We discuss “Economic Consequences of Mandatory Auditor Reporting to Bank Regulators” by Balakrishnan, De George, Ertan, and Scobie (BDES, in this issue). BDES concludes that a key benefit of mandatory auditor reporting to bank regulators is reduced bank risk, and its costs include reduced profitability from less overall and less risky lending, and higher audit costs. BDES also provides evidence on the channels through which mandatory auditor reporting links to reduced bank risk. We scrutinize BDES's analyses and inferences and suggest additional analyses to improve and deepen them. Most notably, we caution that effective bank regulation entails reducing risk for riskier banks; risk reduction for safer banks suggests regulatory overreach. Our evidence is more indicative of regulatory overreach. Thus, although BDES is an important step forward in understanding the role auditors can and do play in improving information available to key decision-makers other than through auditor reports on financial statements and internal controls, a comprehensive assessment of whether the benefits of mandatory auditor reporting to bank regulators exceed its costs is left for future research. Such an assessment is necessary before concluding whether mandatory auditor reporting leads to more effective bank regulation or regulatory overreach

We investigate the impact of reporting regulation on corporate innovation. Exploiting thresholds in Europe's regulation, we find that forcing firms to disclose financial statements reduces the number of innovating firms and the average firm's innovation spending, but it does not reduce industry-wide total innovation spending. Our results suggest that the regulation imposes proprietary costs on firms, which discourages innovation activity, especially by smaller firms. We also show that the regulation provides positive information spillovers to other firms (e.g., competitors, suppliers, and customers), especially larger ones. We complement our analysis with alternative innovation measures, including patents, and corroborate the results with an analysis of reporting changes due to an enforcement reform in Germany. In sum, the European reporting regulation has aggregate and distributional effects on corporate innovation. Importantly, it appears to concentrate innovative activities among fewer, mostly larger firms, which could reflect institutional features of our setting or more general economic forces

The events of September 11, 2001, prompted sweeping cross-border coordination efforts for securities regulators around the globe. After 9/11, the International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO) forged a nonbinding arrangement—the Multilateral Memorandum of Understanding Concerning Consultation and Cooperation and the Exchange of Information (MMoU)—that standardized the protocol for information sharing among participating securities regulators. Because regulators from different countries entered the MMoU at different times, their enlistments created a set of staggered shocks. I use these shocks to show that the resulting cross-border cooperation (a) increases cross-border enforcement and (b) reduces the cost of liquidity provision in the capital markets of participating countries. These results support the conclusion that the MMoU helps fill gaps in cross-border regulation that historically exposed investors to information asymmetry, agency costs, and expropriation risks

The paper by Bertomeu and Magee (this issue) endogenizes accounting regulation by a majority-seeking regulator and examines how the economic cycle affects mandatory reporting quality. This discussion puts the paper in the broader context of a theory of accounting regulation. Then, it focuses on crucial assumptions, including the exogenous evolution of the economy, the role of market frictions, the modeling of reporting quality, and the regulatory process and regulatory cycles, and provides suggestions for future research

We investigate a 2012 comply-or-explain regulation implemented by China’s Shanghai Stock Exchange. The regulation requires eligible firms to pay 30% of their current-year profits as cash dividends or explain the reasons why they do not meet this requirement through a public conference call. Using firms listed on the Shenzhen Stock Exchange as a control group, our difference-in-differences estimates suggest that firms subject to the regulation decreased tunneling, irrespective of whether they complied by paying or disclosing. Further analyses suggest that the reduction in tunneling is partially attributed to enhanced regulatory monitoring over explaining firms and the constraint on excess cash of paying firms. These findings offer novel policy insights into how a flexible comply-or-explain form of regulation can mitigate agency costs between controlling and minority shareholders in a weak institutional environment

I examine whether bank regulators and external auditors have conflicting effects on loan loss provision timeliness, an accounting choice associated with important economic consequences and a potential conflict between regulators and auditors. In the absence of the other group, auditors and strict regulators are each positively associated with timeliness. However, audits are negatively associated with timeliness when strict regulators are present, consistent with a conflict for which auditors are the dominating group as audited banks attain a similar level of timeliness regardless of the extent of regulatory scrutiny. Collectively, this suggests that regulators and auditors differentially influence loan loss provisions

We examine whether Regulation Fair Disclosure (Reg FD) has reduced the informativeness of analysts’ information outputs. For a sample of financial analysts’ earnings forecasts and recommendations released in a 2-year window around Reg FD's effective date, we show that in the post-Regulation FD period the absolute price impact of information disseminated by financial analysts is lower by 28%. We also show that the drop in price impact varies systematically with brokerage house and stock characteristics related to the level of selective disclosure prior to Reg FD. Based on the time-series and cross-sectional evidence we conclude that Reg FD has been effective in curtailing selective disclosure

We study the economic consequences of mandates that require bank auditors to report to bank regulators. Based on survey responses from the European Central Bank, all 28 national bank regulators within the European Union, and a review of national banking regulations, we create a novel dataset on these mandates. Exploiting the cross-sectional and time-series variation in these mandates, we find evidence that auditor reporting to bank regulators reduces bank riskiness, as measured by counterparty risk and credit spreads. We also observe a decline in problem loans and risk-weighted assets, as well as improvements in timeliness of loan loss provisions. Additional analyses suggest that mandated auditor reporting increases the effectiveness of supervisory and monitoring efforts and improves market discipline of banks. However, mandated auditor reporting comes with costs: it reduces future lending growth, risky lending, and profitability, and increases audit fees paid by shareholders

This paper addresses whether events leading to three regulatory accounting principles issued by the Federal Home Loan Bank Board affected the market value of Savings and Loan Associations (S&Ls). The market reaction to these regulations is predicted to be positive since they effectively eased minimum regulatory net worth requirements. A significant market reaction is observed for the regulation that allowed S&Ls to increase regulatory net worth by permitting appraised equity capital. However, results are inconsistent with the alternative hypothesis associated with the regulations permitting deferral of loan losses and net worth certificates

We examine how Regulation FD changed analysts' reliance on firms' public disclosure. Regulation FD is associated with a stronger analyst response to earnings announcements, management forecasts and conference calls—that is, analysts respond to these events more quickly, more frequently and with larger forecast revisions after FD. Further, following public disclosure, the decline in analyst forecast dispersion and forecast error accelerates after FD. We find no such changes either for foreign ADR firms or around several confounding events. Overall, Regulation FD levels the playing field between the analysts and individual investors, thereby promoting “fair game” property of the market