Knowledge that Transforms

This paper extends the investigation of the effect of managerial motives on hedging policy. I utilize a proxy variable that incorporates CEO incentives to increase risk relative to incentives to increase stock price. The variable is directly measured using observed characteristics of CEO portfolios of stock and option holdings. Furthermore, CEO risk-taking incentives are modeled as a choice variable to eliminate the simultaneity bias of modeling risk-taking incentives as an exogenous variable. If modeled as a simultaneous system of equations, a strong negative link between CEO risk-taking incentives and the amount of derivative holdings exists. This result is consistent with the notion that derivatives are used for hedging purposes. Both the characteristics of stock and option holdings are important in determining cross-sectional differences in corporate derivative holdings.

Recently there have been a number of recommendations to increase the role of subordinated debt (SND) in satisfying bank capital requirements as a preferred means to discipline the risk-taking behavior of systemically important banks. One such proposal recommended using SND yield spreads as the triggers for mandatory supervisory action under prompt corrective action guidelines introduced in US banking legislation in the early 1990s. Currently such action is prompted by bank capital ratios. Evidence from previous research suggests that yield information may be a better predictor of bank problems. This paper empirically analyzes potential costs and benefits of using SND signals to trigger prompt corrective action.

Article 65 of the Securities and Exchange Law of Japan, which was carried into effect in 1948, prohibited banks from underwriting corporate securities partially because of the concern that combining the banking and securities businesses might result in a potential conflict of interest. This paper studies the pricing and long-term default performance of industrial bonds underwritten by commercial banks, the Industrial Bank of Japan (IBJ), and trust firms as compared to those underwritten by investment houses during the pre-war period in Japan when banks were allowed to underwrite industrial bonds. The evidence rejects the concern about the conflicts of interest.

This paper examines Wall Street Journal news stories about 79 firms that forced CEO turnover and a matched sample of firms that did not force CEO turnover. In the two years prior to turnover, firms in the forced-turnover sample were the subjects of 76% more news stories about poor firm performance despite being from the same industry, of similar size, and similar performance as a sample of matched firms. Overall, the evidence suggests that scrutiny of poor firm performance by the financial press increases the likelihood of forced CEO turnover.

This paper measures the economic and statistical significance of econometric forecasts of bid–ask spreads. The economic importance of these forecasts is assessed by considering the benefits of scheduling trades based on these forecasts. The unrestricted vector autoregression (VAR) model of Huang and Masulis [Rev. Financial Studies 12 (1999) 61] and the two-equation structural model of Huang and Stoll [Rev. Financial Studies 7 (1994) 179] are used to generate intraday h-step ahead forecasts of spreads for 50 stocks listed on the London Stock Exchange (LSE). The period corresponding to the minimum expected spread is then scheduled into the trading activity of the investor. The results indicate that when the unrestricted VAR model is used, the spreads incurred are around 35% lower than the spreads incurred by investors who do not schedule their trades. By contrast, spread discounts of only 5% are obtained when the two-equation structural model is used. The heterogeneity of the economic importance of the spread forecasts generated by the models is confirmed by tests of the statistical significance of the forecasts.

In this paper we test the absolute and relative purchasing power parity (PPP) hypotheses during the recent flexible exchange rate period, using quarterly data for 21 OECD countries. In doing so, we use a new econometric technique developed by M.H. Pesaran et al. [Bounds testing approaches to the analysis of long run relationships. University of Cambridge, Department of Applied Economics, Working Paper #9907]. This approach is particularly interesting as it is capable of testing the existence of long-run relations regardless of whether the underlying variables are stationary, integrated, or mutually cointegrated.