This paper presents two models in which the fluctuating value of loan collateral (real estate) generates the problem of moral hazard between a bank and a deposit insurance agent. The bank finances risky projects against collateral and relies on the rising collateral value. If the collateral value later appreciates, the bank enjoys handsome profits; otherwise, the bank fails. The findings are rather consistent with the characteristics of the topical subprime mortgage crisis.

We study the microstructure of the Pink Sheets and assess the ability of existing theory to capture salient features of this relatively unstructured and unregulated market. Clustering patterns in quotes, quoted spreads, and trade prices indicate that market participants have selected price-dependent tick sizes for different stocks. Clustering intensity varies across stocks as a function of proxies for information availability. Similarly, the bid-ask spread varies as a function of volatility and liquidity. These results suggest (1) microstructure research has established robust predictions of market attributes and (2) unstructured markets are able to develop at least some effective behavioral norms endogenously.

Regulation Fair Disclosure (Reg FD) altered the voluntary disclosure practices of firms with publicly traded securities, thereby affecting relationships between value and growth stock expectations and actual earnings. The results show that earnings forecasts for both stock groups are biased but that bias is less after the introduction of Reg FD. In fact, the difference in pre/post FD forecast bias is larger for growth stocks, suggesting that before Reg FD, analysts did not just misinterpret news but consciously tried to maintain relationships with growth firm managers. However, Reg FD limited these relationships severing the monetary advantage that might be gained from manipulating forecasts.

The aim of this paper is to analyze how diversification of banks across size and industry affects risk, cost and profit efficiency, and bank capitalization for large Austrian commercial banks over the years 1997–2003. Employing a unique dataset, provided by the Austrian Central Bank, we test for several different types of managerial hypotheses, formalized according to a modified version of the Berger and DeYoung model [Berger, A.N., DeYoung, R., 1997. Problem loans and cost efficiency in commercial banks. Journal of Banking and Finance 21, 849–870]. We find that, although diversification negatively affects cost efficiency, it increases profit efficiency and reduces banks’ realized risk. Finally, diversification seems to have a positive impact on banks’ capitalization.

Using a comprehensive sample of mutual funds and fund families for the period 1992–2004, this study examines the impact of fund management companies’ organizational forms on the level of agency costs within mutual funds. We find that, all else being equal: (1) funds managed by public fund families charge higher fees than those managed by private fund families; (2) public fund families acquire more funds than private fund families; and (3) funds of public fund families significantly underperform funds of private fund families. Collectively, these findings suggest that agency costs are higher in mutual funds managed by public fund families. Our results are consistent with the idea that the agency conflict between the fund management company and fund shareholders is more acute for public management companies because of their shorter-term focus.

This study tests for the international presence of dividend catering across a sample of twenty-three countries. We find evidence of catering among firms incorporated in common law countries but not for those in civil law nations. Catering persists even after controlling for the effect of the firm’s lifecycle. We conclude that when the legal regime and its accompanying set of investor protections permit, investors force dividends from managers, but they also attempt to extract such payouts indirectly by placing a high value on dividend paying firms. The relative failure of civil law firms to cater might be explained by idiosyncratic behaviors in the consumption of the private benefits of control or a lack of interest in responding to temporary market misevaluations of their equity.

This study investigates the effects of Regulation FD and the Global Research Analyst Settlement on market share within the US securities industry as well as the determinants of market share during 1996–2004. We find that these regulations did not cause top brokers to lose market share in spite of their reduction of information asymmetries existing within the brokerage industry. They did, however, significantly reduce the quarterly variability in market share changes. We find that Regulation FD and the Global Research Analyst Settlement reduce the importance of an all-star analyst, issuer affiliation, and analyst optimism for gaining brokerage market share. We further discover that the Global Research Analyst Settlement increases the importance of coverage as a market share determinant while reducing the value of analyst experience for non-top brokers. We find that our results remain robust even when we limit our analysis to a set of pure brokerage firms.

We examine a sample of 254 related party and arms’ length acquisitions and sales of assets in Hong Kong during 1998–2000. Our analysis shows that publicly listed firms enter deals with related parties at unfavourable prices compared to similar arms’ length deals. Firms acquire assets from related parties by paying a higher price compared to similar arms’ length deals. In contrast, when they sell assets to related parties, they receive a lower price than in similar arms’ length deals. With the exception of audit committees, corporate governance characteristics have limited impact on transaction prices. Firms with audit committees on their boards pay lower prices to related parties for acquisitions and receive higher prices from related parties from divestments.

Previous studies document a negative return to equity on the announcement of an SEO. However, the effects of SEO announcements on bonds have received little attention. We find that bondholders experience a significant positive return on the announcement of an SEO and this effect is more pronounced for bonds with lower ratings. We examine alternate explanations for bond market reactions to SEO announcements including the leverage risk reduction, wealth transfer, and information signaling hypotheses. Overall, our results are most consistent with the leverage risk reduction hypothesis.