We provide evidence that existing studies relating financial condition to product market cooperation produce mixed results because of unique features of the industries examined. In particular, all evidence suggesting that poor financial condition decreases cooperation comes from the airline industry during periods of high idle capacity. Using a unique data set of aggregate airfare hikes and a more recent low-idle-capacity period, we find that poor financial condition is positively associated with product market cooperation. Although financially weak airlines appear to value the immediate cash flows of increased cooperation, only liquidity-constrained firms seem willing to incur the cost of cooperative attempts.

We independently and jointly test multiple proposed explanations for chief executive officer (CEO) pay-for-luck asymmetry, comparing their contributions to the observed asymmetry. Measuring luck based on both stock and operating performance, we analyze pay asymmetry for both the average and median CEO. We document that favorable labor market opportunities—measuring executive retention concerns—most consistently underlie pay asymmetry across specifications, while CEO power and bankruptcy avoidance incentives are only weakly related. However, none of these independently explains pay asymmetry across our expanded tests. Our results highlight important empirical modeling concerns and provide valuable insight for future theoretical and empirical work.

The economic value of the Say-On-Pay (SOP) provision of the Dodd–Frank Act has been a subject of debate. Proponents of this provision suggest these votes benefit shareholders by increasing investor influence over managerial compensation. Opponents of the SOP provision believe compensation contracting is better done by well-informed and unobstructed boards of directors. Our study provides direct evidence on the impact of the shareholder SOP votes by examining responses to the vote. We find that overcompensated managers with low SOP support tend to react by increasing dividends, decreasing leverage and increasing corporate investment. However, we find no evidence that management's response to the vote affects subsequent vote outcomes, nor do we find a subsequent change in firm value. Finally, we find excess compensation increases for managers that were substantially overpaid prior to the SOP vote, regardless of the outcome of the vote. Thus, it does not appear that the SOP legislation has had the intended effect of improving executive contracting.