Knowledge that Transforms

Mark J. Flannery, Credit Unions: Theory, Empirical Evidence and Public Regulation: Discussion, The Journal of Finance, Vol. 36, No. 2, Papers and Proceedings of the Thirty Ninth Annual Meeting American Finance Association, Denver, September 5-7, 1980 (May, 1981), pp. 554-556

Robert A. Taggart, Jr., Rate-of-Return Regulation and Utility Capital Structure Decision, The Journal of Finance, Vol. 36, No. 2, Papers and Proceedings of the Thirty Ninth Annual Meeting American Finance Association, Denver, September 5-7, 1980 (May, 1981), pp. 383-393

A growing number of large U.S. banks have used artificial Eurodollar transactions in connection with the heavier weighting of Fridays in the calculation of required reserves to significantly reduce the impact on them of that requirement. This reserve avoidance behavior bestows an unintended and inequitable benefit on those banks engaging in it, unnecessarily increases risks from credit exposures and potentially distorts money stock measures. The incentive for this activity and hence its practice can best be removed by paying interest on required reserves or weighting Fridays equally with all other business days in the reserve requirement calculations.

This study measures the impact of the Federal credit union usury ceiling on consumer credit availability and loan rates. When binding, the ceiling keeps loan rates low, but it reduces credit union lending. There is also evidence that a binding loan rate ceiling affects the competitiveness of credit unions in the market for deposits. Although the Federal Credit Union Act specifically mandates federally chartered credit unions to be a source of low cost consumer credit and to promote thriftiness, it is not at all clear that the intent of the Act is served by a binding usury ceiling.