This study explores the influence of U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) enforcement on corporate green innovation, as measured by green patent counts and citations. Our findings show that EPA-enforced firms experience a substantial uptick in green innovation outputs. This boost can be attributed to enhanced green innovation efficiency and increased hiring of green inventors. Moreover, this effect is more pronounced for firms headquartered in states with stronger environmental enforcement intensity, firms with higher institutional ownership, and firms with fewer financial constraints. Finally, we find that green innovations help enforced firms avoid future EPA enforcements and reduce toxic chemical releases. Taken together, these results imply that EPA enforcement actions can indeed foster positive impacts on corporate green innovation.

This paper examines corporate mergers and acquisitions (M&A) outcomes under lender scrutiny. Using the unique shocks of U.S. supervisory stress testing, we find that firms under increased lender scrutiny after their relationship banks fail stress tests engage in fewer but higher-quality M&A deals. Evidence from comprehensive supervisory data reveals improved credit quality for newly originated M&A-related loans under enhanced lender scrutiny. This improvement is further evident in positive stock return reactions to M&A deals financed by loans subject to enhanced lender scrutiny. As companies engage in fewer but higher-quality deals, they also experience higher returns on assets. Our findings highlight the importance of lender scrutiny in corporate M&A activities.

We show that state right-to-work (RTW) laws significantly encourage corporate innovations in terms of patent grant and citation count. Consistent with the conjecture that the RTW-treated firms conduct more innovations due to their decreased financial distress risk, we find that the RTW adoption also significantly decreases treated firms' financial distress risk ex post, and its treatment effect on innovation outputs is stronger for treated firms that are ex ante more likely to experience financial distress. Further analysis indicates that treated firms intensify research and development expenditures and, likely due to their improved innovations, enhance their competitiveness in product markets.

We study whether and how the market value of corporate real estate (REMV) shapes acquirer M&A performance. Using hand-collected loan agreements linked to M&A deals, we show that financing secured by real estate embeds tighter acquisition covenants and that, unlike other collateral, real estate collateral is associated with higher announcement returns. Instrumental-variables estimates based on headquarters-state property taxes, crime rates, and local natural-disaster exposure support a causal link from REMV to M&A deal performance. A two-by-two design crossing industry growth opportunities with acquisition covenants shows that both lender screening and financial flexibility mechanisms operate: returns are strongest when growth opportunities are high and covenants are restrictive, remain positive but smaller when only one channel is active, and vanish when both are weak. Consistent with ex-ante screening, acquirers borrowing against real estate are more likely to withdraw deals with negative announcement reactions. Our findings highlight the importance of real estate collateral in shaping corporate investment outcomes and suggest that real estate appreciation enhances firms' capacity to undertake more disciplined and value-creating acquisitions.

We find that individualistic countries regulate insider trading activities more intensely. The result is robust to controlling for alternative culture variables, additional controls, and instrumental variable analysis. We also document that individualism's effect is magnified in democratic countries. In addition, we study the economic and financial consequences of individualism, insider trading regulation, and its enforcement. The analysis suggests that individualism and the enforcement of insider trading regulation promote financial development. Interaction effects reveal that individualism and insider trading regulation serve as complements to promote financial development. These findings contribute to the insider trading debate since regulation alone may not be the primary determinant of market efficiency. Combined, our results challenge prior works concluding that individualism is anti-regulation

The economic impact of corporate self-dealing and the regulation against such activity both vary across countries. In this work, we examine the influence of trust on shareholder protection. We hypothesize that anonymous trust can affect self-dealing through two channels. First, trust may complement existing formal regulation. Alternatively, trust and formal regulation can act as substitutes. To test these hypotheses, we examine the association between a country's anti-self-dealing index and anonymous trust. We find that anonymous trust inversely relates to formal self-dealing regulation. We further find that anonymous trust positively relates to financial market development. Collectively, this evidence suggests that trust substitutes for formal self-dealing regulation, providing an alternative mechanism for shareholder protection

We show that social connections between a firm's executives and directors and brokerages that follow the firm decrease the firm's cost of equity. We use quasi-natural experiments to address endogeneity concerns and find that the uncovered effect of firm-brokerage social connections on cost of equity is likely causal. The effect is found to be more pronounced for firms with more soft information, opaque information environments, tight financial constraints, weak corporate monitoring, or high executive equity ownership. Further, consistent with the evidence on cost of equity, we find that firm-brokerage social connections reduce SEO underpricing, decrease information asymmetry in stock markets, and improve the firm's equity valuation.

This paper reviews the economic theory of regulation and surveys the empirical evidence on its application to past and recent changes in U.S. securities regulation. The theory provides multiple potential motives for regulation and cautions the empirical researcher against naïve modeling of the costs and benefits of regulatory change. Moreover, the nature of the regulatory process compounds the standard pitfalls of empirical analysis such as endogeneity and confounding events. Productive empirical techniques include the development of cross-sectional predictions of the effects of regulation as well as the use of unregulated control samples. An important avenue for future research is a more refined estimation of the extent to which regulation has unintended consequences

Bank liquidity shortages during the global financial crisis of 2007–2009 led to the introduction of liquidity regulations, the impact of which has attracted the attention of academics and policymakers. In this paper, we investigate the impact of liquidity regulation on bank lending. As a setting, we use the Netherlands, where a Liquidity Balance Rule (LBR) was introduced in 2003. The LBR was imposed on Dutch banks only and did not apply to other banks operating elsewhere within the Eurozone. Using this differential regulatory treatment to overcome identification concerns and a difference-in-differences approach, we find that the LBR increased the volume of lending by Dutch banks relative to other banks located in the Eurozone. Increased equity, an inflow of retail deposits and subsequent increase in balance sheet size allowed Dutch banks to increase lending despite having to meet the LBR requirements. The LBR also affected the loan composition of Dutch banks (with corporate and retail lending increasing more than mortgage lending) and the maturity profile of loan portfolios. Our results have relevance for policymakers tasked with monitoring the impact of liquidity regulations on banks and the real economy

We present an equilibrium model of financial institutions to examine the optimal regulation of risk taking. Shareholders provide incentives for management to increase risk to excessive levels. Regulators use caps on asset risk and compensation to achieve the socially optimal risk level. This level trades off costs of risk shifting and costs of bank default. Without regulation, equilibrium risk lies above the optimal level. If information and enforcement are perfect, either policy tool (caps on asset risk or compensation) achieves the optimal risk level. If there are frictions – if enforcement is limited, if there is uncertainty about the incentives facing management and costs of risk shifting, or if regulation cannot be bank specific – welfare can be improved by employing both policy tools