Knowledge that Transforms

Abstract We examine the number of external appointments held by corporate directors. Directors who serve larger firms and sit on larger boards are more likely to attract directorships. Consistent with Fama and Jensen (1983), we find that firm performance has a positive effect on the number of appointments held by a director. We find no evidence that multiple directors shirk their responsibilities to serve on board committees. We do not find that multiple directors are associated with a greater likelihood of securities fraud litigation. We conclude that the evidence does not support calls for limits on directorships held by an individual.

ABSTRACT We propose that the limited financial development of emerging markets is a significant factor behind the large share of dollar‐denominated external debt present in these markets. We show that when financial constraints affect borrowing and lending between domestic agents, agents undervalue insuring against an exchange rate depreciation. Since more of this insurance is present when external debt is denominated in domestic currency rather than in dollars, this result implies that domestic agents choose excessive dollar debt. We also show that limited financial development reduces the incentives for foreign lenders to enter emerging markets. The retarded entry reinforces the underinsurance problem.

One explanation for the negative relationship between short‐horizon stock returns and inflation is that inflation proxies (inversely) for expected future real output. In this paper, I examine the possibility that inflation also proxies for variation in real price/dividend ratios (excess returns). I show that when the covariance between real price/dividend ratios and inflation is nonzero, the relationship between returns and expected inflation differs for the two components of returns: dividend yields and capital gains returns. My empirical evidence demonstrates that dividend yields and capital gains are related differently to expected inflation in U.S. and foreign markets.

ABSTRACT We study a sample of diversified firms that alter their organizational structure by divesting a business segment. These firms experience a reduction in the diversification discount after the divestiture. We show that the efficiency of segment investment increases substantially following the divestiture and that this improvement is associated with a decrease in the diversification discount. Our results support the corporate focus and financing hypotheses for corporate divestitures. We demonstrate that inefficient investment is partly responsible for the diversification discount and show that asset sales lead to an improvement in the efficiency of investment for remaining divisions.

Abstract We measure the postsplit performance of 12,747 stock splits from 1927 to 1996 using two methods to measure abnormal returns: size and book‐to‐market reference portfolios with bootstrapping, and calendar‐time abnormal returns combined with factor models. Between 1927 and 1996, neither method applied to splits 25 percent or larger finds performance significantly different from zero. Over selected subperiods, subsamples of 2–1 splits restricted by book‐to‐market availability requirements display positive abnormal returns using some methods. However, these samples show small or negligible abnormal returns using the calendar‐time method. Overall, the stock split evidence against market efficiency is neither pervasive nor compelling.

ABSTRACT A Kyle (1985) model with private information diffusion is used to examine the motivation to spread stock tips. An informed investor with limited investment capacity spreads imprecise rumors to an audience of followers. Followers trade on the advice and move the price. Due to the imprecision of the rumor, the price overshoots with positive probability. This gives the rumormonger the opportunity to trade twice: First when she receives information, then when she knows the price to be overshooting. In equilibrium, rumors are informative and both rumormongers and followers increase their profits at the expense of uninformed liquidity traders.

Abstract This paper presents the first model where entry deterrence takes place through financial rather than product‐market channels. In existing models, a firm's choice of financial instruments deters entry by affecting product market behavior; here entry deterrence occurs by affecting the credit market behavior of investors towards entrant firms. We find that to deter entry, the claims held on incumbent firms should be sufficiently risky, that is, equity . This contrasts with the standard Brander and Lewis (1986) result that debt deters entry. This effect is more marked the less competitive the credit market is—so more credit market competition spurs more product market competition .

Abstract In August 1999, U.S. exchanges began to compete directly for order flow in many options that had been exclusively listed on another exchange, shifting 37% of option volume to multiple‐listing status by the end of September. Effective and quoted bid–ask spreads decrease significantly after multiple listings with spreads generally maintaining their initial lower levels 1 year later. These results hold for both time series and pooled regressions and are robust. We reject that economies of scale in market making cause the decrease in spreads and support the view that interexchange competition reduces option transaction costs.

ABSTRACT This paper examines the implications of market microstructure for asset pricing. I argue that asset pricing ignores the central fact that asset prices evolve in markets. Markets provide liquidity and price discovery, and I argue that asset pricing models need to be recast in broader terms to incorporate the transactions costs of liquidity and the risks of price discovery. I argue that symmetric information‐based asset pricing models do not work because they assume that the underlying problems of liquidity and price discovery have been solved. I develop an asymmetric information asset pricing model that incorporates these effects.

Prior empirical evidence regarding the impact of dividend taxes on firm valuation is mixed. This study avoids some of the complications encountered in previous empirical work by exploiting institutional characteristics of REITs, such as their limited discretion over dividend policy and the relative transparency of REIT assets. We regress the market value of equity on the market value of assets and tax basis, which creates tax deductions that lower future dividend taxes without affecting future pretax cash flow. We find that firm value is positively related to tax basis, suggesting that future dividend taxes are capitalized into share prices.