Using a large dataset of hand-collected information on activist interventions from 2008 to 2014, we examine why certain hedge funds succeed in the face of competition. We document that the top hedge funds succeed, not merely because of how they select targets, but because they acquire a reputation for what we label “clout and expertise.” These hedge funds do not intervene more frequently; to the contrary, activists with more interventions are associated with lower returns. Instead, top activists have a demonstrated ability to succeed in difficult interventions by targeting large firms, launching successful proxy fights, filing and winning lawsuits, pressuring target boards through the media, overcoming anti-takeover defenses, and replacing board members. These activists' successes appear to result more from board representation, improved performance, and monitoring management than from capital structure or dividend policy changes.

We examine interactions between investment and financing decisions in a dynamic model where the firm can alter the mix of debt and equity financing and exercise a randomly arriving and potentially short lived growth option. The firm will typically finance the exercise of the growth option with equity and may wait years before recapitalizing to a higher debt level. The lack of coordination between the timing of investment and debt financing helps explain a number of findings in the empirical literature, including violation of the financing pecking order, debt conservatism, apparent market timing of security issues, and more pronounced underperformance following equity issues than debt issues.

Given the all-importance of analyst coverage for IPO firms, we examine the interaction between the initiation of analyst coverage and management forecast disclosure in IPO prospectuses. We find that IPO firms that provide a prospectus forecast are more likely to receive coverage (and earlier), particularly from lower quality analysts. The depth of coverage, measured by the number of analysts issuing a recommendation on the firm, is also greater for forecasters. These results hold after controlling for potential endogeneity due to simultaneity in management decision to provide a forecast and analysts' decision to cover the firm. Further analyses show that reputation concerns matter to analyst coverage decisions — conditional on firms providing a prospectus forecast, the likelihood of receiving coverage decreases with the magnitude of the absolute management forecast error. There is evidence of quid pro quo where the analyst working for the underwriter of the IPO aligns her forecast with the management forecast more than unaffiliated analysts. Insofar as management forecasts are important to coverage decision and analyst coverage is valuable, our research has important implications for strengthening the safe harbour provision for prospectus forecasts in litigious environments such as that in the U.S.

We investigate how the introduction of market-based pricing, the practice of tying loan interest rates to credit default swaps, has affected bank financing. We find that market-based pricing is associated with lower interest rates, both at origination and during the life of the loan. Our results also indicate that banks simplify the covenant structure of market-based pricing loans, suggesting that the decline in the cost of bank debt is explained, at least in part, by a reduction in monitoring costs. Market-based pricing, therefore, besides reducing the cost of bank debt, may also have adverse consequences resulting from the decline in bank monitoring.

We examine the relation between political uncertainty and cash holdings for firms in China. We document that, during the first year of a new city government official's appointment, a firm, on average, holds less cash, which is consistent with the grabbing hand hypothesis of politician. Our results are robust to alternative measures of cash holdings, instrumental variable estimation, sub-samples without firms in four major cities, a matched sample approach, and placebo tests. In addition, our additional analyses suggest that a firm holds significantly less cash if: (a) the newly appointed official is from a different city relative to that from the same city, (b) it faces high political extraction risk, and (c) it has strong twin agency conflicts. Lastly, our extended results suggest that the market value of cash holdings is significantly negative during periods of political uncertainty and firms hide their cash by moving it to related firms via related party transactions.

Payout policies based on share repurchase programs provide greater flexibility than do those based on cash dividends. We develop and test an empirical model in which strongly governed companies outperform weakly governed companies after announcing share repurchase programs. Our findings include positive associations between strong governance and both post-announcement adjusted operating performance and abnormal stock returns. The results are robust to sample selection bias, different sample criteria, governance measurement, and various control variables. In addition, governance strength is associated with larger post-announcement changes in CEO incentive compensation and merger and acquisition activity, both of which we argue are consistent with strongly governed companies using the financial flexibility derived from choosing share repurchases over cash dividends to drive better performance. Consistent with current literature on attenuation of former anomalies, the associations we find between governance and post-announcement performance tend to disappear in the latter half of our sample period.

While US companies mainly list their board of directors alphabetically, this is not the case for Chinese companies, most of which list their independent directors last. We interpret the listing order of Chinese directors as board hierarchy, reflecting power allocation within the board. Based on extant evidence that independent directors contribute to firm value and that empowered individuals have more influence in group decision making, we expect independent-director rankings to be positively associated with firm value and find evidence consistent with this prediction. In our supplementary analyses we explore the mechanisms through which empowered independent directors enhance firm value. We find that independent directors who are ranked higher are more likely to vote against the management, especially on financial reporting issues. Further, higher independent-director rankings are associated with less earnings management. Our study suggests that empowering independent directors increases firm value.

This paper investigates the dynamics of cross-listing and corporate social responsibility (CSR). Using a sample of 10,815 firm-year observations from 54 countries over the period 2002–2011, we find that cross-listed firms have better CSR performance than non–cross-listed domestic firms. This result is robust to endogeneity and different types of cross-listing. We also find that CSR increases (decreases) significantly after cross-listing in (delisting from) U.S. markets. The positive impact of cross-listing on CSR performance is stronger for firms from countries with weaker institutions, lower country-level sustainability, and higher liability of foreignness, and for firms operating in industries with high litigation risk. Finally, we find that cross-listed firms with better CSR performance exhibit higher valuations.