Ownership structure plays a critical role in the incentives and behaviors of business organizations. The literature has focused on the effects of firm ownership dispersion across managers and investors. We extend the literature by examining the roles of ownership structure within a controlling family. Specifically, we focus on the family trust structure, which is a popular vehicle for holding family ownership around the world. The trust structure typically locks controlling ownership within a family for a very long period. Although it ensures family control, the share transfer restriction may induce family shirking problems, make family conflicts difficult to resolve, and distort firm decisions. Based on a sample of publicly traded family firms in Hong Kong, we report that trust-controlled firms that are more susceptible to these problems tend to pay higher dividends, invest less in the long term, and experience worse performance. The costs of using a trust structure are more significant when the family stakes have been locked inside the trust for a longer period and when a larger amount of family ownership is held by the trust.

This paper examines the relationship between investors' ambiguity in the financial options market and systemic banks' risk. Eliciting ambiguity information from option pricing data on the twelve major U.S. banks between 2003 and 2010, we show that higher behavioral deviations from risk-neutral and Bayesian valuation (i.e., investor ambiguity) are associated with higher systemic banks' downside, market and credit risks. Consistent with behavioral explanations, we confirm the detrimental effect of ambiguity on financial market outcomes and find strong evidence of ambiguity among call and put option holders. Variance decomposition indicates that such a pattern of behavior explains a significant proportion of U.S. banking risk variance. This effect is more pronounced during periods of economic turbulence and bank stress (i.e., the 2007–2009 crisis), and holds after controlling for size, tail risk, implied volatility, and volatility of volatility dynamics. We also document that ambiguity from the financial market has a depressing impact on real economic activity, including capacity utilization, non-farm payrolls and overall economic performance. Our findings are robust to alternative specifications of ambiguity such as multiple priors and expected utilities with uncertain probabilities.

We exploit the staggered adoption of the universal demand (UD) laws across U.S. states, which impedes shareholder rights to initiate derivative lawsuits, as a quasi-natural experiment to examine the relation between shareholder litigation rights and firm capital structures. We find that weaker shareholder litigation rights due to the UD laws adoption lead to higher financial leverage, which enhances firm value. Furthermore, the positive relation between the UD laws adoption and financial leverage is more pronounced for firms exposed to higher shareholder litigation risk ex ante or financially constrained firms. Our evidence is consistent with lower shareholder litigation threats motivating firms to increase financial leverage.

This research examines the relation between political corruption and mergers and acquisitions (M&As). We find that local corruption increases firm acquisitiveness but decreases firm targetiveness. The levels of corruption in acquirer areas relate positively to the bid premiums and negatively to the likelihood of deal completion. Corruption motivates acquiring firms to use excess cash for payment, which mitigates the negative effect of corruption on acquirer shareholder value. The evidence indicates that acquisitions help acquiring firms convert cash into hard-to-extract assets and relocate assets from the high to low corruption areas, thereby shielding their liquid assets from expropriation by local officials.

We examine the diversification choices and financial performance of companies run by former bureaucrats in China. We find that the ex-bureaucrat led companies are involved in more diversified business lines than other firms managed by professionals without such government backgrounds. While former bureaucrats that manage state-owned enterprises (SOEs) tend to operate in unattractive industries, those who manage private firms do businesses in more profitable, faster-growing, and more related industries. The diversification of private firms is helped by additional borrowing capacity brought in by ex-bureaucrat CEOs, while no such financing effect is found in SOEs. The overall diversification performance associated with bureaucrat CEOs is positive in private firms, but not in SOEs. As manifested by the different diversification strategies and outcomes between private firms and SOEs, the government-linked CEOs facilitate transfers of critical business resources that benefit either owners' or governments' goals.

Size threshold-based regulatory requirements are pervasive in banking, but little is known about how they affect the merger and acquisition (M&A) behavior of banks around the thresholds. M&As cause discrete increases in size, so we hypothesize changes in banks' M&A behavior near regulatory size thresholds and associated real effects (changes in small business lending by the acquiring banks). We develop a novel research design that estimates indirect treatment effects for banks just below the thresholds. We find strong evidence of indirect treatment effects on bank M&A behavior and the small business lending of the merged banks. Our results illustrate the importance of indirect treatment effects in difference-in-differences studies involving size thresholds.

We find that co-opted boards facilitate more erratic and arbitrary decision-making, contributing towards default risk. A one standard deviation increase in co-option increases default risk by 11% relative to normal levels. Supporting the notion that co-option makes decision-making more erratic, we find that stock return volatility and fundamental volatility are higher among co-opted boards and that strategic conformity among such firms is lower. We find no evidence that our results may be driven by firm risk-taking, however, we do find evidence suggesting that co-opted boards are less engaged and involved in strategic decision-making. We also find that external oversight mechanisms, in the form of institutional investors, financial analysts, media coverage, and takeover susceptibility, mitigate the documented effect. Overall, our study documents new evidence on the adverse effect of co-opted boards on firm default probability.

Exploiting a unique setting in China where internal controls are intended to manage risks, we investigate how internal controls shape the cash holding policies. Results show that firms with higher internal control quality (ICQ) are less likely to have abnormal cash holdings, either excess or deficit cash, and this effect is not driven by corporate governance quality. We also find that firms with higher ICQ are more likely to increase dividend payments and are less likely to increase M&A investments, especially when the firms have had a negative experience with prior M&A investments. Furthermore, our tests on the market valuation of cash holdings show that investors place a higher value on cash holdings of firms with higher ICQ. Collectively, our findings suggest that internal controls help companies shape reasonable cash policies that lead to value creation.