This paper studies the origins of an import substitution strategy of development, summarizes the consequences of that strategy, and reviews the problems that led to its failure. The fundamental difficulty was its discouragement of the indigenous social learning necessary for sustained, independent development. The emergence of an outward-oriented, minimal-government strategy is due to the success of Korea and Taiwan. This strategy fails to recognize that social learning requires a strong role for national agents and that this role can be penalized by undue openness. An effective strategy must protect and induce domestic learning without penalizing exporting.

Evolutionary game theory provides an answer to two of the central questions in economic modeling: when is it reasonable to assume that people are rational? And, when is it reasonable to assume that behavior is part of a Nash equilibrium (and if it is reasonable, which equilibrium)? The traditional answers are not compelling, and much of evolutionary modeling is motivated by the need for a better answer. Evolutionary game theory suggests that, in a range of settings, agents do (eventually) play a Nash equilibrium. Moreover, evolutionary modeling has shed light on the relative plausibility of different Nash equilibria.