Knowledge that Transforms

Hidden capital exists whenever the accounting measure of a firm's net worth diverges from its economic value. Such unbooked capital has on‐balance‐sheet and off‐balance‐sheet sources. This paper develops a model to estimate both forms of hidden capital and to test hypotheses about their determinants. In effect, the analysis expands the two‐index model by endogenizing the market and interest‐rate sensitivities of any stock and decomposing each sensitivity into on‐balance‐sheet and off‐balance‐sheet elements. For a sample of banks during 1975–1985, the model finds considerable variation in both forms of hidden capital.

This paper uses three methods to estimate quality option values for CBOT Treasury bond futures contracts. It presents evidence regarding: (1) payoffs from exercising this option at delivery, (2) estimates from a T‐bond futures pricing model that incorporates this option, and (3) estimates obtained from an exchange option pricing formula. The results indicate that this option is worth considerably less than reported by Kane and Marcus (1986a) . For example, payoffs obtained by switching from the bond cheapest to deliver three months prior to delivery to the one cheapest at time of delivery average less than 0.30 percentage points of par.

The assumption that the market portfolio follows a specified diffusion process implies, in a simple equilibrium framework, that the representative individual must have a certain utility function which is identified in the paper. Not every diffusion process is viable, i.e., can be “endogenized” to be the market portfolio's price process in such an equilibrium model. The paper provides necessary and sufficient conditions for viability which imply that viable diffusion processes constitute a rather restricted family.

Some closed-end country funds trade at large premiums relative to their net asset values. This paper examines whether international investment restrictions raise country fund price-net asset value ratios by segmenting international capital markets. We test whether a relation exists between announcements of changes in investment restrictions and changes in these ratios using weekly data from May 1981 to January 1989. The results provide evidence that some foreign markets are at least partially segmented from the U.S. capital market.

I show in a model of competitive banks that the characteristics of loan contracts are affected by product market imperfections in the borrower's industry. A bank loan commitment increases the value of a borrower firm operating in an imperfectly competitive industry and thus dominates a simple loan even in the absence of risk sharing considerations and informational asymmetries between the borrower and the bank. While it is individually rational for a firm to obtain a loan commitment, all the firms in that industry taken together are made worse off by the existence of loan commitments.

This paper investigates the relationship between bank ownership structure and risk taking. It is hypothesized that stockholder controlled banks have incentives to take higher risk than managerially controlled banks and that these differences in risk become more pronounced in periods of deregulation. In support of this hypothesis, we show that stockholder controlled banks exhibit significantly higher risk taking behavior than managerially controlled banks during the 1979–1982 period of relative deregulation.

This paper provides a detailed examination of the cost imposed by thrift institutions resolved during the period 1980–1988. A simple model is presented to explain the cost of resolution. This model is tested empirically with a comprehensive data set that permits us to avoid some of the econometric problems present in earlier studies. The empirical evidence suggests that the model that explains resolution costs in the late 1980s is significantly different from the model for either the middle or early 1980s. This evidence is consistent with the changing nature of the thrift crisis and changes in the regulator's closure rule. Our econometric evidence, moreover, is consistent with the hypothesis that, for troubled institutions, tangible net worth systematically understates market‐value net worth. In addition, the importance of including time effects as well as institution effects as determinants of the cost of resolution is revealed.

This paper uses a sample of over 25,000 daily warrant prices to empirically investigate potential problems with the commonly used warrant pricing model proposed by Black and Scholes as an extension of their call option model. One problem seems to be especially important: the constant variance assumption of the dilution adjusted Black‐Scholes model appears to cause biases in model prices for almost all warrants and over the entire sample period. We show that more accurate price forecasts are obtained with a specific form of the constant elasticity of variance model.

We use predictions of aggregate stock return variances from daily data to estimate time-varying monthly variances for size-ranked portfolios. We propose and estimate a single factor model of heteroskedasticity for portfolio returns. This model implies time-varying betas. Implications of heteroskedasticity and time-varying betas for tests of the capital asset pricing model (CAPM) are then documented. Accounting for heteroskedasticity increases the evidence that risk-adjusted returns are related to firm size. We also estimate a constant correlation model. Portfolio volatilities predicted by this model are similar to those predicted by more complex multivariate generalized-autoregressive-conditional-heteroskedasticity (GARCH) procedures.

This paper re-examines the evidence on Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) in the long run. Previous studies have generally been unable to reject the hypothesis that the real exchange rate follows a random walk. If true, this implies that PPP does not hold. In contrast, this paper casts serious doubt on this random walk hypothesis. The results follow from more powerful estimation techniques, applied in a multilateral framework. Deviations from PPP, while substantial in the short run, appear to take about three years to be reduced in half.