Discrete recognition is a long-standing and ubiquitous accounting practice, but it has been widely criticized for suppressing information and inducing accounting-motivated transactions. We study a model to examine the economic consequences of shifting away from discrete recognition to a continuous measurement approach. Without manipulation, discrete recognition is less informative than the continuous approach. However, the continuous regime induces more manipulation. The equilibrium informativeness is determined by both the accounting standard and endogenous manipulation. Discrete recognition is more informative than its continuous counterpart precisely when manipulation is a severe threat. We respond to the recent call in Kothari, Ramanna, and Skinner (2010) for using positive accounting theory to explain certain long-standing accounting practices. We also discuss the model's implications for fair value accounting.

This paper investigates banks’ reporting choices in the context of bank runs. A fundamental-based run imposes market discipline on insolvent banks, but a panic-based run closes banks that could have survived with better coordination among creditors. We augment a bank-run model with the bank’s reporting choices. We show that banks with intermediate fundamentals have stronger incentive to misreport than those in the two tails. Moreover, reporting discretion reduces panic-based runs, but excessive discretion also reduces fundamental-based runs. The optimal amount of reporting discretion increases in the bank’s vulnerability to panic-based runs. Finally, a given bank’s opportunistic use of reporting discretion exerts a negative externality on other banks. Our paper answers the call by Armstrong et al. (2016) and Bushman (2016) to understand better the effects of banks’ special features on their reporting choices.

We characterize the properties of optimal accounting rules in a signaling game. An impatient firm sells shares to competitive investors. The firm can signal its private information about the fundamental by retaining a fraction of the shares. In addition, the firm can commit to disclosing information according to a set of accounting rules chosen ex ante. Information disclosure reduces signaling cost so that perfect disclosure is optimal. When perfect disclosure is impossible, the optimal accounting rule features a lower bound and a summary statistic of the fundamental. The interpretation of the lower bound is consistent with accounting conservatism, and the statistic summarizes the information most relevant to the firm׳s valuation. The justification for accounting conservatism relies on the existence of information asymmetry and the infeasibility of perfect accounting disclosure. This is consistent with the conjecture of LaFond and Watts (2008) that information asymmetry calls for accounting conservatism.

We analytically study the economic consequences of the disclosure of managerial compensation contracts in a setting where two firms, by designing compensation contracts for their respective managers, compete for a new investment opportunity. Each manager is privately informed about her firm's profitability from this investment. We find that the disclosure leads to firms' emphasizing short-term stock performance in their managers' contracts. This, in turn, induces managers to signal favorable private information via myopic overinvestment, which deters rival firms' investments and gains their own firms a competitive edge. Nonetheless, such strategic use of compensation contracts is absent when the contracts are not disclosed; under this regime, equilibrium contracts only focus on long-term outcomes. Moreover, while disclosure-mandate-induced managerial myopia erodes firm profits, it may benefit consumer and social welfare. Our theory illuminates the economic consequences of the Compensation Discussion and Analysis (CD&A) disclosure implemented in 2006.

The adoption of common accounting standards generates both a precision effect and a network effect. When firms use common standards, investors can leverage their knowledge about the standards to process more financial reports. Embedding both effects into the economic framework of Baiman and Verrecchia (1995, 1996), we study the adoption’s effects on reporting precision, firm value, and liquidity of both the switcher and the early adopter. The model helps address the identification challenge and reconcile some existing results in the empirical literature on IFRS adoption. It also generates implications for standardizing disclosure and accounting methods.

Investors in financial markets are often uncertain about the relationship intensity between firms and have to rely on firms’ disclosure of such relationship intensity. We analytically study the asset pricing implications of this relationship intensity uncertainty and how such uncertainty affects firms’ incentives to form and disclose their relationship intensities (i.e., the real implications). We find that while such disclosure has a positive price impact by increasing the expected cash flow, it also has a negative impact by reducing the diversification benefit of investing in multiple firms that have more correlated cash flows. The price impact upon relationship intensity disclosure is therefore not monotone: it increases with the expected benefit of relationship and decreases with the risk of the underlying relationship. Our analysis implies that mandatory disclosure of firm relationship intensities may both destroy relationship development and reduce investor welfare, i.e., has adverse real consequences.