as supportive of the transparency hypothesis. We also document that the relative improvement in the information environment is greater for baths that are not voluntary, consistent with managerial obfuscation prior to the bath.

Discontinuities in earnings distributions at zero have been widely cited as evidence of earnings management but not without controversy. Recent research suggests discontinuities may be mere artifacts of certain research design choices. We find that the well-known zero-earnings discontinuity disappears soon after passage of the Sarbanes–Oxley Act (SOX) and has not returned. We also find that neither the discontinuity nor its disappearance require the effects of widely cited alternative (non-earnings management) explanations for the zero-earnings discontinuity.

We examine the global equity supply chains of U.S. multinationals to explore how tax and nontax country characteristics affect whether firms use foreign holding companies and where they locate them. We find that U.S. multinationals supply equity from headquarters to their foreign operating companies through foreign holding companies located in countries that lightly tax equity distributions. We also find that foreign holding companies tend to be located in countries with less corruption and investment risk than the countries in which the operating companies they own are located. In addition, we provide empirical evidence that the Netherlands, a well-known location for international tax planning, is a particularly popular site for foreign equity holding companies. Our findings contribute to a nascent literature that examines ownership chains in multinational companies and a larger literature on subsidiary location decisions for multinationals. The findings also provide empirical evidence that could be useful to governments in developed countries as they attempt to reform international tax policy.