Knowledge that Transforms

In this paper, a model of market reaction to stock splits is presented and tested. We argue that the announcement of a split sets off the following chain of events. The market recognizes that, subsequent to the (reverse) split ex-day, the daily number of transactions along with the raw volume of shares traded will increase (decrease). This increase in volume results in an increase in the noisiness of the security's return process. The increase in noise raises the tax-option value of the stock, and it is this value that generates the announcement effect of stock splits. Empirical evidence using security returns, daily trading volume, and shareholder data strongly supports this theory. The evidence, in conjunction with this theory, also agrees with extant literature that splits result in decreased liquidity, but there is no evidence that this reduction in liquidity is priced.

Evidence is presented that indicates that the standard estimator of the covariance matrix of daily returns provides a distorted view of the true covariance‐factor structure. An alternative estimator, based on a model of the price‐adjustment delay process, reveals roughly twice as much covariation in individual security returns. The number of factors identified also appears to increase when this estimator is employed. Since the linear space spanned by the estimated factor‐loading vectors is quite sensitive to the estimator used, it is important that the consistent estimator be considered in the usual two‐stage empirical investigations of the APT.

An efficient signalling equilibrium with dividends and investments or, equivalently, dividends and net new issues of stock is constructed, and its properties are identified. Because corporate insiders can exploit multiple signals, the efficient mix must minimize dissipative costs. In equilibrium, many firms both distribute dividends and deviate from first-best investment. Also, the impact of dividends on stock prices is positive. By contrast, the announcement effect of new stock is negative for firms with private information primarily about assets in place and positive for firms with inside information mainly about opportunities to invest.

This paper characterizes the conditions under which the adverse-selection problem, which may prevent a firm from issuing securities to finance an otherwise profitable investment, may be costlessly overcome by an appropriate choice of financing strategy. The conditions are specialized when the information asymmetry may be characterized by either a first-degree-stochastic-dominance or a mean-preserving-spread ordering across possible distributions of firm earnings. Possible financing strategies that resolve the information asymmetry are discussed, and the results are related to recent empirical findings concerning security issues.

In models where both investors and securities are subject to differential taxation, there may be no set of prices that rule out infinite gains to trade, or “tax arbitrage.” This paper characterizes the joint restrictions on financial‐asset returns and investors' tax schedules that preclude tax arbitrage in the absence of short‐sale constraints. The authors show that, if there exists any configuration of marginal tax rates on investors' tax schedules that rule out infinite gains to trade, then “no‐tax‐arbitrage” prices will exist. They also show that the existence of “no‐tax‐arbitrage” prices ensures the existence of equilibrium prices.

We examine the impact of capital income taxation, both accrual forms of taxation and taxation of realized capital gains, on total savings and the demand for corporate financial instruments. We find that investors may hold both debt and equity in the face of effective collection of capital gains taxation even in a flat tax system. We also find that the two taxes will have substantially different effects on saving and consumption behavior, making it unlikely that the tax structure can be summarized by any single equivalent accrual tax rate.

A costless, fully revealing signalling equilibrium is derived from two easily understandable conditions. The outsider‐rationality condition states that the outsiders relate the price that they offer to pay for a security inversely to the supply of this security, which they interpret as a quality signal. The no‐arbitrage condition requires that the marginal exchange rate for two securities be the same in both primary and secondary markets. These conditions restrict the firm's financing policy and have strong implications for the valuation of securities and of the total firm. A costless signalling equilibrium is obtained.