We propose that family firms with religious founders have less risk than other family firms. Using a sample of 4159 family firms in China, we find that firms founded by religious entrepreneurs have lower leverage and less investment in fixed and intangible assets compared to firms founded by nonreligious entrepreneurs. These findings are consistent with our proposition. However, these findings primarily hold for entrepreneurs who adhere to Western religions but not to Eastern religions. As such, our paper makes important contributions to the literature on family-firms and their risk-taking and the literature on the relation between religion and risk aversion.

Using a sample of Chinese firms, we examine the influence of state-pyramids on corporate tax burden. We find results that state-pyramidal layers are significantly and negatively associated with effective tax rates, indicating that pyramids formed by the state protect local state-owned enterprises (SOEs) from political intervention. The results hold after controlling for potential endogeneity. We further find evidences suggesting that taxation is one of the channels through which state-controlled pyramids increase firm value. Our study contributes to both corporate finance and corporate tax literatures by documenting the role of pyramidal organizational structures in reducing local SOEs' tax burden.