Knowledge that Transforms

ABSTRACT Can banks’ reputational concerns improve the quality of opaque, off‐balance sheet securities, such as mortgage‐backed securities? We study this question in a uniquely parsimonious setting. In the 1760s, Dutch banking partnerships securitized West‐Indian plantation mortgages that were risky and opaque. High‐reputation banks originated better mortgages and issued securities that, on average, retained 17.5% more of their value during a market collapse. Reputational effects are attenuated when the managing partners were married into wealth or received a large share of profits in the short term, suggesting that bank reputation only works if bankers are personally exposed to (long‐run) reputational losses.

ABSTRACT We assess the long‐term effects of managerial stress on aging and mortality. Using a difference‐in‐differences design, we apply neural network–based machine‐learning techniques to CEOs' facial images and show that exposure to industry distress shocks during the Great Recession produces visible signs of aging. We estimate a one‐year increase in “apparent” age. Moreover, using data on CEOs since the mid‐1970s, we estimate a 1.1‐year decrease in life expectancy after an industry distress shock, but a two‐year increase when antitakeover laws insulate CEOs from market discipline. The estimated health costs are significant, both in absolute terms and relative to other health risks.

ABSTRACT This paper documents new stylized facts about returns and cashflow growth rates on stocks and housing over decade‐long holding periods. While cashflow growth rates on the two assets comove positively, their returns comove negatively until the Global Financial Crisis and positively thereafter. These facts present a puzzle for representative‐agent models that imply positive return comovement for assets with similar cashflows. I consider a heterogeneous‐agent model with segmented stock and housing markets connected through credit. News about the aggregate economy generates negative return comovement. Recent shifts such as wealthier homebuyers and institutional housing purchases reduce the importance of credit and segmentation.

ABSTRACT Young firms' contribution to aggregate employment has been underwhelming. We show that a similar trend is not apparent, however, in their contribution to aggregate sales or stock market capitalization, implying that these firms have exhibited a high average‐to‐marginal revenue product of labor. We study the implications of a gradual shift in the average‐to‐marginal revenue product of labor within a model of dynamic firm heterogeneity. We show that this shift provides (i) a unified explanation for several aspects of the decline in dynamism and (ii) a possible explanation for why large declines in young‐firm employment may have only a moderate effect on aggregate output and consumption.

ABSTRACT Farmer, Schmidt, and Timmermann (FST) document time‐variation in market return predictability, identifying “pockets” of significant predictability through kernel regressions. However, our analysis reveals a critical discrepancy between the method outlined by FST and the code actually implemented. Instead of using a one‐sided kernel, which guarantees out‐of‐sample forecasts, they perform in‐sample estimation with a two‐sided kernel. As a result, future information leaks into the forecasting model, undermining its reliability. Rectifying this error qualitatively alters the findings, invalidating most conclusions of the FST study. Thus, attempts to exploit such “pockets”—should they exist—offer little help in forecasting market returns.

ABSTRACT Short‐sale costs eliminate the abnormal returns on asset pricing anomaly portfolios. While many anomalies persist out‐of‐sample before accounting for short‐sale costs, they cannot be exploited with long‐short strategies due to stock borrow fees. Using a comprehensive sample of 162 anomalies, the average long‐short portfolio return is a significant 0.14% per month before short‐sale costs, and the returns are due to the short leg. However, the average is −0.01% once returns are adjusted for borrow fees. Moreover, anomalies are not profitable even before fees if the high‐fee observations, representing 12% of stock dates, are excluded from the analysis.

ABSTRACT This paper establishes that mutual funds strategically time their trades in environmental, social, and governance (ESG) stocks around disclosure dates to inflate their sustainability ratings. This claim is supported by three empirical findings. First, we show that funds' ESG betas increase shortly before disclosure and decrease shortly afterwards. Second, we document that post‐disclosure fund returns are higher but have lower ESG exposure than disclosed portfolios. Third, we provide evidence that ESG stock prices temporarily rise before disclosure and decline afterwards. Overall, we establish that green window dressing positively impacts fund sustainability ratings, performance, and flows.

ABSTRACT Over‐the‐counter (OTC) trading thrives despite competition from exchanges. We let OTC dealers cream skim from exchanges in an otherwise standard Glosten and Milgrom framework. Restricting the dealer's ability to cream skim induces “cheap substitution”: some traders exit while others with larger gains from trade enter. Cheap substitution implies trading costs, trade volumes, and market shares are poor policy indicators. In a benchmark case, restricting the dealer raises welfare only if trading cost increases, volume falls, and OTC market share is high. By contrast, the restriction improves welfare when adverse selection risk is low. A simple procedure implements the optimal Pigouvian tax.

ABSTRACT Recent influential work finds large increases in inequality in the United States based on measures of wealth concentration that notably exclude the value of social insurance programs. This paper shows that top wealth shares have not changed much over the last three decades when Social Security is properly accounted for. This is because Social Security wealth increased substantially from $7.2 trillion in 1989 to $40.6 trillion in 2019 and now represents nearly 50% of the wealth of the bottom 90% of the wealth distribution. This finding is robust to potential changes to taxes and benefits in response to system financing concerns.