Trade credit is created whenever a supplier offers terms that allow the buyer to delay payment. In this paper we document the rich variation in interfirm credit terms and credit policies across industries. We examine empirically the firm's basic credit policy choices: whether to extend credit or to require cash payment; and, if credit is extended, whether to adopt simple net terms or terms with discounts for prompt payment. We also examine determinants of variations in two‐part terms. Results are supportive primarily of theories that explain credit terms as contractual solutions to information problems concerning product quality and buyer creditworthiness.

For corporations facing tax‐function convexity, hedging lowers expected tax liabilities, thereby providing an incentive to hedge. We use simulation methods to investigate convexity induced by tax‐code provisions. On average, the tax function is convex (although in approximately 25 percent of cases it is concave). Carrybacks and carryforwards increase the range of income with incentives to hedge; other tax‐code provisions have minor impacts. Among firms facing convex tax functions, average tax savings from a five percent reduction in the volatility of taxable income are about 5.4 percent of expected tax liabilities; in extreme cases, these savings exceed 40 percent.

The authors provide an empirical examination of the determinants of corporate debt maturity. Their evidence offers strong support for the contracting-cost hypothesis. Firms that have few growth options, are large, or are regulated have more long-term debt in their capital structure. The authors find little evidence that firms use the maturity structure of their debt to signal information to the market. The evidence is consistent, however, with the hypothesis that firms with larger information asymmetries issue more short-term debt. The authors find no evidence that taxes affect debt maturity.

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Building on Duffie and Kan (1996) , we propose a new representation of affine models in which the state vector comprises infinitesimal maturity yields and their quadratic covariations. Because these variables possess unambiguous economic interpretations, they generate a representation that is globally identifiable . Further, this representation has more identifiable parameters than the “maximal” model of Dai and Singleton (2000) . We implement this new representation for select three‐factor models and find that model‐independent estimates for the state vector can be estimated directly from yield curve data, which present advantages for the estimation and interpretation of multifactor models.

We compare fees charged by investment banks for conducting IPOs in the United States and Europe. In recent years, the “7% solution,” as documented by Chen and Ritter (2000) , has become even more prevalent in the United States, and is now the norm for IPOs raising up to $250 million. The same banks dominate both markets, but European IPO fees are roughly three percentage points lower, are much more variable, and have been falling. We review explanations for the gap in spreads and find the evidence consistent with strategic pricing. U.S. issuers could have saved over $1 billion a year by paying European fees.

We develop a model in which a firm's manager can voluntarily disclose to privately informed investors. In equilibrium, the manager only discloses sufficiently favorable news. If the manager is known to be informed but disclosure is costly, the probability of disclosure increases with market liquidity and the stock trades at a discount relative to expected cash flows. However, when investors are uncertain about whether the manager is informed, disclosure can decrease with market liquidity and the stock can trade at a premium relative to expected cash flows. Moreover, contrary to common intuition, public information can crowd in more voluntary disclosure.

This paper estimates the performance of insider trades on the closely held Oslo Stock Exchange (OSE) during a period of lax enforcement of insider trading regulations. Our data permit construction of a portfolio that tracks all movements of insiders in and out of the OSE firms. Using three alternative performance estimators in a time‐varying expected return setting, we document zero or negative abnormal performance by insiders. The results are robust to a variety of trade characteristics. Applying the performance measures to mutual funds on the OSE, we also document some evidence that the average mutual fund outperforms the insider portfolio.