We examine the relation between firm diversification and asymmetric information empirically using metrics drawn from the market microstructure literature. We find that the average diversified firm in our sample has somewhat less severe asymmetric information problems than a similarly constructed portfolio of stand-alone firms chosen to approximate the segments of the conglomerate. We also find that the information asymmetry of diversified firms is very similar to that of individual focused firms that approximate the conglomerates along several dimensions not including industry composition. We conclude that greater diversification is not on average associated with increased asymmetric information.

Institutional investors have become more active in corporate governance with the relaxation of Depression Era securities laws. The California Public Employees Retirement System (CalPERS) is a leading institutional activist. In this paper, we examine the relationship between CalPERS' public targeting and both short- and long-term stock returns to address what has been dubbed the “CalPERS effect.” Our results indicate evidence of an announcement effect and that, while there is also evidence of some long-term improvement, it is limited to 6 months from the announcement of the target list in the Wall Street Journal when more consistent empirical methodologies are employed.

We study the underpricing and long-term performance of A- and B-share initial public offerings (IPOs) issued in China during the 1993–1998 period. The average underpricing for A- and B share IPOs are 178% and 11.6%, respectively. The underpricing of A-share IPOs is positively related to the number of days between the offering and the listing and the number of stock investors in the province from which the IPO comes, and negatively related to the number of shares being issued. None of these characteristics explain the underpricing of B-share IPOs. In the long run, A-share IPOs slightly underperform the size- and/or book/market (B/M)-matched portfolios while B-shares outperform the benchmark portfolios.

This paper provides evidence of the association between a firm's investment opportunity set (IOS), director ownership, and corporate policy choices. Using a sample of growth and non-growth firms in an emerging Asian market, we find that the IOS theory has significant explanatory power in the financing, dividend, executive compensation, and leasing aspects of corporate policies. Growth firms have lower debt-to-equity ratios and dividend yields, pay higher cash compensation and bonus amounts to their top executives, and finance a higher proportion of their asset acquisitions through operating leases. We also find that director ownership moderates and counteracts the association between IOS and corporate policies. Our results are consistent with contracting theory predictions that high director ownership mitigates the need for incentive or bonus compensation plans in growth firms.

Asian initial public offerings (IPOs) require investors to pay subscription funds up-front upon submission of applications, and these funds are locked-up for 1–3 weeks without interest. Hence, the IPO process entails an explicit financing cost (opportunity cost) whether investors borrow funds or use their own funds to apply for IPO shares. The IPO subscription costs are not trivial, especially in a high interest rate environment or when an IPO is highly oversubscribed. These costs should be considered in any comparison of IPO returns across countries.