Knowledge that Transforms

We analyze the impact of easing borrower-based measures on residential mortgage credit and borrower characteristics in the Czech Republic in early 2020. This easing included a relaxation of the LTV limit and the abolition of the DTI and DSTI limits. Our findings indicate that affected households increased borrowing, purchased more expensive houses, and accepted lower collateral values. Borrowers' debt service burdens rose but were offset by income growth. We find that: (i) LTV-constrained borrowers exhibited cash-retention behavior, while DTI- and DSTI-constrained borrowers aligned with the financial accelerator motive; (ii) LTV relaxation had a greater effect in poorer counties, while the abolition of DTI and DSTI limits affected richer regions; (iii) younger borrowers were more impacted by LTV and DTI easing, whereas DSTI easing influenced older borrowers; and (iv) LTV relaxation primarily affected first-time borrowers, while the abolition of DTI and DSTI limits impacted repeat borrowers, who obtained larger mortgages and purchased more expensive properties.

Does pledging movables as collateral alter corporate borrowing? To answer this question, we study the effect of collateral law reforms on syndicated bank loans granted across nine European countries that facilitated pledging movables between 1995 and 2019, comparing them to 19 countries that did not. We differentiate firms in sectors of higher versus lower asset movability to strengthen the identification. We find that although the reforms have enabled firms in movable-intensive sectors to issue more secured loans, the average cost of the loans and the number of covenants have also increased. Channel tests suggest that banks may demand more to compensate for the potential wealth redistribution induced by newly issued secured credit, or the unique risk involved with using movables as collateral.

We find that the leverage of primary dealers has predictive power in forecasting exchange rates, but that it varies by a novel type of heterogeneity, the dealer’s headquarter jurisdiction, and over time. The leverage of foreign-headquartered dealers in the U.S. drives the predictive power for exchange rates, while it is insignificant for U.S.-headquartered dealers. We propose this heterogeneity can be explained by the relative balance sheet capacity of foreign dealers compared to domestic dealers and how that capacity changes over time with regulation. Furthermore, we document that currency market positions are stronger than cross-border lending as the channel through which leverage affects exchange rates.

Over the past 15 years, banks around the world have been confronted with substantial costs related to misconduct. In this paper, we examine the impact of provisions for misconduct costs on the behavior of UK banks. We first document that misconduct provisions have a significant and negative effect on capital ratios. Next, we show that banks whose capital is reduced by misconduct provisions decrease non-lending activities but increase lending. Lending growth is driven by profitable higher loan-to-value mortgages, which typically incur a lower capital risk-weighting compared to non-lending activities. These results suggest that when faced with a capital shock due to misconduct provisions, banks restore their capital ratios by shifting their balance sheet towards activities that optimize the ratio of profitability to risk-weighted assets.

Can bank competition help to attenuate the prevalence of zombie firms? Motivated by a stylized model, this paper studies the effect of bank competition on the formation of zombie firms in two stages: the formation of distressed firms and distressed firms obtaining zombie lending. Using China's 2009 bank entry deregulation as a quasi-natural experiment, the paper finds that bank competition lowers the probability of the formation of distressed firms, while it increases the probability of distressed firms obtaining zombie lending. Overall, bank competition decreases the formation of zombie firms. In addition, the findings show that a higher ex ante proportion of bad loans and higher probability of bad loan recovery lead to a higher probability of distressed firms receiving zombie lending. Both factors encourage banks to sustain lending to distressed firms to keep them alive and to gamble that those firms may recover in the future.

Managers often overreact to revenue fluctuations, leading to unnecessary workforce adjustments and increased training costs. This study examines how board governance influences firms’ employment sensitivity to revenue fluctuations. Analyzing global board reforms, we find that board reforms significantly reduce managerial overreaction to revenue fluctuations. Utilizing recent difference-in-differences estimators that address heterogeneous treatment effects, we ensure the robustness of our results. The reduction in employment sensitivity is more pronounced when board reforms strengthen the independence of boards and audit committees, particularly in jurisdictions with weaker board efficacy, shareholder, and employment protection legislation. Enhanced effects are observed in firms with initially lower board independence and rapid reform compliance, in entities experiencing greater information asymmetry, marked by higher labor intensity, higher pre-reform agency costs and financial constraints, and in firms led by less experienced CEOs or boards with higher male representation.