Estimating comovement measures for a large set of bilateral foreign exchange (FX) rates, I explore the relation between firm-level FX exposure and its time-varying diversifiability. For a sample of U.S. firms, the magnitude of FX exposure appears to increase during periods of low currency risk diversifiability. Additional results suggest that the introduction of the euro exacerbated the effect of diversifiability on developed market currency exposure. Moreover, the low diversifiability of emerging market currencies seems to have a stronger effect on FX exposure than the low diversifiability of developed market currencies.

We investigate how supervisory enforcement actions (EAs) against banks affect their business borrowers. We find negative short-term valuation effects of EAs for large relationship borrowers, which are reversed after new loans are granted. Large non-relationship borrowers' valuations are unaffected by EAs, but turn negative after relationships are established with sanctioned banks. Additionally, sanctioned banks appear to offset uncertainty and reputational damage of EAs by improving credit terms and availability for relationship and non-relationship large businesses, but decrease credit availability to small businesses. The small business credit contraction may have significant negative economic consequences due to bank dependency and credit constraints.

This paper examines whether high-ability managers’ earnings smoothing is motivated by the need to mitigate the adverse effects of heightened information asymmetry triggered by mergers and acquisitions (M&As) on managers’ reputation capital (job loss) and firm value. We document that acquirers led by high-ability managers engage in more pre-acquisition earnings smoothing and experience more significant announcement abnormal returns and operating performance in post-M&A periods than their low-ability counterparts. This result is consistent with the theory of managerial response to asymmetric information, amplified by M&As, where high-ability managers use earnings smoothing as a signaling device to ensure that the market quickly discovers their superior abilities, to increase acquirers’ future growth prospects and avoid the adverse effects of information asymmetry on managers’ job security and career prospects in a competitive executive labor market.

A firm with less redeployable assets, which are assets that have fewer alternative uses outside the firm, is more likely to borrow from banks than issue public debt. These findings are consistent with firms with less redeployable assets valuing the ability to renegotiate bank debt contracts instead of selling assets in the event of default. Consistent with this mechanism, firms with lower asset redeployability sell fewer assets following covenant violations. Our results contribute to work on the determinants of which debt markets a firm chooses to borrow from and the role that banks play as intermediaries.

This paper provides a modern overview of capital markets, financial institutions, and corporate finance in China. In our discussions, we highlight and describe what is unique to China. We also describe how papers in the Special Issue advance our understanding of financial markets, institutions, and corporate finance in China and in general.

Do managerial incentive horizons have capital market consequences? We find that they do when short-sale constraints are more binding. Firms experience significant stock price inflation when their CEOs have short horizon incentives. The short-horizon CEOs sell more shares at inflated prices and generate greater abnormal trading profits. The stock price inflation is partly explained by greater earnings surprises and more positive investor reaction to the surprises. To inflate stock prices, short-horizon firms are more likely to employ income-increasing discretionary accruals. Consistent with theoretical predictions, all these effects are attenuated or statistically insignificant when short-sale constraints are less binding.

This study tests whether the information processing costs of analysts vary positively with the environmental performance information available on the firms they follow. Consistent with this conjecture, we find that these costs increase when analysts process a wider array of environmental performance ratings. Specifically we find that as the number of environmental performance ratings increases, analysts cover fewer firms in their portfolio, provide fewer earnings-per-share (EPS) forecast revisions, and make less timely forecast revisions. Two additional tests confirm that our results relate to environmental performance information and not to confounding factors. First, the “shock” of the Global Warming Solutions Act of 2006 implemented for California firms in 2012 increases analyst information processing costs incremental to the main effect of environmental performance ratings. Second, analyst information processing costs increase further in the year a firm covered by an analyst provides a CSR report for the first time. Our results have implications for firm managers considering voluntary environmental disclosure and investors deciding on what stocks to include in their socially responsible portfolios because when processing costs are high, analysts will provide less information or less timely information, resulting in more gradual price discovery in capital markets.

Size threshold-based regulatory requirements are pervasive in banking, but little is known about how they affect the merger and acquisition (M&A) behavior of banks around the thresholds. M&As cause discrete increases in size, so we hypothesize changes in banks' M&A behavior near regulatory size thresholds and associated real effects (changes in small business lending by the acquiring banks). We develop a novel research design that estimates indirect treatment effects for banks just below the thresholds. We find strong evidence of indirect treatment effects on bank M&A behavior and the small business lending of the merged banks. Our results illustrate the importance of indirect treatment effects in difference-in-differences studies involving size thresholds.

We find that co-opted boards facilitate more erratic and arbitrary decision-making, contributing towards default risk. A one standard deviation increase in co-option increases default risk by 11% relative to normal levels. Supporting the notion that co-option makes decision-making more erratic, we find that stock return volatility and fundamental volatility are higher among co-opted boards and that strategic conformity among such firms is lower. We find no evidence that our results may be driven by firm risk-taking, however, we do find evidence suggesting that co-opted boards are less engaged and involved in strategic decision-making. We also find that external oversight mechanisms, in the form of institutional investors, financial analysts, media coverage, and takeover susceptibility, mitigate the documented effect. Overall, our study documents new evidence on the adverse effect of co-opted boards on firm default probability.