Knowledge that Transforms

This paper takes advantage of the dynamic nature of institutional reforms in transition economies and explores the causal effects of those reforms on bank risk. Using a difference-in-difference approach, we show that banks’ financial stability increases substantially after these countries reform their legal institutions, liberalize banking, and restructure corporate governance. We also find that the effects of legal and governance reforms on bank risk may critically depend on the progress of banking reforms. A further examination of alternative risk measures reveals that the increases in financial stability among banks mainly come from the reduction of asset risk. Banks tend to have lower ROA volatility and fewer nonperforming loans after reforming the institutional environment. Finally, we split our sample into foreign and domestic banks and find that the enhancement of financial stability is more pronounced for domestic banks. Crown Copyright 2013 Published by Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

Deposit insurance is widely offered in a number of countries as part of a financial system safety net to promote stability. An unintended consequence of deposit insurance is the reduction in the incentive of depositors to monitor banks which lead to excessive risk-taking. We examine the relation between deposit insurance and bank risk and systemic fragility in the years leading up to and during the recent financial crisis. We find that generous financial safety nets increase bank risk and systemic fragility in the years leading up to the global financial crisis. However, during the crisis, bank risk is lower and systemic stability is greater in countries with deposit insurance coverage. Our findings suggest that the “moral hazard effect” of deposit insurance dominates in good times while the “stabilization effect” of deposit insurance dominates in turbulent times. The overall effect of deposit insurance over the full sample we study remains negative since the destabilizing effect during normal times is greater in magnitude compared to the stabilizing effect during global turbulence. In addition, we find that good bank supervision can alleviate the unintended consequences of deposit insurance on bank systemic risk during good times, suggesting that fostering the appropriate incentive framework is very important for ensuring systemic stability.

This paper attempts to shed some light on the role of financial sector policies in generating new knowledge, drawing on the experience of one of the fastest growing and largest developing countries. Using time series data for India over the period 1963–2005, the results indicate that interest rate restraints help generate ideas. Other financial repressionist policies, in the form of high reserve and liquidity requirements, as well as significant directed credit controls, appear to have a dampening effect on ideas production. These results lend some support to the argument that some form of financial sector reforms may help stimulate economic growth via increasing technological innovation.

We provide a cross-country and cross-bank analysis of the financial determinants of the Great Financial Crisis using data on 83 countries from the period 1998 to 2006. First, our cross-country results show that the probability of suffering the crisis in 2008 was larger for countries having higher levels of credit deposit ratio whereas it was lower for countries characterized by higher levels of: (i) net interest margin, (ii) concentration in the banking sector, (iii) restrictions to bank activities, (iv) private monitoring. The bank-level analysis reinforces these results and shows that the latter factors are also key determinants across banks, thus explaining the probability of bank crisis. Our findings contribute to extend the analytical toolkit available for macro and micro-prudential regulation.

I study how the possibility of default on external debts affects other capital allocation decisions in a small open economy. In the model, default has an option value derived from the randomization over ex-post default regimes, which depends on country-specific productivity shocks. This feature of default reduces incentives for ex-ante diversification, which would reduce exposure to the productivity shock. As a result, if the economys debt to capital ratio is allowed to cross a fixed threshold (identified in the model), the unique equilibrium exhibits an allocation of capital that is less productive in expectation and more volatile than in a benchmark model without default. The model therefore captures a number of salient features of emerging and less developed countries, where low levels of international risk-sharing have gone hand-in-hand with frequent and recurring default events.

This paper extends the macroeconomic frailty model to include sectoral frailty factors that capture default correlations among firms in a similar business. We estimate sectoral and macroeconomic frailty factors and their effects on default intensity using the data for Japanese firms from 1992 to 2010. We find strong evidence for the presence of sectoral frailty factors even after accounting for the effects of observable covariates and macroeconomic frailty on default intensity. The model with sectoral frailties performs better than that without. Results show that accounting for the sources of unobserved sectoral default risk covariations improves the accuracy of default probability estimation.

This paper examines the impact of press freedom on stock price informativeness in a sample of firms from 50 countries. We find a significant relation between more press freedom and lower stock price synchronicity. Our results suggest that the freedom of the press can enhance the information environment of stock markets.