We show that state right-to-work (RTW) laws significantly encourage corporate innovations in terms of patent grant and citation count. Consistent with the conjecture that the RTW-treated firms conduct more innovations due to their decreased financial distress risk, we find that the RTW adoption also significantly decreases treated firms' financial distress risk ex post, and its treatment effect on innovation outputs is stronger for treated firms that are ex ante more likely to experience financial distress. Further analysis indicates that treated firms intensify research and development expenditures and, likely due to their improved innovations, enhance their competitiveness in product markets.

We find that individualistic countries regulate insider trading activities more intensely. The result is robust to controlling for alternative culture variables, additional controls, and instrumental variable analysis. We also document that individualism's effect is magnified in democratic countries. In addition, we study the economic and financial consequences of individualism, insider trading regulation, and its enforcement. The analysis suggests that individualism and the enforcement of insider trading regulation promote financial development. Interaction effects reveal that individualism and insider trading regulation serve as complements to promote financial development. These findings contribute to the insider trading debate since regulation alone may not be the primary determinant of market efficiency. Combined, our results challenge prior works concluding that individualism is anti-regulation

The economic impact of corporate self-dealing and the regulation against such activity both vary across countries. In this work, we examine the influence of trust on shareholder protection. We hypothesize that anonymous trust can affect self-dealing through two channels. First, trust may complement existing formal regulation. Alternatively, trust and formal regulation can act as substitutes. To test these hypotheses, we examine the association between a country's anti-self-dealing index and anonymous trust. We find that anonymous trust inversely relates to formal self-dealing regulation. We further find that anonymous trust positively relates to financial market development. Collectively, this evidence suggests that trust substitutes for formal self-dealing regulation, providing an alternative mechanism for shareholder protection

We show that social connections between a firm's executives and directors and brokerages that follow the firm decrease the firm's cost of equity. We use quasi-natural experiments to address endogeneity concerns and find that the uncovered effect of firm-brokerage social connections on cost of equity is likely causal. The effect is found to be more pronounced for firms with more soft information, opaque information environments, tight financial constraints, weak corporate monitoring, or high executive equity ownership. Further, consistent with the evidence on cost of equity, we find that firm-brokerage social connections reduce SEO underpricing, decrease information asymmetry in stock markets, and improve the firm's equity valuation.

This paper reviews the economic theory of regulation and surveys the empirical evidence on its application to past and recent changes in U.S. securities regulation. The theory provides multiple potential motives for regulation and cautions the empirical researcher against naïve modeling of the costs and benefits of regulatory change. Moreover, the nature of the regulatory process compounds the standard pitfalls of empirical analysis such as endogeneity and confounding events. Productive empirical techniques include the development of cross-sectional predictions of the effects of regulation as well as the use of unregulated control samples. An important avenue for future research is a more refined estimation of the extent to which regulation has unintended consequences

We present an equilibrium model of financial institutions to examine the optimal regulation of risk taking. Shareholders provide incentives for management to increase risk to excessive levels. Regulators use caps on asset risk and compensation to achieve the socially optimal risk level. This level trades off costs of risk shifting and costs of bank default. Without regulation, equilibrium risk lies above the optimal level. If information and enforcement are perfect, either policy tool (caps on asset risk or compensation) achieves the optimal risk level. If there are frictions – if enforcement is limited, if there is uncertainty about the incentives facing management and costs of risk shifting, or if regulation cannot be bank specific – welfare can be improved by employing both policy tools

A long regulative process exists between the initial announcement and execution of seasoned equity offerings (SEOs) in China. Although the initial announcement of an SEO is associated with a significant reduction in the stock price, the regulator (China Securities Regulatory Commission) finally approves it after a significant run up in the price of the stock. Chinese managers execute SEOs after additional stock price increases. As a result, the stock price at issuance is not significantly different from the price on announcement, and is significantly higher than the price three months before the announcement. We also find stock prices decline following the execution. These results suggest that regulative screenings for market stabilization are beneficial for SEO market timing, and that Chinese managers successfully time the market, even with a prolonged regulative process

Ostensibly, the SEC's new round of regulatory activity is motivated by a bout of well-publicized business scandals and an explosive increase in financial innovations and instruments. Many critics of the “new” SEC question the proportionality and usefulness of the responses, which move the SEC well beyond reliance on disclosure and promotion of transparency. Others argue that more heavy-handed and far-reaching regulation is necessary given the vast changes in financial markets, the increasing importance of (largely unregulated) hedge funds and private equity, and corporate scandals that allege fraud and deception. This paper provides a rationale for studying recent regulatory changes and for addressing the overarching question of how to define the boundaries of SEC intervention in financial markets. The study provides an overview of papers in this special issue and concludes with suggestions for how policymakers can use research to better evaluate the costs and benefits of regulation

We show that firms with higher levels of organizational capital (OC) exhibit higher levels of tax avoidance and that shareholders view tax avoidance of high OC firms as value-enhancing. We also show that the OC-tax avoidance relation mainly manifests in firms with good internal governance and information environment and in firms that face tight financial constraints. In addition, we document that tax avoidance by high OC firms increases future cash flow and that high OC firms are more likely to invest in tax haven subsidiaries. Overall, our evidence suggests that OC enhances firms' tax efficiency.

This paper studies the impact of regulation on IPO markets using historical data. Regulatory interventions have different effects on the development of public equity markets under different conditions. Studying the whole population of 879 Italian IPOs from the unification of Italy (1861) through the present, we find that tightening regulatory changes improve IPO survival rates. In contrast, easing of regulations tends to harm IPO survival rates, without increasing the number of IPOs