Knowledge that Transforms

This brief primer is intended to provide the foundations for the study of more rigorous and lengthy texts. It is designed principally for the finance faculty which does not specialize in continuous time methods, PhD students in finance and finance professionals. Chapters cover: a paradigm for primary asset valuation; complications of the basic paradigm; the valuation of derivative securities; optimal decision strategies and valuation.

The Arbitrage Pricing Theory (APT) implies that if asset returns have a factor structure, then an approximate multibeta representation holds with respect to the factors as reference variables. This paper assumes that asset returns satisfy a factor structure and derives a condition under which the approximate multibeta representation holds with respect to a set of reference variables which may not be the factors. This condition is that the regression matrix of the reference variables on the factors is nonsingular. Implications for the testability of the APT are also discussed.

While the U.S. has pursued a vigorous antitrust policy towards horizontal mergers over the past four decades, mergers in Canada have until recently been permitted to take place in a virtually unrestricted antitrust environment. The absence of an antitrust overhang in Canada presents an interesting opportunity to test the conjecture that the rigid market share and concentration criteria of the U.S. policy effectively deters a significant number of potentially collusive mergers. The effective deterrence hypothesis implies that the probability of a horizontal merger being anticompetitive is higher in Canada than in the U.S. However, parameters in cross-sectional regressions reject the market power hypothesis on samples of both U.S. and Canadian mergers. Judging from the Canadian evidence, there simply isn't much to deter.

Postwar U.S. data are characterized by negative correlations between real equity returns and inflation and by positive correlations between real equity returns and money growth. These patterns are closely matched quantitatively by an equilibrium monetary asset pricing model. The model also implies negative correlations between expected asset returns and expected inflation, and it predicts that the inflation-asset return correlation will be more strongly negative when inflation is generated by fluctuations in real economic activity than when it is generated by monetary fluctuations.

The paper characterizes predictable components in excess rates of returns on major equity and foreign exchange markets using lagged excess returns, dividend yields, and forward premiums as instruments. Vector autoregressive techniques demonstrate one-step-ahead predictability and provide implied long-horizon statistics. We estimate latent variable models as constrained counterparts to the VARs. The predictability of returns is related to asset pricing models by examining the volatility bounds on intertemporal marginal rates of substitution.

This paper investigates the behavior of stock and option prices around block trades in stocks. The results indicate that for both up tick and downtick block trades the stock prices adjust within a fifteen minute period after the block trade. Moreover, for uptick blocks there is no evidence of any stock price reaction before the block trade. However, the adjustment of stock price for downtick blocks begins about fifteen minutes before the block trade. We also find that option price behavior differs considerably from stock price behavior. Specifically, our results suggest that options exhibit abnormal price behavior starting thirty minutes before the block and ending one hour after the block. The pattern is more pronounced for downtick blocks and for put options. We interpret this abnormal price behavior of options before the block trade as consistent with intermarket frontrunning.

Keith M. Howe, Jia He, G. Wenchi Kao, One-Time Cash Flow Announcements and Free Cash-Flow Theory: Share Repurchases and Special Dividends, The Journal of Finance, Vol. 47, No. 5 (Dec., 1992), pp. 1963-1975

Restrictions on trading by insider agents are analyzed using an optimal contracting framework. Prohibition of insider trading is shown to be Pareto preferred if, and only if, a revelation or moral hazard problem exists. If prohibition of insider trading is valuable, then trade registration with a delay is shown to be as valuable as complete prohibition. Short selling restrictions, however, are generally of less value than complete prohibition. Finally, regulation of insider agent trading by governmental institutions and/or professional associations is discussed.