This paper considers the issue of when venture capitalists (VCs) make a partial, as opposed to a full exit, for the full range of exit vehicles. A full exit for an initial public offerings (IPO) involves a sale of all of the venture capitalist’s holdings within one year of the IPO; a partial exit involves sale of only part of the venture capitalist’s holdings within that period. A full acquisition exit involves the sale of the entire firm for cash; in a partial acquisition exit, the venture capitalist receives (often illiquid) shares in the acquiror firm instead of cash. In the case of a buyback exit (in which the entrepreneur buys out the venture capitalist) or a secondary sale, a partial exit entails a sale of only part of the venture capitalist’s holdings. A partial write-off involves a write down of the investment. We consider the determinants of full and partial venture capital exits for all five exit vehicles. We also perform a number of comparative empirical tests on samples of full and partial exits derived from a survey of Canadian and US venture capital firms. The data offer support to the central hypothesis of the paper: that the greater the degree of information asymmetry between the selling VC and the buyer, the greater the likelihood of a partial exit to signal quality. The data also indicate differences between the US and Canadian venture capital industries, and highlight the impact of legal and institutional factors on exits across countries.

This study empirically examines the effects of a regulation change on the structure and governance of leveraged buyouts (LBOs) within the Italian private equity market, whose transactions were only recently legalized. With a new data set covering approximately 85% of the buyout funds active in Italy during the period of 1999–2006, we find that a regulation that prohibits LBOs can reduce their frequency, but does not exclude them altogether. Rather, it inhibits efficient governance and distorts decision making. Overall, the data are consistent with the view that laws prohibiting LBOs result in less efficient LBO arrangements.

This paper introduces a new dataset from 100 Dutch institutional investors’ domestic and international asset private equity allocations. The data indicate that the perceived comparative dearth of regulations of private equity funds impedes institutional investor participation in private equity funds, particularly in relation to the lack of transparency. The data further indicate that the perceived importance of regulatory harmonization of institutional investors has increased Dutch institutional investor allocations to domestic and international private equity funds. The Financieel Toetsingskader (regulation of portfolio management standards such as matching of assets and liabilities) has had the most pronounced and robust effect, followed by Basel II (regulation of risk management and disclosure standards) and the International Financial Reporting Standards (regulation of reporting standards and transparency).

This paper analyzes hedge fund performance, risk, and fund flows before and after the implementation of the Dodd–Frank Act. The data indicates that, relative to non-US hedge funds, US hedge funds that are regulated under Dodd–Frank have lower fund alphas in the post-Dodd–Frank implementation period, both statistically and economically significant, while the evidence on its effect on risk (standard deviations and idiosyncratic risk) is mixed. We find evidence that there is more fund outflow (or less fund inflow) for certain US hedge fund strategies after the implementation of Dodd–Frank. We show some differences in these findings dependent on fund size and strategy. The findings are robust to difference-in-differences analyses comparing US to non-US funds.

We show that the presence of high frequency trading (HFT) has significantly mitigated the frequency and severity of end-of-day price dislocation. The effect of HFT is more pronounced on days when end of day price dislocation is more likely to be the result of market manipulation. Moreover, the effect of HFT is more pronounced than the role of trading rules, surveillance, enforcement and legal conditions in curtailing the frequency and severity of end-of-day price dislocation. We show our findings are robust to different proxies of the start of HFT by trade size, cancellation of orders, and co-location.

We document a positive effect of product market competition (PMC) on venture capital (VC) staging. Employing large tariff rate reductions as an exogenous shock to PMC, we find that large tariff reductions lead to a greater likelihood of staged financing and a larger number of financing rounds. Cross-sectional analyses reveal that the effect is stronger for entrepreneurial firms that are younger, operate in high-tech and manufacturing industries, or receive investments from less reputable and inexperienced VCs. Our findings are consistent with the notion that by mitigating business uncertainty and survival risk, VC staging acts as a complement to PMC for enhancing entrepreneurial firms’ success.

Special Purpose Acquisition Companies (SPACs) are shells initiated with the sole intent of acquiring a single privately held company. SPAC shareholders vote on this acquisition, and in this paper we identify the factors that affect approval probability. Surprisingly, the data indicate more experienced managers and boards do not enhance the probability of deal approval. Similarly, glamor underwriters and larger underwriter syndicates are less likely to be associated with successful SPACs. Further, we find a negative relation between the presence of active investor (hedge funds and private equity funds) shareholdings in a SPAC and approval probability.

Portfolio optimization using private equity is typically based on one of three indices: listed private equity, transaction-based private equity, or appraisal value-based private equity indices. However, we show that none of these indices is fully suitable for portfolio optimization. We introduce here a new benchmark index for venture capital and buyouts, which is updated monthly, adjusted for autocorrelation (de-smoothing), and available contemporaneously. We illustrate how our benchmark enables superior quantitative portfolio optimization.