Knowledge that Transforms

A theory of trading volume is developed based on assumptions that market agents frequently revise their demand prices and randomly encounter potential trading partners. The model describes two distinct ways informational events affect trading volume. One is consistent with conjectures made by empirical researchers that investor disagreement leads to increased trading. But the observation of abnormal trading volume does not necessarily imply disagreement, and volume can increase even if investors interpret the information identically, if they also have had divergent prior expectations. Simulation tests support the model and are used to contrast the random-pairing environment with costless market clearing. Volume is lower in the costly market, and volume increases caused by an informational event persist after the event period. This is consistent with existing empirical evidence and suggests that markets do not immediately clear all orders or that investors have demands to recontract.

This paper demonstrates how Bayesian information may be analyzed as a variable input in determining an optimal bank portfolio and investigates the impact of information in a way that is statistically satisfactory. A portfolio model is developed, and the impact of information is analyzed. Information is treated as an economic input that is used up to the point where its predicted marginal benefit is exactly equal to its marginal cost, and, from there, the optimal demand for information is derived. A comparative‐static analysis demonstrates that the reaction of optimal portfolio holdings to interest rate changes under variable uncertainty is dramatically different from portfolio behavior when uncertainty is exogenous. Finally, the elasticity of reserves with respect to scale is examined under the assumption of variable uncertainty.

This paper looks at the moral hazard and adverse selection problems confronting an entrepreneur offering securities to an uninformed, but competitive financial market. The adverse selection aspect of the problem is generated by the unobservable entrepreneur's ability to transform effort into value. Moral hazard arises because the investment decision is made subsequent to financing. We consider the joint use of both debt and equity, and characterize the equilibrium relation between capital structure and unobservable attributes. It is shown that: (1) investment and financing are not separable; (2) there is an underinvestment problem for “better” firms; and (3) simultaneous use of both debt and equity can resolve this difficulty. We also establish a connection between expected terminal firm value and debt-promised payment level and between share retention and standard deviation.

Capital market data were used to examine the divestiture effects pertaining to deregulation, the dropping of antitrust charges, and the reversing of the co‐insurance effect associated with the recent breakup of AT&T. The empirical results of the study indicate that significant economic events took place during the breakup process, which led to transfers of wealth from various parties to the securityholders of AT&T. The results also indicate that the buffering effect of regulation was reduced as AT&T went through the total deregulation process. This is in accordance with Peltzman's prediction.

Publication of the December 1985 issue of the Journal of Finance completed the Journal's first 40 years of contributions to the profession. This study identifies and summarizes the contributing authors, where they earned their doctoral degrees, and their employers at the time of publication. The authors, degree-granting institutions, and employers appearing most frequently in the Journal are ordered for the entire 40-year period and for various subperiods. Where possible, the present findings are compared with those of previously published studies.