Knowledge that Transforms

This paper discusses the consistent specification and estimation of asset demand equations in a disequilibrium model of financial markets. We estimate the effective asset demands of savings and loan associations, allowing for rationing in the mortgage market. These disequilibrium estimates are not very different from the estimates of notional demands with no rationing assumed. Savings and loans seem to be least affected by excess demand situations in that they are apparently not reluctant to raise mortgage rates and/or to ration borrowers.

The paper presents a theoretical proof that flattening of yield curves for par bonds is inevitable for long maturities. This proof implies that behavioral explanations of flattening are unnecessary. The proof also implies that the use of yields to maturity of couponbearing bonds to estimate the true term structure (as well as forward rates) for long maturities has potentially infinite bias, suggesting that a greater effort should be made to directly estimate the true term structure in empirical work.

Anthony M. Santomero, Jeremy J. Siegel, A General Equilibrium Money and Banking Paradigm, The Journal of Finance, Vol. 37, No. 2, Papers and Proceedings of the Fortieth Annual Meeting of the American Finance Association, Washington, D.C., December 28-30, 1981 (May, 1982), pp. 357-369

This study presents an analysis of the managerial incentive problem in a stock market economy in which incentive contracts are structured in terms of security ownership. In our model, the manager's ownership share signals effort and is determined endogenously as the solution to a special portfolio decision problem. Managerial investment in the firm is evaluated under various security pricing arrangements. Our analysis indicates that, in general, stockholders should sell shares to a manager at a discount to ensure a Pareto efficient ownership (incentive) structure. However, efficient pricing (discount) schedules generally are nonlinear and, in many respects, isomorphic to discriminating price functions which have been considered in neoclassical models of monopoly.