The finance literature has shown that equity returns are predictable using past returns. This study extends that literature by examining bond return predictability. Using returns constructed from dealer bid prices, we find short- to intermediate-term reversals in investment grade corporate bond returns. These reversals are larger in the first half of the sample period and consistent with the predictions of dealer inventory cost models. This supports Jegadeesh and Titman’s [J. Financ. Intermed. 4 (1995) 116] assertion that daily, weekly, and monthly reversals in equity returns come from dealer inventory considerations, not behavioral biases. Finally, unlike equity returns, we find no evidence of momentum in bond returns.

This paper examines the call option values embedded in callable agency bonds. For FHLB, FNMA, and SLMA bonds, call value estimates range from 1.23% of par to 1.47% on average, which are between those for the treasury and corporate debt securities. FHLMC bonds, on the other hand, have an average call value estimate of 2.85%. Call values are significantly larger for bonds with a longer remaining maturity and greater default risk. Most interestingly, call values in the call protection period are significantly larger than those in the callable period except for the SLMA bonds, whereas previous studies on corporate debt find no significant difference in call values between these two periods. In general, call value exhibits a downward trend over time as the callable bond approaches maturity. Also, call value is inversely related to the level of interest rates. Interest rate drops are usually accompanied by an increase in call values. An analysis of the determinants of call values suggests the following conclusions. First, call values are negatively related to short-term interest rates and the slope of the yield curve, and positively related to coupon rate and remaining maturity. Second, bonds with a greater amount of call protection have smaller call values, which is in contrast with the finding in a previous study on corporate debt that call protection period has little effect on call value.

This study examines how family ownership affects the performance and capital structure of 613 Canadian firms from 1998 to 2005. In particular, we distinguish the effect of family ownership from the use of control-enhancing mechanisms. We find that freestanding family owned firms with a single share class have similar market performance than other firms based on Tobin’s q ratios, superior accounting performance based on ROA, and higher financial leverage based on debt-to-total assets. By contrast, family owned firms that use dual-class shares have valuations that are lower by 17% on average relative to widely held firms, despite having similar ROA and financial leverage.

In this paper we examine the importance of systematic equity market factors in explaining the cross-sectional variation in yield spreads on corporate debt. Based on a sample of 1771 corporate bonds over the period from January 1985 to March 1998, we find that once the default-related variables are controlled for, bond betas or sensitivities to aggregate equity market risks have very limited explanatory power. This is in contrast to [Elton, E.J., Gruber, M.J., 2001. Explaining the rate spread on corporate bonds. Journal of Finance 56, 247–277] who find that market factors tied to expected returns are predominantly important, but who do not control for these variables (i.e. the relevant variables from structural models), possibly biasing their estimates. On the other hand, our finding that the systematic factors exhibit some limited explanatory power suggests that the standard contingent claims approach may not fully apply. This finding is consistent with previous research that bond betas are not completely irrelevant once market frictions are introduced. Overall, the evidence provides empirical support for the proposition that structural models capture important elements of corporate bond yield spread determination and equity market systematic factors are by no means predominant.

We examine the relation between the overall corporate governance structure and managerial risk-taking behavior. We find that the overall governance structure has a significant impact on how managers make decisions on investment policy: strong bondholder governance motivates more low-risk investments such as capital expenditure and lower high-risk investments such as R&D expenditures, whereas weak shareholder governance (entrenched managers) leads to more R&D expenditures. Moreover, we find that the effects of governance on investment policy differ significantly between speculative and investment-grade firms. For speculative firms, strong bondholder or shareholder governance leads to more capital expenditures and low R&D investments. For investment-grade firms, strong bondholder or shareholder governance leads to low capital expenditures and an insignificant impact on R&D investments. Furthermore, financing and investment covenants exhibit strong binding power to deter risky investments. Finally, a more dependent (or a less independent) board is associated with low capital expenditures and high R&D investments.