Knowledge that Transforms

This paper presents our investigation of the factors that determine secondary market prices of developing country syndicated loans. Trading volume in this market has almost doubled yearly from 1985 to 1988 while average market prices declined from 73% to 41% of par value during the same period. We find that loan values depend on a country's solvency rather than its liquidity and show that a country's adoption of a debt conversion program significantly decreases its loans' market prices. Furthermore, the debt moratoria by Brazil and Peru, as well as the developing‐country‐specific provisions made by U.S. banks, impact loan prices negatively.

Our study uses a multinomial logit model to analyze the concurrent termination experience of adjustable‐rate and fixed‐rate mortgages. A new set of ARM‐specific interactive determinants expands the conventional FRM specification to isolate the unique termination behavior of ARMs. We find that expected rate adjustments and large lifetime caps are positively related to ARM termination probabilities while long adjustment frequencies are inversely related. Caps, both periodic and lifetime, have a secondary, inverse effect on termination probabilities when interest‐rate movements exceed cap limits. The model also shows that interest‐rate expectations affect FRM terminations more strongly than ARM terminations.

For homothetic time and state separable preferences, the coefficient of relative risk aversion (CRRA) is equal to the reciprocal of the elasticity of intertemporal substitution (EIS). This paper shows that, when the growth rate of consumption is i.i.d., asset pricing models based upon preferences in which the CRRA and the EIS are no longer linked do not have more explanatory power. Further, in these stochastic environments, estimates of the CRRA in the standard preferences are measures of the true CRRA and not the EIS. These results are fairly accurate descriptions of economies calibrated using United States annual data.

New legislation and traditional FDIC insolvency‐resolution procedures transform and intensify the principal‐agent problems most responsible for the FSLIC mess. These problems explain counterproductive constraints on the governance and operating policies of the agency responsible for rescuing and salvaging assets in insolvent thrifts: the RTC. The constraints slow insolvency resolution, increase interim financing costs, and undermine RTC recovery of asset value. Operationalizing its task as preserving evanescent and economically misconceived “franchise values,” the RTC allows insolvents to seek financing on an unconsolidated basis, initiates bidding for one institution at a time, holds back seriously troubled assets, and recruits an overly narrow range of bidders.

We assume a world like the one that gives the capital asset pricing model, but with many goods and many countries. We assume that investors in a given country have homothetic utility functions with the same weights, and a currency that has a sure end‐of‐period value using a price index with those weights. Siegel's paradox (derived from Jensen's inequality) makes investors want a positive amount of exchange risk. When average risk tolerance is the same across countries, every investor will hold the same mix of market risk (through the world market portfolio of all assets) and exchange risk (in a diversified basket of foreign currencies). In fact, the ratio of exchange risk to market risk is equal to the average investor's risk tolerance. We can write the ratio of exchange risk to market risk (and the fraction of the market's exchange risk that investors hedge) as depending on an average of world market risk premia, an average of world market volatilities, and an average of exchange rate volatilities. The weights in these averages are the same as the weights of the different countries in the currency basket. Given these averages, the ratio (and the fraction hedged) will not depend directly on exchange rate means or covariances. In equilibrium, we can use the ratio of exchange risk to market risk to measure average risk tolerance: in this model, risk tolerance is observable.

This paper evaluates the effects of events leading to the passage of the Garn‐St. Germain Depository Institutions Act of 1982. The evidence suggests that the call for reform by President Reagan's Housing Commission and the Senate passage of the bill produced positive abnormal returns to stockholders of large savings and loans and commercial banks. Stockholders of small S&Ls and banks, on the other hand, generally experienced negative abnormal returns. Furthermore, when hopes of passage of the Act faded, significant negative (positive) abnormal returns were experienced by stockholders of large (small) S&Ls and banks.

This paper investigates the effects of seniority rules and restrictive dividend convenants on the over‐ and under‐investment incentives associated with risky debt. We show that increasing seniority of new debt decreases the incidence of under‐investment but increases over‐investment, and vice versa. Under symmetric information, the optimal seniority rule is to give new debtholders first claim on a new project without recourse to existing assets (i.e., project financing). Under asymmetric information, the optimal debt contract requires equating the expected return to new debtholders in the default state to the new project's cash flow in the same rate. If this is not possible, the optimal seniority rule calls for strict subordination of new debt if the expected cash flow in default is small and full seniority if it is large. With regard to dividend convenants, we show that their effect depends on whether or not dividend payments are conditioned on future investments. When they are unconditioned, allowing more dividends increases the under‐investment incentive. In contrast, conditional dividends decrease the underinvestment incentive and increase the over‐investment incentive.

This paper presents an information-theoretic, infinite horizon model of the equity issue decision. The model predicts that (a) equity issues on average are preceded by an abnormal positive return on the stock, although for some firms the issue is preceded by a loss; (b) equity issues on average are preceded by an abnormal rise in the market; and (c) the stock price drops at the announcement of an issue. The model provides a measure of the welfare cost of asymmetric information; the welfare loss may be small even if the price drop at issue announcement is large.