Knowledge that Transforms

Daily data from interdealer government bond brokers are examined for tax and liquidity effects. We use two approaches to create cash flow matching portfolios of similar securities and look for pricing discrepancies associated with liquidity or tax effects. We also look for the presence of tax and liquidity effects by including a liquidity term when fitting a cubic spline to the after-tax yield curve. We find evidence of tax timing options and liquidity effects. However, the effects are much smaller than previously reported and the effects of liquidity are primarily due to high volume bonds with long maturities.

We find that about 25 percent of our sample of 171 Japanese multinationals' stock returns experienced economically significant positive exposure effects for the period January 1979 to December 1993. The extent to which a firm is exposed to exchange-rate fluctuations can be explained by the level of its export ratio and by variables that are proxies for its hedging needs. Highly leveraged firms, or firms with low liquidity, tend to have smaller exposures. Foreign exposure is found to increase with firm size. We also find that keiretsu multinationals are more exposed to exchange-rate risk than nonkeiretsu firms.

Default, loss severity, and average loss rates for a large sample of privately placed bonds are presented and compared with loss experience for publicly issued bonds. The chance of very large portfolio losses is estimated and some determinants of such losses are analyzed. Results show ex ante riskier classes of private debt perform better on average than public debt. Both diversification and the riskiness of individual portfolio assets influence the bad tail of the portfolio loss distribution. Private placements are similar to corporate loans in that both are monitored private debt. The results are thus relevant to management and securitization of private debt portfolios generally.

This paper issues a warning that compounding daily returns of the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) equal-weighted index can lead to surprisingly large biases. The differences between the monthly returns compounded from the daily tapes and the monthly CRSP equal-weighted indices is almost 0.43 percent per month, or 6 percent per year. This difference amounts to one-third of the average monthly return, and is large enough to reverse the conclusions of a paper using the daily tape to compute the return on the benchmark portfolio. We also investigate the sources of these biases and suggest several alternative strategies to avoid them.

Unlike Dutch auction repurchases and tender offers, open-market repurchase programs do not precommit firms to acquire a specified number of shares. In a sample of 450 programs from 1981 to 1990, firms on average acquire 74 to 82 percent of the shares announced as repurchase targets within three years of the repurchase announcement. We find that share repurchases are negatively related to prior stock price performance, suggesting that firms increase their purchasing depending on its degree of perceived undervaluation. In addition, repurchases are positively related to levels of cash flow, which is consistent with liquidity arguments.

We investigate how differences in legal and financial systems affect firms' use of external financing to fund growth. We show that in countries whose legal systems score high on an efficiency index, a greater proportion of firms use long-term external financing. An active, though not necessarily large, stock market and a large banking sector are also associated with externally financed firm growth. The increased reliance on external financing occurs in part because established firms in countries with well-functioning institutions have lower profit rates. Government subsidies to industry do not increase the proportion of firms relying on external financing.

This paper investigates whether Chapter 11 bankruptcy provides a mechanism by which insolvent firms are efficiently reorganized and the assets of unproductive firms are effectively redeployed. We argue that incentives to reorganize depend on the level of demand and industry conditions. Using plant-level data, we find that Chapter 11 status is much less important than industry conditions in explaining the productivity, asset sales, and closure conditions of Chapter 11 bankrupt firms. This suggests that firms that elect to enter into Chapter 11 incur few real economic costs.

We find that the underperformance of IPO stocks relative to the market over a three-year holding period is less severe for IPOs handled by more prestigious underwriters. Consistent with prior studies, we also find that IPOs managed by more reputable underwriters are associated with less short-run underpricing. Among the various existing proxies for underwriter reputation, the Carter–Manaster measure is the most significant in the context of initial returns and also in the context of the three-year performance of IPOs. The study also provides an updated list of the Carter–Manaster measure for various underwriters.

This paper uses commercial aircraft transactions to determine whether capital constraints cause firms to liquidate assets at discounts to fundamental values. Results indicate that financially constrained airlines receive lower prices than their unconstrained rivals when selling used narrow-body aircraft. Capital constrained airlines are also more likely to sell used aircraft to industry outsiders, especially during market downturns. Further evidence that capital constraints affect liquidation prices is provided by airlines' asset acquisition activity. Unconstrained airlines significantly increase buying activity when aircraft prices are depressed; this pattern is not observed for financially constrained airlines.

The aggregate dividend payout ratio forecasts excess returns on both stocks and corporate bonds in postwar U.S. data. High dividends forecast high returns. High earnings forecast low returns. The correlation of earnings with business conditions gives them predictive power for returns; they contain information about future returns that is not captured by other variables. Dividends and earnings contribute substantial explanatory power at short horizons. For forecasting long-horizon returns, however, only (scaled) stock prices matter. Forecasts of low long-horizon stock returns in the mid-1990s are caused not by earnings or dividends, but by high stock prices.