This study examines the effect of the book income adjustment provision in the 1986 alternative minimum tax (AMT) on financial accounting practices. A model is developed to identify firms that are more susceptible to the book income adjustment. The changes in financial accounting practices for firms affected by the AMT are then examined. Our results indicate that firms that are likely to be affected by the book income adjustment shift timing and permanent differences across years to reduce the impact of the AMT.

We find that a firm's dividend yield has a positive impact on its common stock return that is decreasing in the level of institutional and corporate ownership, our indicator of whether the marginal investor in a firm's common stock is more likely to be a low-tax or a high-tax investor. These results suggest that (1) a dividend tax penalty is incorporated into the return on a firm's common stock and (2) both a firm's dividend policy and its ownership structure impact the size of the dividend tax penalty.

This paper examines the relationship between the ownership control status of firms and the accounting methods they adopt. The arguments of Watts and Zimmerman's positive theory are integrated with those of managerial economists to generate the prediction that management controlled firms are more likely than owner controlled firms to adopt accounting methods which increase reported earnings. This prediction is inconsistent with Fama's hypothesis that the market for managerial talent will prevent management controlled firms from acting differently than owner controlled firms. This paper compares the depreciation methods used by a sample of management and owner controlled firms for financial reporting purposes. The comparison considers and controls for the factors of firm size, leverage, and the depreciation method used for tax reporting purposes. The comparison reveals that there is a significant difference in the depreciation methods adopted by management controlled and owner controlled firms for financial reporting purposes.

With the exception of financial firms, we find no evidence that comprehensive income is more strongly associated with returns/market value or better predicts future cash flows/income than net income. Moreover, the only component of comprehensive income that improves the association between income and returns is the marketable securities adjustment. Our results do not support the claim that comprehensive income is a better measure of firm performance than net income. Our results also raise questions about the appropriateness of items included in SFAS 130 comprehensive income as well as the need for mandating uniform comprehensive income disclosures for all industries.

We provide more direct evidence on the causal relation between the quality of financial reporting and investment efficiency. We examine the investment behavior of a sample of firms that disclosed internal control weaknesses under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. We find that prior to the disclosure, these firms under-invest (over-invest) when they are financially constrained (unconstrained). More importantly, we find that after the disclosure, these firms’ investment efficiency improves significantly.

We investigate the backdating of stock option exercises. Before SOX, we find evidence that some exercises were backdated to days with low stock prices. Consistent with a tax-based incentive, these suspect exercises are more likely when the personal tax savings from backdating are higher. However, suspect CEO exercises generate average (median) estimated tax savings of 96,000 (7,000). These savings appear modest relative to the costs insiders and firms face. We find that the likelihood of a suspect exercise increases in the likelihood of option grant backdating. This suggests that agency problems associated with backdating permeate option compensation in some firms.

The Jobs and Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2003 reduced shareholder-level taxes on equity income. If shareholder-level taxation is a component of cost of equity capital, then the cost of equity capital should decrease after the Tax Act. We find that the cost of equity capital decreases by 1.02% and that the decline is smaller for firms largely held by institutional investors to whom the tax rate reduction does not apply. These results suggest that the Tax Act lowered the cost of equity capital and add further evidence to the question of whether taxes impact valuation.

This study investigates the relation between customer concentration and a supplier׳s cost of equity capital. We hypothesize that a more concentrated customer base increases a supplier׳s risk, which results in a higher cost of equity. Our results show a positive association between customer concentration and a supplier׳s cost of equity, and this relation is more pronounced for suppliers that are more likely to lose major customers or that are more prone to larger losses if they lose such customers. Further, results from a propensity score matched sample analysis and instrumental variables regressions imply that our findings are robust to accounting for endogeneity. We also provide evidence that a supplier with a concentrated base of safer government customers has a lower cost of equity. Finally, we document a positive relation between corporate customer concentration and a supplier’s cost of debt. Overall, our findings suggest that the composition and concentration of a supplier’s customer base significantly impact its financing costs.