Knowledge that Transforms

George Tauchen, An Investigation of Transactions Data for NYSE Stocks: Discussion, The Journal of Finance, Vol. 40, No. 3, Papers and Proceedings of the Forty-Third Annual Meeting American Finance Association, Dallas, Texas, December 28-30, 1984 (Jul., 1985), pp. 739-741

In this paper, we derive a model of the individual banking firm facing stochastic inflation. The bank is considered as a depository financial intermediary operating in the primary market as a multiproduct price discriminating firm. A secondary market is also considered where liquidity surpluses and deficits are traded. Two types of assets and liabilities are assumed: deposits and loans linked to a general price level and nonlinked instruments. Effects of changes in the parameters such as inflation rate and variability, reserve requirements are analyzed.

The purpose of this note is to examine, theoretically, why the market risk premium (R^_ g\ raa y influence tests of asset pricing models with higher moments. When moments of higher order than the variance are added to a pricing model developed within the usual two-fund separation assump- tions, the market risk premium enters the pricing equation in a nonlinear fashion and is implicit in the estimation of each moment's coefficient.

George M. Constantinides, The Disposition to Sell Winners Too Early and Ride Losers Too Long: Theory and Evidence: Discussion, The Journal of Finance, Vol. 40, No. 3, Papers and Proceedings of the Forty-Third Annual Meeting American Finance Association, Dallas, Texas, December 28-30, 1984 (Jul., 1985), pp. 791-792

This paper tests the tax explanation of the January effect by examining small firm stock returns before the War Revenue Act of 1917. No evidence of a turn-of-the-year effect is found. This paper also extends previous authors' work on the subject to 1918–29. A January effect is found during that period.

The agency relationship of corporate insiders and bondholders is modeled as a dynamic game with asymmetric information. The incentive effect of risky debt on the investment policy of a levered firm is studied in this context. In a sequential equilibrium of the model, a concept of reputation arises endogenously resulting in a partial resolution of the classic agency problem of underinvestment. The incentive of the firm to underinvest is curtailed by anticipation of favorable rating of its bonds by the market. This anticipated pricing of debt is consistent with rational expectations pricing by a competitive bond market and is realized in equilibrium. Some empirical implications of the model for bond rating, debt covenants, and bond price response to investment announcements are explored.

In this study a real price index is created for whole life insurance sold in the United States from 1953 to 1979. New purchases of whole life insurance are shown to be negatively related to changes in this cost index, contrary to what has been widely accepted in the insurance literature, but consistent with economic theory. The existence of strong price elasticity of demand for whole life insurance does not ensure, however, that the insurance industry manifests a high degree of price competition.