We examine data from the mid-1980s to 2003 to investigate whether stock prices set on the Tokyo Stock Exchange for Japanese firms react more strongly to changes in credit ratings of global rating agencies than of local agencies. This offers a strong test of relative influence of the two groups of rating agencies. We hypothesize that global raters will have more influence, but given that the two global agencies, Moody’s and Standard and Poors, are headquartered in the United States, analysis of stocks of Japanese firms listed on US exchanges would confound the results to the extent there is a home bias for raters. We find that global agencies are more influential than the two major local raters, Japan Rating and Investment Information and Japan Credit Rating Agency, for rating downgrades. Thus for credit downgrades, global raters are more influential than local ones even in the local market. Consistent with previous research, we find that upgrades are benign events, and this holds true for global as well as local agencies.

Using 1,584 listed banks from 64 countries during the COVID-19 pandemic, we conduct the first broad-based international study of the effect of the pandemic on bank systemic risk. We find the pandemic has increased systemic risk across countries. The effect operates through government policy response and bank default risk channels. Additional analysis suggests that the adverse effect on systemic stability is more pronounced for large, highly leveraged, riskier, high loan-to-asset, undercapitalized, and low network centrality banks. However, this effect is moderated by formal bank regulation (e.g., deposit insurance), ownership structure (e.g., foreign and government ownership), and informal institutions (e.g., culture and trust).

We propose a continuous-time heterogeneous agent model consisting of fundamental, momentum, and contrarian traders to explain the significant time series momentum. We show that the performance of momentum strategy is determined by both time horizon and the market dominance of momentum traders. Specifically, when momentum traders are more active in the market, momentum strategies with short (long) time horizons stabilize (destabilize) the market, and meanwhile the market under-reacts (over-reacts) in short-run (long-run). This provides profit opportunity for time series momentum strategies with short horizons and reversal with long horizons. When momentum traders are less active in the market, they always lose. The results provide an insight into the profitability of time series momentum documented in recent empirical studies.

The price disparity between the A- and H-share markets for dual-listed firms in China is one of the most intriguing puzzles in the Mainland and Hong Kong financial markets. In this paper, we revisit this price disparity puzzle using the channel of parameter uncertainty. In the presence of information asymmetry and market segmentation, investors have different views on a firm’s asset volatility, and hence different valuations of the same reference firm. We estimate a structural model for equity pricing using a Bayesian approach, in which the uncertainty of investor model parameters is represented by the posterior standard deviation of the firm’s asset volatility. Our regression analysis shows that in addition to other market-based and macro factors, parameter uncertainty explains variations in price disparity.

We develop a model that predicts corporate investment level increases with investors’ optimism and that the relationship between investment level and executive compensation depends on investor sentiment and other parameters. The empirical test shows that optimism is significantly and positively related to the level of investment and that executive compensation is insignificantly related to the level of investment. The managerial share ownership is positively related to the level of investment, conditional on the degree of optimism. The empirical results suggest that executives make investment decisions that not only cater to investor sentiment but also reflect their own interest in the company.

We develop a simply theory on interest rate swaps based on the difference between bank loans and public debts. While restrictive covenants of bank loans help reduce agency costs, banks also have natural disadvantages in bearing interest rate risk due to their floating liabilities. A firm that wants a fixed-rate loan can borrow a floating-rate loan from a bank and enter an interest rate swap to hedge the interest rate risk. Consistent with our theory, we find empirically that fixed-rate swap payers generally have lower credit ratings, higher leverage ratios, higher percentages of long-term floating-rate loans, and are more likely to use bank loans than floating-rate swap payers.

Recent occurrences of financial distress to some insurers have raised questions about whether the current guaranty system is adequate to protect policyholders. Four new systems have been proposed. Using the state preference model, it was found the Stewart's national system faring the best, if it adopts uniform regulation. Based on agency theory, the pre-assessment approach and the policyholder surcharge (or premium increase) recoupment method were found to be better than the current post-assessment approach and premium tax offset method. Furthermore, uniform policy limits and regulations are recommended.

This study develops a theoretical model to analyze the asset substitution problem over insurance decisions. We find that agency conflict is related to a firm’s risk level and capital structure. In particular, at the optimal leverage, agency conflict occurs only when the risk level is relatively high, which explains why insurance covenants are typically for significant pure risks. Moreover, when the risk level is specified, agency conflict over insurance decisions occurs within a specific leverage range. This is consistent with the findings of some research on the asset substitution problem over speculative risk choices. In addition, we consider premium loadings and conclude that full hedging is not a firm’s optimal risk management strategy, contributing to the literature on optimal hedging decisions with transaction frictions. Our framework with premium loadings can also explain many insurance phenomena, such as risk retention for small losses and subsidies for catastrophe insurance.

The CARD Act restricts consumer credit card issuers’ ability to raise interest rates. We examine whether the Act influences the degree to which an issuer adjusts offered interest rates in response to changes in interest rates offered by other lenders in credit card solicitations—the price responsiveness. Using small business card offers as a control group, we find a significant decline in the price responsiveness after the Act. The decline is concentrated among other lenders’ rate reductions rather than rate increases and is more pronounced in areas with more subprime borrowers. The results underscore an unintended consequence of regulating the consumer credit market.

We model the impact of supply and demand on risk premiums in electricity futures, using daily data for 2003–2014. The model provides a satisfactory fit and allows for unspanned economic risk not embedded in futures prices. Model-implied spot risk premiums and forward biases are large, negative, highly time-varying, and exhibit plausible seasonal patterns. They differ from existing models, especially in periods of market turmoil, have not decreased in size over time, and help predict future returns. Both demand and supply have an economically significant impact on risk premiums. The risk premium associated with supply is characterized by large positive outliers.