A company’s credit default swap spread is the cost per annum for protection against a default by the company. In this paper we analyze data on credit default swap spreads collected by a credit derivatives broker. We first examine the relationship between credit default spreads and bond yields and reach conclusions on the benchmark risk-free rate used by participants in the credit derivatives market. We then carry out a series of tests to explore the extent to which credit rating announcements by Moody’s are anticipated by participants in the credit default swap market

Credit default risk for an obligor can be hedged with either a credit default swap (CDS) or a constant maturity credit default swap (CMCDS). We find strong evidence of persistent differences in the hedging cost associated with the two comparable contracts. Between 2001 and 2006, it would have been more profitable to sell CDS and buy CMCDS while after the crisis between 2008 and 2013 the opposite strategy was profitable. Panel data tests indicate that for our sample period the implied forward CDS rates are unbiased estimates of future spot CDS rates. The changes in the company implied volatility is the main determinant of trading inefficiencies, followed by the changes in GDP and in the interest rates before the crisis, and the changes in sentiment index and in the VIX after the crisis

This study finds that credit default swap (CDS) trading positively affects a firm's environmental, social, and governance (ESG) performance. This effect is more prominent in ESG strengths than ESG concerns. The proposed empirical connection remains valid across endogeneity-controlling methodologies, model specifications, and ESG performance measures. The effect is stronger for firms with stronger bank relationships, higher debt dependence, and more restrictive covenants. Furthermore, improvement in ESG performance is more pronounced for firms with more free cash flow, lower institutional ownership, and higher financial constraints. Our findings reveal the real effects of CDS trading on firm ESG performance

Credit default swap (CDS) spreads display pronounced regime specific behaviour. A Markov switching model of the determinants of changes in the iTraxx Europe indices demonstrates that they are extremely sensitive to stock volatility during periods of CDS market turbulence. But in ordinary market circumstances CDS spreads are more sensitive to stock returns than they are to stock volatility. Equity hedge ratios are three or four times larger during the turbulent period, which explains why previous research on single-regime models finds stock positions to be ineffective hedges for default swaps. Interest rate movements do not affect the financial sector iTraxx indices and they only have a significant effect on the other indices when the spreads are not excessively volatile. Raising interest rates may decrease the probability of credit spreads entering a volatile period

In this paper, we analyze the determinants and effects of credit default swap (CDS) trading initiation in the sovereign bond market. CDS trading initiation is associated with a 30–150 basis point reduction in sovereign bond yields, with greater yield reductions accruing to higher default risk economies. For countries with high default risk, rated B or lower by Standard and Poor’s, CDS initiation is also associated with significant price efficiency benefits in the underlying market. CDS trading initiation is more likely following increases in local equity index volatility, index spreads for regional and global CDS markets, or depreciation of the local currency relative to the US dollar, and decreases in a country’s ability to service foreign debt. Our results are robust to selection bias controls based on these factors

This study examines whether good and bad news have any asymmetric effect on credit default swap (CDS) spreads by decomposing equity volatility into continuous variation and signed jumps depending on the information. We find that negative jumps affect CDS spreads more significantly and economically than positive jumps even after controlling for other variables related to credit risk. This finding suggests that negative jumps in equity prices would be a credit risk factor of individual firms. Moreover, the effects of jumps on CDS spreads are more pronounced for firms with high leverage ratios and small sizes. Finally, we show that our findings remain intact even when considering the global financial crisis period and different CDS maturity terms

Under standard assumptions the reduced-form credit risk model is not capable of accurately pricing the two fundamental credit risk instruments – bonds and credit default swaps (CDS) – simultaneously. Using a data set of euro-denominated corporate bonds and CDS our paper quantifies this mispricing by calibrating such a model to bond data, and subsequently using it to price CDS, resulting in model CDS spreads up to 50% lower on average than observed in the market. An extended model is presented which includes the delivery option implicit in CDS contracts emerging since a basket of bonds is deliverable in default. By using a constant recovery rate standard models assume equal recoveries for all bonds and hence zero value for the delivery option. Contradicting this common assumption, case studies of Chapter 11 filings presented in the paper show that corporate bonds do not necessarily trade at equal levels following default. Our extension models the implied expected recovery rate of the cheapest-to-deliver bond and, applied to data, largely eliminates the mispricing. Calibrated recovery values lie between 8% and 47% for different obligors, exhibiting strong variation among rating classes and industries. A cross-sectional analysis reveals that the implied recovery parameter depends on proxies for the delivery option, primarily the number of available bonds and bond pricing errors. No evidence is found for a direct influence of the bid-ask spread, notional amount, coupon, or rating used as proxies for bond market liquidity

We evaluate the size and power of different statistical tests and adjustment methods for matching-portfolio models to detect abnormal changes in credit default swap (CDS) spreads. The sign-test generally dominates the signed-rank test in terms of size, and dominates both the t-test and the signed-rank test in terms of power. Traditional adjustment methods often lead to a misspecified sign-test. We propose a new and parsimonious method (the spread-matched method), which leads to a well-specified and more powerful sign-test. The superiority of the spread-matched method is particularly evident for observations characterized by extreme levels of CDS spread. Analyses of CDS samples differing by contract maturity, data source, and time period confirm these results. We perform an event study on rating downgrades to illustrate how the choice of tests and adjustment methods can affect inference

We document the ability of the credit default swap (CDS) market to anticipate favorable as well as unfavorable credit rating change (RC) announcements based on more extensive samples of credit rating events and CDS spreads than previous studies. We obtain four new results. In contrast to prior published studies, we find that corporate RC upgrades do have a significant impact on CDS spreads even though they are still not as well anticipated as downgrades. Second, CreditWatch (CW) and Outlook (OL) announcements, after controlling for prior credit rating events, lead to significant CARs at the time positive CW and OL credit rating events are announced. Third, we extend prior results by showing that changes in CDS spreads for non-investment-grade credits contain information useful for estimating the probability of negative credit rating events. Fourth, we find that the CDS spread impact of upgrades but not downgrades is magnified during recessions and that upgrades and downgrades also differ as to the impact of simultaneous CW/OL announcements, investment-grade/speculative-grade crossovers, current credit rating, market volatility, and industry effects

This paper analyzes the response of stock and credit default swap (CDS) markets to rating announcements made by the three major rating agencies during the period 2000–2002. Applying event study methodology, we examine whether and how strongly these markets respond to rating announcements in terms of abnormal returns and adjusted CDS spread changes. First, we find that both markets not only anticipate rating downgrades, but also reviews for downgrade by all three agencies. Second, a combined analysis of different rating events within and across agencies reveals that reviews for downgrade by Standard & Poor’s and Moody’s exhibit the largest impact on both markets. Third, the magnitude of abnormal performance in both markets is influenced by the level of the old rating, previous rating events and, only in the CDS market, by the pre-event average rating level of all agencies