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Suppliers' listing status and trade credit provision

Journal of Corporate Finance 2020 60, 101535 open access
We show that public suppliers extend more trade credit than their private counterparts. The impact of stock market listing on accounts receivable is more pronounced among firms that are financially more constrained or more reliant on external finance. Moreover, firms significantly increase their trade credit provision following equity issuances in stock exchanges. These results are consistent with the argument that stock market listing status improves firms' access to external sources of financing, especially equity capital, thus enhancing their ability to offer more trade credit to customers.

Political connections and debt restructurings

Journal of Corporate Finance 2020 65, 101497
This paper presents evidence that distressed firms with politically connected executives and board members are more likely to reorganize outside of court than to file for Chapter 11 bankruptcy. This relation is more evident for firms that have more political importance, such as major employers within a state, firms located in swing states, and in periods leading up to major election dates. The evidence suggests that the expected costs of financial distress are lower for politically connected firms which may partially explain the higher leverage ratios of politically connected firms documented in the extant literature.

Bequest motive, information transparency, and family firm value: A natural experiment

Journal of Corporate Finance 2020 65, 101751 open access
Motivated by Cao et al. (2015), we utilize China’s one-child policy reform as a unique and exogenous setting to examine the economic impact of a potential rise in bequest motives among family firms, which is driven by the prospect of family and clanship expansion after the reform. A bequest motive is the economic incentive to accumulate wealth presently for inheritance by heirs in the future. It causes short-term present economic decisions to be influenced by long-term future utility expectations. On the one hand, the reform may strengthen stewardship as a means to maximize firm value for present family wealth enhancement and future inter-generational succession. On the other hand, the reform may weaken innovation and competitiveness by inducing reluctance against takeovers or outsider succession. Consistent with a positive economic impact, we observe that family firms experience (i) favorable ex-ante market reactions to the news of the reform and (ii) ex-post decline in managerial expropriation through tunneling after the reform. These findings of ex-ante investor anticipation and ex-post real effect are both stronger among less transparent family firms where Type-II agency problems are likely to be more pronounced. Further analyses also provide supportive evidence of a post-reform rise in the long-term value, measured by Tobin’s Q, and a decline in stock-selling by controlling shareholders among family firms. Our combined findings imply that this reform could induce positive externality on family firm governance.

Uncertainty avoidance and mutual funds

Journal of Corporate Finance 2020 65, 101748 open access
We study how culture influences mutual funds around the world. Uncertainty Avoidance (UA), which is related to ambiguity aversion, is negatively associated with flow-performance sensitivity, deviation from the fund benchmark, fund alpha, and the fraction of active management across the 25 countries in our sample. This is true even when controlling for an exhaustive set of fund- and country-level characteristics. We also find that a fund's deviation from its benchmark is not only affected by the UA of its domicile country but also by the UA of its fund family's country of origin. Our results highlight the importance of considering cultural characteristics, and UA in particular, when studying mutual funds across countries.

The consequences of limiting shareholder litigation: Evidence from exclusive forum provisions

Journal of Corporate Finance 2020 64, 101712
In response to an explosion of shareholder litigation, many firms have adopted exclusive forum provisions which limit lawsuits to courts in a firm's state of incorporation. This paper examines the consequences of a required venue for shareholder litigation. Delaware-incorporated companies experience significant increases in firm value around exogenous events that confirmed the use of a specified forum. Reduced legal costs and the designation of the domicile court as the sole forum to hear shareholder claims contribute to the increase in firm value. Overall, these findings suggest that a required venue for shareholder litigation benefits firms by eliminating multi-jurisdictional lawsuits and reducing the threat of claims with little merit.

The interaction of bank regulation and taxation

Journal of Corporate Finance 2020 64, 101629 open access
The tax benefit of interest deductibility encourages debt financing, but regulatory constraints create dependency between bank leverage and asset risk. Using a large international sample of banks this paper shows that banks located in high-tax countries have higher leverage and lower average asset risk-weights. This trade-off is stronger when regulation is more stringent and for banks with less capital. Non-financial firms' leverage and asset risk are positively related to tax rates, as further evidence of the regulatorily induced adjustment of portfolio risk. A difference-in-difference analysis provides support for a causal interpretation of these results. Overall, higher tax rates are positively correlated with systemic risk, suggesting that the lower asset risk does not offset the risk-inducing effect of tax rates on bank leverage.

Managerial multi-tasking, Team diversity, and mutual fund performance

Journal of Corporate Finance 2020 65, 101766
This study examines the impact of multi-tasking teams on fund performance. We find that while managerial multi-tasking has a negative impact on fund performance, teamwork can mitigate the adverse effect associated with managerial multi-tasking, which is indicative of superior performance of funds managed by multi-tasking teams. More importantly, it is the characteristics of the multitasking team that contribute to these superior results, which can be attributed to network cognitive diversity, suggesting that extended networks, facilitated by indirectly-connected managers via local teammates, can largely enhance the scale of cognitive diversity, thus generating significant gains through information pooling and integration. In assessing possible mechanisms for the observed superior performance, we find evidence of improved decision-making induced by network cognitive diversity through both transmission and sharing of value-relevant information, and speedy information diffusion.

What's good for you is good for me: The effect of CEO inside debt on the cost of equity

Journal of Corporate Finance 2020 64, 101699
We find an overall negative relation between CEO inside debt holdings and the cost of equity capital. Such a negative relation holds in an instrumental-variable analysis, a test using changes in variables due to CEO turnover events, a test using seasoned equity offering (SEO) underpricing as an alternate cost of equity measure, and a difference-in-differences test based on the implementation of Internal Revenue Code Section 409A Final Regulations. Additionally, the negative relation between inside debt and the cost of equity capital is nonlinear, suggesting the existence of optimal inside debt compensation that can minimize cost of capital. The negative relation is less pronounced in firms with pre-funded executive pension plans and in firms that provide executives with the pension lump-sum option. We also provide evidence that inside debt lowers the cost of equity more for excessively levered firms. Collectively, these findings suggest that shareholders value the beneficial role of CEO debt-like compensation in constraining excessive managerial risk taking.

Antitakeover Provisions and Firm Value: New Evidence from the M&A Market

Journal of Corporate Finance 2020 62, 101594 open access
New evidence from acquisition decisions suggests that antitakeover provisions (ATPs) may increase firm value when internal corporate governance is sufficiently strong. We document that, in Germany, firms with stronger ATPs, and particularly supermajority provisions, are better acquirers. Managers of high-ATP firms create value in acquisitions by making governance-improving deals. They are more likely to engage in acquisitions that reduce their own entrenchment level and less likely to invest in declining industries. The empirical evidence is consistent with a short-termist interpretation. Takeover threats can induce myopic investment decisions, which ATPs can mitigate. They lead managers to engage more often in value-creating long-term and innovative investing, and increase a firm's sensitivity to investment opportunities. Our findings contribute to a growing literature challenging conventional wisdom that the agency-increasing effect of ATPs empirically dominates the myopia-eliminating effect, suggesting that a more contextual view of the value implications of ATPs is necessary.

On short-term institutional trading skill, behavioral biases, and liquidity need

Journal of Corporate Finance 2020 65, 101749
Are portfolio managers skilled or do they trade too much? Using a marked-to-market based “fair-value” method for measuring fund manager skill, we find that institutional managers can potentially earn +42 (+33) basis points benchmark-adjusted return before transaction costs after a holding period of four weeks on their buy (sell) trades. After transaction costs, the benchmark-adjusted return for the buy (sell) trades is +1 (-8) basis points. Pension fund managers outperform money managers. We are unable to detect evidence for overconfidence among pension fund managers over this short-horizon. In addition, we are unable to find evidence of disposition effect among mutual fund managers. Institutions tend to engage in short-term trades with holding period of four weeks (or less) despite only breaking-even or making economically insignificant (modest) benchmark-adjusted losses after round-trip transaction costs for liquidity, risk-management, or tax-minimization reasons. Among these, evidence for liquidity trading motive is the strongest.