Knowledge that Transforms

This paper provides an empirical description of the relationship between the trading system operated by a stock exchange and the trading behaviour of heterogeneous investors who use the exchange. The recent introduction of SETS in the London Stock Exchange provides an excellent opportunity to study the impact of an electronic trading system upon traders who use the exchange. Using the cost-of-carry model of futures prices we estimate (non-linearly) the transaction costs and trade speeds faced by arbitragers who take advantage of mispricing of FTSE100 futures contracts relative to the spot prices of the stocks that make up the FTSE100 stock index. We divide the sample period into pre-SETS and post-SETS sample periods and conduct a comparative study of arbitrager behaviour under different trading systems. The results indicate that there has been a significant reduction in the level of transaction costs faced by arbitragers and in the degree of transaction cost heterogeneity. Finally, generalised impulse response functions show that both spot and futures prices adjust more quickly in the post-SETS period. These results suggest that both spot and futures markets have become more efficient under SETS.

This paper examines how corporate control is exerted in companies listed on the Brussels Stock Exchange. There are several alternative corporate governance mechanisms which may play a role in disciplining poorly performing management: blockholders (holding companies, industrial companies, families and institutions), the market for partial control, debt policy, and board composition. Even if there is redundancy of substitute forms of discipline, some mechanisms may dominate. We find that top managerial turnover is strongly related to poor performance measured by stock returns, accounting earnings in relation to industry peers and dividend cuts and omissions. Tobit models reveal that there is little relation between ownership and managerial replacement, although industrial companies resort to disciplinary actions when performance is poor. When industrial companies increase their share stake or acquire a new stake in a poorly performing company, there is evidence of an increase in executive board turnover, which suggests a partial market for control. There is little relation between changes in ownership concentration held by institutions and holding companies, and disciplining. Still, high leverage and decreasing solvency and liquidity variables are also followed by increased disciplining, as are a high proportion of non-executive directors and the separation of the functions of CEO and chairman.

We study the rationality of learning and the biases in expectations in the Iowa Experimental Markets. Using novel tests developed in (Bossaerts, P., 1996. Martingale restrictions on equilibrium security prices under rational expectations and consistent beliefs. Caltech working paper; Bossaerts, P., 1997. The dynamics of equity prices in fallible markets. Caltech working paper), learning in the Iowa winner-take-all markets is found to be in accordance with the rules of conditional probability (Bayes' law). Hence, participants correctly update their beliefs using the available information. There is evidence, however, that beliefs do not satisfy the restrictions of rational expectations that they reflect the factual distribution of outcomes.

This paper demonstrates that the use of GARCH-type models for the calculation of minimum capital risk requirements (MCRRs) may lead to the production of inaccurate and therefore inefficient capital requirements. We show that this inaccuracy stems from the fact that GARCH models typically overstate the degree of persistence in return volatility. A simple modification to the model is found to improve the accuracy of MCRR estimates in both back- and out-of-sample tests. Given that internal risk management models are currently in widespread usage in some parts of the world (most notably the USA), and will soon be permitted for EC banks and investment firms, we believe that our paper should serve as a valuable caution to risk management practitioners who are using, or intend to use this popular class of models.

Over the past decade, commercial banks have devoted many resources to developing internal models to better quantify their financial risks and assign economic capital. These efforts have been recognized and encouraged by bank regulators. Recently, banks have extended these efforts into the field of credit risk modeling. However, an important question for both banks and their regulators is evaluating the accuracy of a model’s forecasts of credit losses, especially given the small number of available forecasts due to their typically long planning horizons. Using a panel data approach, we propose evaluation methods for credit risk models based on cross-sectional simulation. Specifically, models are evaluated not only on their forecasts over time, but also on their forecasts at a given point in time for simulated credit portfolios. Once the forecasts corresponding to these portfolios are generated, they can be evaluated using various statistical methods.

This paper derives the optimal size of the financial sector using a general equilibrium framework that is an extension of the paper of Holmstrom and Tirole (1997) [Quarterly Journal of Economics 112, 663–691]. We show that the financial sector has a unique optimal size relative to the size of the economy as a whole. Creating and maintaining this sector requires diversion of some physical capital from production of output to monitoring that production. However, the efficiency gain in output production brought about by monitoring warrants the diversion. It is also found that the optimal size of the financial sector is independent of the state of the economy and does not vary over the business cycle.

We investigate how banking market competition, informational opacity, and sensitivity to shocks have changed over the last three decades by examining the persistence of firm-level rents. We develop propagation mechanisms with testable implications to isolate the sources of persistence. Our analysis suggests that different processes underlie persistence at the high and low ends of the performance distribution. Our tests suggest that impediments to competition and informational opacity continue to be strong determinants of persistence; that the reduction in geographic regulatory restrictions had little effect on competitiveness; and that persistence remains sensitive to regional/macroeconomic shocks. The findings also suggest reasons for the recent record profitability of the industry.