Knowledge that Transforms

We test the conditional CAPM for the world's eight largest equity markets using a parsimonious GARCH parameterization. Our methodology can be applied simultaneously to many assets and, at the same time, accommodate general dynamics of the conditional moments. The evidence supports most of the pricing restrictions of the model, but some of the variation in risk-adjusted excess returns remains predictable during periods of high interest rates. Our estimates indicate that, although severe market declines are contagious, the expected gains from international diversification for a U.S. investor average 2.11% per year and have not significantly declined over the last two decades.

Recent studies have documented that firms conducting seasoned equity offerings have inordinately low stock returns during the five years after the offering, following a sharp run-up in the year prior to the offering. This article documents that the operating performance of issuing firms shows substantial improvement prior to the offering, but then deteriorates. The multiples at the time of the offering, however, do not reflect an expectation of deteriorating performance. Issuing firms are disproportionately high-growth firms, but issuers have much lower subsequent stock returns than nonissuers with the same growth rate.

This article examines possible explanations for “winner‐loser reversals” in the national stock market indices of 16 countries. There is no evidence that loser countries are riskier than winner countries either in terms of standard deviations, covariance with the world market or other risk factors, or performance in adverse economic states of the world. While there is evidence that small markets are subject to larger reversals than large markets, perhaps due to some form of market imperfection, the reversals are not only a small‐market phenomenon. The apparent anomaly of winner‐loser reversals in national market indices therefore remains unresolved.

We provide evidence on the agency cost explanation for corporate diversification. We find that the level of diversification is negatively related to managerial equity ownership and to the equity ownership of outside blockholders. In addition, we report that decreases in diversification are associated with external corporate control threats, financial distress, and management turnover. These findings suggest that agency problems are responsible for firms maintaining value-reducing diversification strategies and that the recent trend toward increased corporate focus is attributable to market disciplinary forces.

The 3e of this well-respected textbook continues the tradition of providing clear and concise explanations for fixed income securities, pricing, and markets. The book matches well with fixed income securities courses. The book's organization emphasizes institutions in the first part, analytics in the second, selected segments of fixed income markets in the third, and fixed income derivatives in the fourth. This enables instructors to customize the material to suit their course structure and the mathematical ability of their students. In this title, new material on Credit Default Swaps, Collateralized Debt Obligations, and an integrated discussion of the Credit Crisis have been added. Online Resources for instructors on password protected website provides worked out examples for each chapter. A detailed description of all key financial terms is provided in a glossary at the back of the book.

In this article we develop alternative ways to compare asset pricing models when it is understood that their implied stochastic discount factors do not price all portfolios correctly. Unlike comparisons based on χ 2 statistics associated with null hypotheses that models are correct, our measures of model performance do not reward variability of discount factor proxies. One of our measures is designed to exploit fully the implications of arbitrage-free pricing of derivative claims. We demonstrate empirically the usefulness of our methods in assessing some alternative stochastic factor models that have been proposed in asset pricing literature.

This article evaluates the tax‐loss‐selling hypothesis against the window‐dressing hypothesis as explanations for turn‐of‐the‐year anomalies. We examine differences between securities dominated by individual investors versus those dominated by institutional investors and find that the effect is more pervasive in the former. Controlling for capitalization, we find that in early January (late December), stocks with greater individual investor interest outperform (underperform) stocks with greater institutional investor interest. These results hold for both stocks that previously appreciated in value and stocks that previously depreciated in value. The results are most consistent with the tax‐loss‐selling hypothesis as an explanation for the turn‐of‐the‐year effect.

This article examines the hypothesis that the superior return to so-called value stocks is the result of expectational errors made by investors. The authors study stock price reactions around earnings announcements for value and glamour stocks over a five-year period after portfolio formation. The announcement returns suggest that a significant portion of the return difference between value and glamour stocks is attributable to earnings surprises that are systematically more positive for value stocks. The evidence is inconsistent with a risk-based explanation for the return differential. Coauthors are Josef Lakonishok, Andrei Shleifer, and Robert Vishny.

This article examines the relation between top executives' trading and the long‐run stock returns of seasoned equity issuing firms. Primary issuers, who sell mostly newly‐issued primary shares, significantly underperform their benchmarks, regardless of the top executives' prior trading pattern. However, top executives' trading is reliably associated with the stock returns of secondary issuers, who sell mostly secondary shares previously held by existing shareholders. On average, secondary issuers do not underperform their benchmarks. The results suggest that increased free cash flow problems after issue play an important role in explaining the underperformance of issuing firms.

This article examines the role of corporate headquarters in allocating scarce resources to competing projects in an internal capital market. Unlike a bank, headquarters has control rights that enable it to engage in “winner-picking”—the practice of actively shifting funds from one project to another. By doing a good job in the winner-picking dimension, headquarters can create value even when it cannot help at all to relax overall firm-wide credit constraints. The model implies that internal capital markets may sometimes function more efficiently when headquarters oversees a small and focused set of projects.