Knowledge that Transforms

The traditional view of the futures clearinghouse as an insurer that eliminates the need for customers to evaluate default risk is inaccurate. A clearinghouse member default in 1985 confirms that the clearinghouse only guarantees payment from member to member, not from customer to customer or member to customer. Thus, non‐defaulting customers are subject to losses as a result of the action of individuals with whom thay have no contractual obligations. This study models the behavior of customers choosing a futures commission merchant (FCM) given the current legal position of the clearinghouse. In a single‐period model with symmetric information, customers can eliminate their exposure to defaults of other customers or of their FCM only by choosing to trade through “boutique” (undiversified) FCMs. In practice, monitoring and rebalancing costs may impede the attainment of zero default risk. However, FCM diversification remains an important factor in customer choice of an FCM. When setting capital requirements, clearinghouses and government regulators need to consider the implications of diversification for both customer and market protection.

Prior studies report lower issue costs for shelf registered debt and conclude that the benefits of increased underwriter competition can be realized by those firms using this registration procedure. This study re‐examines the purported superiority of issuing debt via shelf registration, and finds that the savings in issue costs displayed by earlier studies can be attributed to a self selection bias and not the method of registration.

We investigate a class of agency costs of debt that arise because debt financing affects the firm's incentives to use inputs efficiently. A methodology for estimating this class of costs is presented and applied to a major industry, air transport. Our results are consistent with agency models that predict a decrease in efficiency as the debt increases. A part of the loss of efficiency that we identify is attributable to the greater use by levered firms of inputs that can be monitored and are collateralizable.

We examine the CBOE option market depth and bid-ask spreads. Absence of price effects surrounding large option trades suggests excellent market depth. However, bid-ask spreads for the CBOE options and the NYSE stocks are nearly equal, even though an average option is equivalent to less than half a stock plus borrowing. We explain this tradeoff between market depth and bid-ask spreads on the CBOE and the NYSE by differences in market mechanisms. We also show that the adverse-selection component of the option spread, which measures the extent of information-related trading on the CBOE, is very small.

This paper investigates the existence of equilibria with information-based block trading in a multiperiod market when no investor is constrained to block trade. Attention is restricted to equilibria in which a strategic uninformed institution (i.e., one which is forced to rebalance its portfolio but is free to choose an optimal rebalancing strategy) is willing to trade a block rather than break up the block into a series of smaller trades. Examples of such equilibria are found and analyzed. A STRIKING FACT ABOUT the New York Stock Exchange is that roughly half of the volume is traded in blocks of over 10,000 shares.1 However, despite the obvious importance of block trading, the types of market microstructures which generate block trades are not well understood. This paper provides a theoretical rationale for block trades by modeling an equilibrium in which blocks are endogenously traded. In particular, we show that, even when a block can be broken up into a sequence of small trades, blocks may still be traded as part of both informed and uninformed investors' optimal trading strategies. The analysis is conducted in a simple market in which there are competitive dealers and specialists, a group of small noise traders, and a strategic institution which trades either to exploit private information or because it is constrained to rebalance its portfolio. The main results about block trading in this setting are as follows:

The minimum cost output configuration for a firm may change as the result of a variety of factors, including changes in market structure. In this paper we test this structural change hypothesis with savings and loan data. We find support for the hypothesis that separable, constant returns to scale production functions characterize the average savings and loan in our sample in 1983. This is in contrast to the cost complementarities found in 1978. We argue that this result may be the result of regulatory changes that allowed savings and loans to alter their production mix to fully capture the benefits of joint production.

Using daily and monthly stock returns we find no convincing evidence that Federal Reserve margin requirements have served to dampen stock market volatility. The contrary conclusion, expressed in recent papers by Hardouvelis (1988a, b), is traced to flaws in his test design. We do detect the expected negative relation between margin requirements and the amount of margin credit outstanding. We also confirm the recent finding by Schwert (1988) that changes in margin requirements by the Fed have tended to follow rather than lead changes in market volatility.

We examine the cross‐sectional pricing equation of the APT using the elements of eigenvectors and the maximum likelihood factor loadings of the covariance matrix of returns as measures of risk. The results indicate that, for data assumed stationary over twenty years, the first vector is a surprisingly good measure of risk when compared with either a one‐ or a five‐factor model or a five‐vector model. We conclude that in some circumstances principal components analysis may be preferred to factor analysis.

This paper provides evidence that firms signal their private information about future earnings by their choice of split factor. Split factors are increasing in earnings forecast errors, after controlling for differences in pre-split price and firm size. Furthermore, price changes at stock dividend and split announcements are significantly correlated with split factors, holding other factors constant, and with earnings forecast errors. These correlations suggest that management's choice of split factor signals private information about future earnings and that investors revise their beliefs about firm value accordingly. The analysis also suggests, however, that announcement returns are significantly correlated with split factors after controlling for earnings forecast errors. This suggests that earnings forecast errors measure management's private information about future earnings with error, that split factors signal other valuation-relevant attributes, or that a signaling explanation is incomplete.