Knowledge that Transforms

This paper examines optimal corporate financing arrangements under asymmetric information for different patterns of temporal resolution of uncertainty in the underlying technology. An agency problem, a signalling problem and an agency‐signalling problem arise as special cases. The associated informational equilibria and the optimal financing arrangements are characterized and compared. In the agency‐signalling equilibrium the private information of corporate insiders at the time of financing is signalled through capital structure choices which deviate optimally from agency‐cost minimizing financing arrangements, which in turn induce risk‐shifting incentives in the investment policy. In the pure signalling case the equilibrium is characterized by direct contractual precommitments to implement investment policies which are riskier than pareto‐optimal levels. Empirical implications for debt covenants and the announcement effect of investment policies and leverage increasing transactions on existing stock and bond prices are explicitly derived.

We report evidence of seasonality in the Fama and MacBeth estimate of the CAPM‐based risk premium in four stock exchanges: the NYSE and the London, Paris, and Brussels exchanges. Specifically, we found that, in Belgium and France, risk premia are positive in January and negative the rest of the year. There is no January seasonal in the U.K. risk premium. Instead, we observed in this country a positive April seasonal and a negative average risk premium over the rest of the year. In the U.S., the pattern of risk‐premium seasonality coincides with the pattern of stock‐return seasonality. Both are positive and significant only in January. We also found that the January risk premium in the U.S. is significantly larger than those observed in the European markets. Interestingly, the reported patterns of risk‐premium seasonality in European equity markets do not fully coincide with the observed patterns of stock‐return seasonality in these markets. For example, in the U.K., average stock returns are significant and positive in January and April, whereas the market risk premium is significantly positive only in April. A possible interpretation of this phenomenon is presented in the paper.

We show that growth opportunities which cannot be converted to cash under conditions of financial distress are a critical determinant of an intermediary's choice of risk. Financial institutions in which is a low proportion of total assets will be much more likely to engage in go‐for‐broke behavior. The model leads to a reevaluation of the effectiveness of several traditional remedies for dealing with banks that take excessive risks such as raising insurance premiums, intervening before capital is depleted, and restricting investment options. The model also has implications about a new approach to the examination of financial intermediaries.

Prior studies indicate that common stocks tend to earn negative returns immediately following listing on the NYSE. The authors document the phenomenon in detail and investigate a number of possible explanations. No full explanation is discovered, although several are ruled out.