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A dynamic analysis of executive stock options: Determinants and consequences

Journal of Corporate Finance 2010 16(1), 88-103
We investigate the determinants of executive stock options (ESOs) and their impact on risky investment and subsequent firm performance in a dynamic setting. We find that, first, the dynamic response of ESOs to growth opportunity and risk is positive and lasts for two to three years. Second, the dynamic response of risky investments to option compensation is positive but converges to zero after three years. More importantly, the positive effect of ESOs on risky investments is observed when CEOs' personal risk-aversion is taken into account. Third, accounting performance responds positively to the risky, option-induced investment, but the dynamic effect lasts only for one year. Meanwhile, when managers undertake more risky investments than what ESOs imply, accounting performance responds negatively to the over-investment.

On the decision to go public with dual class stock

Journal of Corporate Finance 2010 16(2), 170-181
Why do firms deviate from a one share-one vote regime when going public? This question raises considerations that are at the core of many corporate governance issues. We consider three arguments for this choice. Examining data on IPOs from 1980 through 2008, we do not find that firms go public with dual class stock so managers have more incentive to invest in hard to monitor projects nor to gain more when selling control of the firm. Rather, managers appear to take their firms public with dual class stock in order to retain control of their firms while reducing their lack of diversification costs.

Macroeconomic conditions and capital structure adjustment speed

Journal of Corporate Finance 2010 16(1), 73-87
Using two dynamic partial adjustment capital structure models to estimate the impact of several macroeconomic factors on the speed of capital structure adjustment toward target leverage, we find evidence that firms adjust their leverage toward target faster in good macroeconomic states relative to bad states. This evidence holds whether or not firms are subject to financial constraints. Our results are robust to an alternative method of calculating states and to omitting zero-debt boundary firms and are not driven by firm size, deviation from target, or leverage definitions.

Outside monitoring and CEO compensation in the banking industry

Journal of Corporate Finance 2010 16(4), 383-399 open access
We hypothesize that CEO compensation is optimally designed to trade off two types of agency problems: the standard shareholder-management agency problem as well as the risk-shifting problem between shareholders and debtholders. Analyses in this setup produces two predictions: (1) the pay-for-performance sensitivity of CEO compensation decreases with the leverage ratio; and (2) the pay-for-performance sensitivity of CEO compensation increases with the intensity of outside monitoring on the firm's risk choice. We test these two hypotheses for the banking industry where regulators and nondepository (subordinated) debtholders provide outside monitoring on the risk choice. We construct an index of the intensity of outside monitoring based on three variables: subordinated debt rating, non performing loan ratio and examination rating assigned by regulators. We find supporting evidence for both hypotheses.

Pay-performance sensitivity and firm size: Insights from the mutual fund industry

Journal of Corporate Finance 2010 16(4), 400-412
I examine the ex ante decision to make an agent's pay-performance sensitivity an inverse function of organization size. I focus on mutual funds and their decision to use compensation contracts that reduce the advisor's marginal compensation as the fund grows (a declining-rate contract) over the dominant contract type, where marginal compensation is unrelated to fund size (a single-rate contract). I find evidence consistent with the view that declining-rate contracts are a mechanism to keep marginal compensation in line with the advisor's declining marginal product. Specifically, I find that funds with greater exposure to diseconomies of scale are more likely to use a declining-rate contract and to specify a greater amount of compensation decline in their contracts. Consistent with optimal contracting, I find no evidence of a performance difference between funds with declining-rate contracts and funds with single-rate contracts.

Equity market liberalization and corporate governance

Journal of Corporate Finance 2010 16(5), 609-621
Equity market liberalizations open up domestic stock markets to foreign investors. A puzzle in the literature is why developing countries exhibit relatively small financial impacts associated with liberalizations. We use cross-firm variation in corporate governance at the time of the official liberalization of the equity market in Korea to test whether governance can explain the extent to which firms benefit when countries liberalize. The results show that better-governed firms experience significantly greater stock price increases upon equity market liberalization. Following the liberalization in Korea, foreign ownership in firms with strong corporate governance was significantly higher than that in firms with weak governance. Better-governed firms also exhibit higher rates of physical capital accumulation after liberalization.

Can corporate governance deter management from manipulating earnings? Evidence from related-party sales transactions in China

Journal of Corporate Finance 2010 16(2), 225-235
This study investigates whether good governance structures help constrain management's opportunistic behaviors (in the form of transfer pricing manipulations) in one of the world's most dynamic economies. Our data are a unique sample of 266 companies listed on the Shanghai stock exchange that disclose gross profit ratios on related-party transactions. We find that firms with a board that has a higher percentage of independent directors or a lower percentage of “parent” directors (i.e., directors who are representatives of the parent companies of the listed firms), or have different people occupying the chair and CEO positions, or have financial experts on their audit committees, are less likely to engage in transfer pricing manipulations. Overall, our research findings reveal that the quality of corporate governance is important in deterring the use of manipulated transfer prices in related-party sales transactions.