We show that private equity-sponsored public-to-private buyouts in the US evoke positive externality effects among their targets’ industry peers. Industrial organization and strategic theory suggest buyouts may impact their industry peers as a result of increased takeover threat and competitive pressure felt by the peers. We document that buyouts are associated with positive market returns and better fundamental performance in the three years following a buyout acquisition in the industry. Drilling down into specific channels of improvement, we document that industry peers mitigate the increased takeover threat and competitive pressure by significantly improving several dimensions of operational efficiency, by engaging in long-term innovation and by enhancing their corporate governance. Our results suggest that competitive factors rather than takeover threat is responsible for the spillover effects.

How are trading activity and performance impacted by material events during individual investors’ lifetimes? Using a unique dataset, we identify transfers of common stock initiated by the major event of divorce and analyze trading patterns and performance of divorced traders. In aggregate, divorcing individuals underperform, and part of this underperformance is due to liquidation needs arising from divorce. Cross-sectionally, however, actively-trading divorced investors demonstrate superior performance in the window surrounding divorce settlement, while underperforming just prior to divorce. This result survives a difference-in-differences analysis based on a propensity-score matched sample of non-divorced investors. Our analysis thus suggests that the life-cycle distraction of divorce temporarily reduces the performance of active retail traders, which improves once the stressor is removed.