This paper investigates the impact of CEOs' career experiences on corporate investment decisions. We hypothesize that CEOs with more diverse career experiences are less likely to be constrained by insufficient internal capital. The potential mechanism is that rich external experiences help CEOs accumulate social connections and these connections mitigate information asymmetry and lead to better access to external funds. Consistent with this argument, we find that firms with CEOs who have more diverse career experiences exhibit lower investment-cash flow sensitivity and exploit more outside funds, including both bank loans and trade credit. These effects are more pronounced among financially constrained firms. Even controlling for connections gained through financial institutions or government offices, the effect of diversity still remains very strong. Finally, we conduct several tests to mitigate the concern that our results are driven by the endogeneity of CEOs' appointments.

We examine whether adding more founding family members as firm owners and/or managers matters to corporate governance outcomes. Based on a sample of 1242 founder-controlled publicly traded Chinese private-sector firms, we find that more such family involvement is associated with lower volumes of related party transactions suspicious of expropriating shareholder wealth. The curtailing relation is stronger when family members own firm shares and/or serve as managers, and are more arm's-length relatives instead of immediate kin of the founders. The intra-family governance effects are stronger when firms are subject to weaker capital market disciplines or have more free cash under insider discretion. The overall evidence is consistent with founding family members' information advantages and ownership incentives making them more robust monitors of managerial decisions than other formal mechanisms, which help enforce shareholder rights in emerging markets.

Using a two-firm dynamic model, we investigate whether firms’ corporate policies are impacted by the peers’ idiosyncratic technology shocks. A firm hit by the positive idiosyncratic technology shock becomes more productive. Thus, it is better off. As a result, its Cournot competitor is worse off. Therefore, their optimal decisions are opposite to each other, leading to negative correlations between corporate policies across the firms. The empirical analysis using the idiosyncratic technology shocks and, to a lesser extent, CEO sudden deaths supports this prediction. Our analysis suggests that mimicking peers who alter their corporate policies due to idiosyncratic technology shocks destroys shareholder value.

We examine the effects of independent directors' external social connectedness on corporate fraud commission and detection. The results show that well-connected independent directors do not affect the likelihood of fraud commission but significantly reduce the likelihood of fraud detection given occurrence of a fraud. In particular, with a one-standard-deviation increase in independent directors' connectedness, the likelihood of fraud detection reduces by 22.5%. We also find that the consequences of fraud commission faced by firms with well-connected independent directors are less severe as fraud remains undetected for a longer period of time and fewer people are charged with fraud when independent directors are well connected. We further show that independent directors' connections to fraud firms significantly increase a firm's propensity to fraud commission and the likelihood of fraud detection is also higher. Overall, our results suggest that directors' personal networks have a “dark side”. Regulators should be aware of unintended consequences associated with directors' external social connections when considering how to prevent and detect corporate fraud.

This paper examines the diversification choices of top managers and their implications for the levels of portfolio equity incentives as well as for firms' financial policies. Standard portfolio theory should also apply to corporate managers and therefore excessive risk exposures to the firm should create portfolio diversification incentives for the managers. We use a unique dataset from the Taiwan tax data center and construct the measures of the degree of diversification in a manager's equity portfolio that is made up of equities of other firms to capture his motives for diversifying his risk exposure to his own firm. We provide empirical evidence supporting the view that managers have a risk-reduction motive when they trade in the equities of other firms besides their own. Moreover, we document evidence that the degree of diversification in such equity portfolios also significantly affects managerial equity incentives as well as firms' financial policies. Overall, our findings confirm that managers' personal diversification can help make up for the diversification that the managers would otherwise have lost, thereby reducing the agency cost of equity incentive contracts.

Sell-side analysts rate on a particular type of behavioral curve: recency. Although they claim to use objective criteria (like expected raw, market-adjusted, or industry-adjusted returns), we find that, even after controlling for these claims, their recommendations on a particular stock are negatively influenced by their assessment of the quality of the few other stocks they have rated that month. This recency bias has price implications. The next day's alpha of a sophisticated trading strategy that incorporates this bias is about 40 % higher compared to the alpha of an unsophisticated strategy that uses rating information only.

Our paper provides evidence regarding the use of share repurchases as an earnings management mechanism in the presence of debt-financing constraints as well as the impact of these constraints on the use of accruals and other real earnings management techniques. We document that share repurchases are prevalent as a mechanism to increase earnings per share. Next, we show that the presence of debt-financing constraints discourages the use of repurchase-based earnings management. We also find that for firms more likely to be engaged in earnings management, high financing constraints appear to increase the use of accruals based earnings management and decrease the use of other real earnings management techniques.

We investigate IPO market efficiency using a sample of equity carve-outs offered during the period of 1985–2005. Unlike IPOs examined in previous studies where trading during the pre-IPO book-building period does not exist and trading on the IPO date is rationed, in equity carve-outs, investors can trade in the non-rationed market for shares of the parent, which holds a significant fraction of the subsidiary. We find that the subsidiary's initial day return is significantly related to its parent's return over the book-building period, but unrelated to its parent's contemporaneous return. Neither the pre-IPO price revision of the subsidiary nor the return to the parent on the initial trading day can be predicted. While the portion of the subsidiary's initial return unpredictable from information available during the book-building period is significantly related to its parent's contemporaneous return, the predictable component of the initial return is not. We interpret these results as evidence consistent with market efficiency.

Prior studies suggest that income smoothing may be used as an earnings management tool by managers, and is associated with stock price declines when companies subsequently break smoothing patterns. We contend that investors' negative reaction in these situations is also driven by their magnified concerns about firm information risk, in addition to their decreased earnings expectations. Consistent with this argument, we find that bid-ask spreads around unexpected loss announcements are greater when preceded by higher levels of income smoothing. Furthermore, total spreads before the loss announcements were not greater for firms that exhibited higher income smoothing but had not reported earlier losses. This suggests that investors had difficulties seeing through managerial opportunistic motives before the unexpected loss announcements. Additionally, we find that institutional ownership and sell-side analyst coverage appear to moderate the positive association between income smoothing and bid-ask spreads, consistent with the monitoring role institutional investors and financial analysts play in constraining managerial opportunism. We also detect a significant decrease in the extent of income smoothing following loss announcements. Overall, our results are consistent with the view that income smoothing may be viewed by investors as being motivated by managerial opportunism instead of as communicating the true earnings results. Further analysis suggests that pursing a moderate amount of volatility in reported earnings may be the optimal financial reporting policy.