Firms can adjust their convertibles to be more debt-like or equity-like through several contract terms. In particular, by providing call protection, a convertible issuer can assure its convertible bondholders that it will not force them to become equity holders during the call protection period. The possibility of a forced conversion instituted by an early call should be more threatening to investors in an economy where local laws are biased against shareholders. I examine call protection terms in an international sample and find evidence consistent with the hypothesis that convertible bond design varies based on the features of local law.

We investigate stock price reactions to Internet-related name changes in a market downturn. In contrast to the Internet boom period, during which there was a surge of dot.com additions, in the bust period, there is a dramatic reduction in the pace of dot.com additions accompanied by a rapid increase in dot.com name deletions. Following the Internet “crash” of mid-2000, investors react positively to name changes for firms that remove dot.com from their name. This dot.com deletion effect produces cumulative abnormal returns on the order of 64% for the 60 days surrounding the announcement day. Our results add support to a growing body of literature that documents that investors are potentially influenced by cosmetic effects and that managers rationally time corporate actions to take advantage of these biases.