One of Hungary's policies during the transition from a centrally planned to a market economy was the issue of compensation vouchers – a unique security designed both as a privatization mechanism and as a form of restitution for Hungarian citizens who suffered property losses in post-war nationalizations. The coupons were actively traded on the Budapest Stock Exchange (BSE). This paper examines the intertemporal behavior of the Hungarian voucher and equity markets in an effort to assess the efficiency of these markets and to gauge the degree of interaction between the two different assets. Evidence from variance ratio tests indicates that stock and voucher trading are each individually weakly efficient. Furthermore, vector autoregressions and cointegration methods show that there is little detectable intermarket interaction: a result which is consistent with joint efficiency. Thus, although the Hungarian equity market is small, it appears to function remarkably well.

This paper derives the optimal size of the financial sector using a general equilibrium framework that is an extension of the paper of Holmstrom and Tirole (1997) [Quarterly Journal of Economics 112, 663–691]. We show that the financial sector has a unique optimal size relative to the size of the economy as a whole. Creating and maintaining this sector requires diversion of some physical capital from production of output to monitoring that production. However, the efficiency gain in output production brought about by monitoring warrants the diversion. It is also found that the optimal size of the financial sector is independent of the state of the economy and does not vary over the business cycle.

This article presents an application of extreme value theory to compute the value at risk of a market position. In statistics, extremes of a random process refer to the lowest observation (the minimum) and to the highest observation (the maximum) over a given time-period. Extreme value theory gives some interesting results about the distribution of extreme returns. In particular, the limiting distribution of extreme returns observed over a long time-period is largely independent of the distribution of returns itself. In financial markets, extreme price movements correspond to market corrections during ordinary periods, and also to stock market crashes, bond market collapses or foreign exchange crises during extraordinary periods. An approach based on extreme values to compute the VaR thus covers market conditions ranging from the usual environment considered by the existing VaR methods to the financial crises which are the focus of stress testing. Univariate extreme value theory is used to compute the VaR of a fully aggregated position while multivariate extreme value theory is used to compute the VaR of a position decomposed on risk factors.

Economic theory tells us that market and credit risks are intrinsically related to each other and not separable. We describe the two main approaches to pricing credit risky instruments: the structural approach and the reduced form approach. It is argued that the standard approaches to credit risk management – CreditMetrics, CreditRisk+ and KMV – are of limited value when applied to portfolios of interest rate sensitive instruments and in measuring market and credit risk. Empirically returns on high yield bonds have a higher correlation with equity index returns and a lower correlation with Treasury bond index returns than do low yield bonds. Also, macro economic variables appear to influence the aggregate rate of business failures. The CreditMetrics, CreditRisk+ and KMV methodologies cannot reproduce these empirical observations given their constant interest rate assumption. However, we can incorporate these empirical observations into the reduced form of Jarrow and Turnbull (1995b). Drawing the analogy. Risk 5, 63–70 model. Here default probabilities are correlated due to their dependence on common economic factors. Default risk and recovery rate uncertainty may not be the sole determinants of the credit spread. We show how to incorporate a convenience yield as one of the determinants of the credit spread. For credit risk management, the time horizon is typically one year or longer. This has two important implications, since the standard approximations do not apply over a one year horizon. First, we must use pricing models for risk management. Some practitioners have taken a different approach than academics in the pricing of credit risky bonds. In the event of default, a bond holder is legally entitled to accrued interest plus principal. We discuss the implications of this fact for pricing. Second, it is necessary to keep track of two probability measures: the martingale probability for pricing and the natural probability for value-at-risk. We discuss the benefits of keeping track of these two measures.

We investigate how banking market competition, informational opacity, and sensitivity to shocks have changed over the last three decades by examining the persistence of firm-level rents. We develop propagation mechanisms with testable implications to isolate the sources of persistence. Our analysis suggests that different processes underlie persistence at the high and low ends of the performance distribution. Our tests suggest that impediments to competition and informational opacity continue to be strong determinants of persistence; that the reduction in geographic regulatory restrictions had little effect on competitiveness; and that persistence remains sensitive to regional/macroeconomic shocks. The findings also suggest reasons for the recent record profitability of the industry.

We observe intraday price reversals following large price changes at the opening of the S&P 500 Futures market and the HSI Futures market. We note that the magnitude of subsequent price reversals is positively related to the initial price changes, and that the price reversals are not caused by a bid–ask spread, or by panic among investors. We also note that such price reversals can be exploited to give rise to profitable opportunities after transaction costs, even though these may not be very significant. This study shows that investor overreaction may be a universal phenomenon and irrational investor behavior like overreaction may also exist among groups of sophisticated investors.

We present a simple put option pricing procedure within an asset–liability valuation model that can be used to estimate the incentives facing stock-based life insurance firms to voluntarily sell their businesses under various operating and regulatory conditions. Estimates are derived for samples of 11 sold firms and 24 continuing Australian life insurance companies over a period of industry consolidation. The put option values interact with other actuarial and accounting components of the fair value of these life insurance firms and are used to assess the effectiveness of accounting and actuarial measures of capital, under static or dynamic based solvency testing models.