This paper examines the impact of credit default swaps (CDS) on firms' financing and trade credit policies. Our results indicate firms with CDS trading on their debt increase their equity issuances. Further, firms with CDS trading on their debt and high levels of long-term debt issuances decrease their debt financing. Total and idiosyncratic risks are also higher for firms with CDS trading on their debt. These firms pay their suppliers and collect from their customers quicker. Thus, the impacts of the CDS market are not limited to the borrowing firms but also affect economically connected firms

Whether and how credit default swaps (CDSs) affect corporate debt structure remains an unanswered question. We find that firms use more public debt relative to bank debt when CDSs referencing their debt start trading. The results are robust to the endogeneity of CDS trading. Furthermore, the increase in public debt is concentrated in senior bonds and notes, which are the most common CDS reference assets. The effect of CDS trading is most pronounced when bond underwriters take a net selling CDS position and for informationally opaque firms. These findings suggest that the hedging and informational roles of CDSs have real effects on corporate debt structure

This study examines whether the availability of traded credit default swaps (CDS) influences the referenced firms' incentive to smooth their performance. We show that with the introduction of CDS trading on their debt, CDS-referenced firms (CDS firms) lower both their earnings and cash flow volatility. Specifically, earnings volatility declines faster than cash flow volatility, which is consistent with income smoothing behavior. The effect of CDS trading on performance smoothing is qualitatively similar under different market and economic conditions. These results support the notion that CDS firms smooth their performance to avoid renegotiation with CDS-protected creditors. We also find that CDS firms smooth their cash flows via hedging with derivatives and smooth their earnings using discretionary accruals after the inception of CDS trading

This paper contributes to existing climate finance literature by examining how firms' proactive management of carbon risks affects market assessment of their credit risk. Using two quasi-exogenous events involving the 2015 Paris Climate Agreement and the staggered implementation of U.S. state climate adaptation plans, we find that stronger carbon risk management is associated with significantly lower credit default swap spreads. Our results are not driven by firm-level climate exposure, and social or governance risk. Firms with better carbon risk management also exhibit lower subsequent carbon emissions. Our paper highlights the importance of carbon risk management in mitigating credit risk

Leverage represents both a fundamental component of equity volatility and a long-run selection variable. Based on this premise, we investigate the influence of leverage on the long-run cross-sectional predictability of future realized equity volatility. Leverage makes equity volatility significantly less predictable than underlying firm asset volatility, a result that is robust to different predictors of future realized volatility: credit default swap implied, historical, and option implied volatility. A simple model of optimal capital structure, wherein companies maximize tax benefits subject to a common maximum default probability (minimum credit rating) target, helps explain this finding

In this paper, we examine the effect of credit defaults swaps (CDS) initiation on reference firms' cost management strategies. CDS contracts provide insurance protection for creditors, inducing a shift in bargaining power from borrowers to creditors and an excessive incidence of bankruptcy. Anticipating more intransigent creditors in debt renegotiations and higher bankruptcy risk, CDS firms are incentivized to mitigate risk through decreasing cost stickiness after CDS initiation, as cost stickiness lowers liquidity and triggers early covenant violations. We find that, on average, CDS initiation is associated with a decline in reference firms' cost stickiness. This association is more pronounced for less liquid, financially distressed, and lower credit quality firms. We also find that CDS firms with a reduction in cost stickiness will exhibit lower future bankruptcy risk than CDS firms without such as reduction in stickiness. Collectively, our findings suggest that the CDS-induced “empty creditor problem” causes reference firms to undertake more conservative cost management practices to alleviate downside risk

We examine the effect of voluntary climate risk disclosure on Credit Default Swap (CDS) premiums. We develop a structural model, in which climate-related disclosures serve as an information source reducing climate change uncertainty. The model predicts a negative relation between the informativeness of climate risk disclosure and the CDS premium, and asymmetric effects of positive and negative disclosure tone on the CDS premium. Using climate risk measures quantified from earnings call transcripts, we provide evidence supporting these predictions with causal inference. Our study suggests that climate risk is priced in the CDS market, where investors pay attention to climate risk disclosures

Theoretically, increased risk-taking incentives should disproportionately benefit equity holders at the expense of creditors. However, we find that increases in CEO risk-taking incentives (vega) are associated with better outcomes for creditors. Specifically, credit ratings and credit default swaps both improve following increases in vega. This effect is magnified for firms close to default. Within the Merton (1974) framework, our findings suggest that increased risk-taking incentives induce managers to take on more positive net present value projects. Consequently, while higher vega increases the risk of the firm, our results imply that it also increases the expected value of the firm, reducing its credit risk

We test whether bank loans change public bond yields. A 25% increase in bank debt raises bond yields by 8 bps, reflecting a trade-off between the benefits of bank cross-monitoring and higher bond risk. This effect is smaller for firms with no credit default swaps (CDSs) and with junk debt—scenarios where bank monitoring is most valuable. It is unlikely that firms with bank debt are riskier, because they are less likely to be downgraded and have lower loan spreads. We find similar results using a natural experiment around the 2014 oil shock. Our results highlight how bond yields depend on incentive conflicts among creditors

We develop a model of compensation structure and asset risk choice, where a risk-averse manager is compensated with salary, equity and inside debt. We seek to understand the joint implications of this compensation package for managerial risk-taking incentives and credit spreads. We show that the size and seniority of inside debt not only are crucial for the relation between inside debt and credit spreads but also play an important role in shaping the relation between equity compensation and credit spreads. Using a sample of U.S. public firms with traded credit default swap contracts, we provide evidence supportive of the model's predictions