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Large investors’ portfolio composition and firms value

Journal of Corporate Finance 2020 61, 101404 open access
We analyze new Swedish data on the portfolio holdings of large blockholders and find that firm value increases with the weight of a stock in a large blockholder's portfolio. In our sample, this weight may be greater than 50%. We are the first to show that this value premium is correlated with portfolio weights for any large blockholders, not just institutions. We find some evidence that indicates that “stock importance” (high portfolio weight) can mitigate the negative effects of a dual-class structure on firm value. Further, it does not seem that a large blockholder's tenure as a CEO or as a board chairman affects this value premium. We conduct a variety of tests to rule out endogeneity and reverse causality.

Holding company affiliation and bank stability: Evidence from the US banking sector

Journal of Corporate Finance 2020 65, 101739
Is affiliation with a multibank holding company beneficial for bank stability? We revisit this question by examining the response of market-based risk measures of independent and multibank-holding-company banks to an exogenous negative shock (the 2005 US hurricane season). We find evidence consistent with bank holding companies playing an important role in mitigating negative shocks, with affiliates of more liquid holdings remaining more stable in terms of both systemic and individual stability. We also conduct an event study showing that markets perceive multibank-holding-company banks' dynamics after the shock as value-enhancing.

The anatomy of block accumulations by activist shareholders

Journal of Corporate Finance 2020 62, 101620
We conduct a large-sample analysis of investor activism in the US based on all 13D filings from 2001 to 2016. While hedge funds represent the largest filer group, the sample contains a diverse set of other activist shareholders. This raises the question to what extent other investors perform a governance role similar to hedge funds. Based on target firms' outcome variables, like announcement returns of activist campaigns and changes in operating performance measures, we find surprisingly few differences. However, hedge funds play a special role when it comes towards takeovers. They stimulate monitoring activities among relatively larger firms and they help to set payout policies.

CEOs' hometown connections and access to trade credit: Evidence from China

Journal of Corporate Finance 2020 62, 101574
In this study, we investigate how informal institutions, namely, chief executive officers' hometown connections with suppliers, impact firms' access to trade credit. Using unique data manually collected from China, we find that hometown connections significantly increase access to trade credit. The hometown effect is more pronounced for non-state-owned firms, firms in provinces with poorly developed financial institutions, and firms whose chief executive officers come from hometowns with a strong merchant guild culture or hold an important position in the hometown's chamber of commerce. We suggest two plausible channels for the hometown effect: information and social trust. Overall, this study contributes to the literature by documenting how hometown connections help firms to obtain external financing in emerging markets.

The shrouded business of style drift in active mutual funds

Journal of Corporate Finance 2020 64, 101667
This study investigates the motivation and performance consequence of intentional style drift in an exclusively in-house fund management industry in China. With style drift, fund investors are exposed to investment portfolio outside their risk-return preference but are generally unaware that their risk and return expectations are disrupted, and the functioning of the fund market undermined. Our study provides evidence for the first time about the incentive that motivates style drift behavior. We find that style drift increases a fund's subsequent net inflows, thus affirming the maximization of AUM-linked compensation as the motivation for fund manager's style drift behavior. We also find that larger funds have greater incentive to drift. We demonstrate that style drift behavior interferes with the picking of quality stocks to deliver fund performance for fund investors. Style drift as an unobserved risk behavior harms fund investor interest and undermines market integrity.

Reputational concerns in the market for corporate control

Journal of Corporate Finance 2020 61, 101399
This paper explores whether corporate acquirers consider environmental reputations when planning and structuring takeovers. We find that firms with an environmentally toxic reputation, which have the greatest potential for negative spillovers to their merger partners, have a lower associated probability of being both acquirers and targets. Acquirers are more likely to pair with similar reputation firms and are less likely to acquire firms with lower reputations. Most notably, green firms in our sample never acquire toxic firms. Acquirers that buy firms with differing environmental reputations use a higher percentage of stock in their acquisition offers. We further show that the returns to acquirers are lower when they acquire firms outside of their area. Collectively, these findings suggest that managers account for potential negative spillover effects in acquisition decisions.

Corporate board reforms around the world and stock price crash risk

Journal of Corporate Finance 2020 62, 101557
We examine the impact of corporate board reforms around the world on stock price crash risk. Using a sample of firms in 41 economies that passed major board reforms between 1990 and 2012, we find that board reforms are associated with a significant reduction in crash risk of about 13%. The effect of reforms on crash risk is stronger among firms with more severe ex ante agency problems. Our analysis further suggests that board reforms reduce crash risk by improving financial transparency and enhancing investment efficiency. In sum, our findings are consistent with the notion that board reforms improve board oversight and mitigate agency problems.