This paper studies the strategic use and timing of share repurchases by insiders for personal gain. Using grant-level compensation data and a hand-collected sample of monthly repurchases, I find a positive causal relation between executive equity sales and share repurchases. I identify the relation using the vesting schedule of equity grants as an instrument for equity sales. This behavior is persistent across firm, executive, and governance characteristics. Both CFO and CEO vesting schedules impact repurchases, suggesting the CFO may also have influence over the execution of the repurchase program. There is minimal evidence of long-term value destruction. The results indicate executive contracts impact the execution of share repurchase programs.

Using a unique set of banking data containing both originally reported and subsequently revised financial variables, we find adverse revisions to accounting statements are associated with downgrades in supervisory ratings. To assess the financial significance of the revisions, we compare the ability of the original and revised data to map into exam ratings. The relationship between accounting data and exam results is significantly stronger for revised data than for real-time data. Our findings document significant differences between real-time and revised banking data, highlight the auditing role of bank exams, and provide a more realistic assessment of early warning model accuracy.

We empirically investigate the effects of market structure on profitability and stability for 1929 banks in 40 emerging and advanced economies over 1999–2008 by incorporating the traditional structure-conduct-performance (SCP) and relative-market-power (RMP) hypotheses. We observe that a greater market share leads to higher bank profitability being biased toward the RMP hypothesis in advanced economies, yet neither of the hypotheses is supported for profitability in emerging economies. The SCP appears to exert a destabilising effect on advanced banks, suggesting that a more concentrated banking system may be vulnerable to financial instability, however, the RMP seems to perform a stabilising effect in both economies. Evidence also highlights that profitability and stability increase with an increased interest-margin revenues in a less competitive environment for emerging markets. Overall, these results suggest that although policy measures to promote competition may dampen economic rent, excessive implementation may have an undesired destabilising impact on banks.

We examine data from the mid-1980s to 2003 to investigate whether stock prices set on the Tokyo Stock Exchange for Japanese firms react more strongly to changes in credit ratings of global rating agencies than of local agencies. This offers a strong test of relative influence of the two groups of rating agencies. We hypothesize that global raters will have more influence, but given that the two global agencies, Moody’s and Standard and Poors, are headquartered in the United States, analysis of stocks of Japanese firms listed on US exchanges would confound the results to the extent there is a home bias for raters. We find that global agencies are more influential than the two major local raters, Japan Rating and Investment Information and Japan Credit Rating Agency, for rating downgrades. Thus for credit downgrades, global raters are more influential than local ones even in the local market. Consistent with previous research, we find that upgrades are benign events, and this holds true for global as well as local agencies.

We investigate the source of information advantage in inter-dealer FX trading using data on trades and counter-party identities. In liquid dollar exchange rates, information is concentrated among dealers that trade most frequently and specialize their activity in a particular rate. In cross-rates, traders that engage in triangular arbitrage are best informed. Better-informed traders are also located on larger trading floors. In cross-rates, the ability to forecast flows explains all of the advantage of the triangular arbitrageurs. In liquid dollar rates, specialist traders can forecast both order-flow and the component of exchange rate changes that is uncorrelated with flow.

This paper examines the resilience of banks as perceived by market participants during the COVID-19 crisis. We analyse how bank stock returns during January-March 2020 relate to the pre-crisis activation of macroprudential policy across 52 countries in a cross-sectional dimension. We find that, overall, a tighter macroprudential policy stance is beneficial for bank systemic risk, as assessed by equity market investors. A robust finding is that a perceived decrease in bank risk stems primarily from the use of credit growth limits, reserve requirements, and dynamic provisioning. By contrast, a pre-crisis build-up of capital surcharges on systemically important financial institutions seems to lower bank stock returns. Alternative bank risk indicators suggest that the latter is likely to be driven by concerns about profits rather than the probability of default.

We decompose US Treasury bid-ask spreads into inventory, adverse selection and order processing costs by using the fact that inventory trades have different effects on spreads than do proprietary trades. We exploit this asymmetry and develop a technique to identify the three components of the spread in order to test three hypotheses: dealers make larger changes to inventory (1) following macroeconomic announcements (2) at the start and toward the end of the New York trading hours, and (3) when transaction sizes are relatively large. We test these predictions using GovPX data for on-the-run 2-year and 10-year Treasury Notes. All three predictions are supported. We also assess how primary dealers react to the Federal Reserve’s open market operations (OMOs). Our findings reveal interesting intraday patterns in the inventory component for both securities.

Common asset holdings are widely believed to have been the primary vector of contagion in the recent financial crisis. We develop a network approach to the amplification of financial contagion due to the combination of overlapping portfolios and leverage, and we show how it can be understood in terms of a generalized branching process. This can be used to compute the stability for any particular configuration of portfolios. By studying a stylized model we estimate the circumstances under which systemic instabilities are likely to occur as a function of parameters such as leverage, market crowding, diversification, and market impact. Although diversification may be good for individual institutions, it can create dangerous systemic effects, and as a result financial contagion gets worse with too much diversification. There is a critical threshold for leverage; below it financial networks are always stable, and above it the unstable region grows as leverage increases. Note that our model assumes passive portfolio management during a crisis; however, we show that dynamic deleveraging during a crisis can amplify instabilities. The financial system exhibits “robust yet fragile” behavior, with regions of the parameter space where contagion is rare but catastrophic whenever it occurs. Our model and methods of analysis can be calibrated to real data and provide simple yet powerful tools for macroprudential stress testing.